Further to last week's post on American military bases in Africa, Foreign Policy's William Moseley argues for a halt to the militarization of humanitarian aid across Africa. While Moseley is focused primarily on Mali, where he has been engaged in development work for some 20+ odd years, his line of reasoning may well be applied elsewhere in the continent:
In the West African country of Mali [...] there has been low-grade al Qaeda activity occurring in the northern frontier over the past few years. The marginal desert region between Mali and its neighbors is appealing real estate for would-be terrorists because it is difficult to control and monitor. It provides space for camps and opportunities for terrorist cells to tax cross-border trade and occasionally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. The U.S. government provides assistance to Mali's military to manage and contain the few, mostly foreign, al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country.
But now the U.S. military is getting involved in development work across Mali and in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa -- as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan -- despite the de minimis al Qaeda threat. Now, military personnel repair schools, wells, health centers, roads, and bridges. Army doctors provide basic treatment and vaccinations. In fiscal year 2008, the Defense Department gave the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Mali $9.5 million to run a counterterrorism program, with close coordination between the two. The program provides curriculum advice to Koranic schools and job training for young men (who are seen as highly susceptible to Islamist rhetoric). USAID has also built 14 community radio stations that broadcast programming on peace and tolerance.
But this reframing of aid to Mali within the fight against terrorism could prove counterproductive. The Pentagon has taken its conceptualization of the fight against al Qaeda in war zones and applied it broadly in a peaceful country. In the past, U.S. involvement in West African countries like Mali has focused intently on humanitarian assistance, not a geopolitical agenda.
Indeed, once you increase military involvement in development work to such an extent, such work comes to be viewed by locals as part of a broader military campaign. And while this is quite justified in conflict situations - as are Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance - it may indeed prove counterproductive in an altogether peaceful country, like Mali. While I have absolutely no problem with the U.S. military - or any other foreign military, for that matter - assisting the Malian army in managing the terrorist threat (even running a counterterrorism program if it feels so inclined and such a program is deemed to be of value), I do agree that military involvement in aspects of humanitarian aid in which other agencies are already active, and in many cases better suited, may elevate tensions rather than effectively assisting communities in their needs. This is not to suggest that all military-operated foreign assistance programs be dismantled, but rather that other existing alternatives exhausted before such a path is pursued. And with so many other alternatives, such a path should very rarely be embarked upon.