IMF releases Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Head-scratching ensues.

The IMF has recently released it Regional Economic Outlook (2010-2011) for Sub-Saharan Africa, the link to which may be found here (pdf file). What I find especially curious is the report's suggestion that Africa's national elections have little to no bearing on economic activity in the states in which they transpire. A rather erroneous wedge between politics and economics, I would be inclined to argue.

If one does follow the IMF's claim to its logical conclusion, however, the good news is that the 17 elections* scheduled to take place across the continent over the course of the coming year will have absolutely no impact on neither growth nor general investment prospects in any of these states.

What do we think?

* Countries where major elections in 2011 are planned or have been mooted include Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Cruel Ethiopia

As an avid reader of the New York Review of Books and, equally, having a distinct interest in African politics, I was quite thrilled to read Helen Epstein's piece in the NYRB, "Cruel Ethiopia." In the piece, Epstein addresses the pitfalls of foreign aid as they are manifest in Ethiopia in particular and - I would argue - in Africa, generally:

The Western Renaissance helped to democratize “the word” so that all of us could speak of our own individual struggles, and this added new meaning and urgency to the alleviation of the suffering of others. The problem with foreign aid in Ethiopia is that both the Ethiopian government and its donors see the people of this country not as individuals with distinct needs, talents, and rights but as an undifferentiated mass, to be mobilized, decentralized, vaccinated, given primary education and pit latrines, and freed from the legacy of feudalism, imperialism, and backwardness. It is this rigid focus on the “backward masses,” rather than the unique human person, that typically justifies appalling cruelty in the name of social progress.

Epstien's piece does an apt job highlighting not only the herd mentality which continues to typify foreign assistance strategies, but further emphasizes a point which many fail to, or are otherwise unwilling to, appreciate: more often than not, the domestic policies maintained by the governments of recipient states are the culprits of poverty and oppression, and stand to be exacerbated by inflows of aid money. Ethiopia is, for instance, rapidly becoming among the most repressive and dictatorial countries on the continent, and yet simultaneously remains the subject of an informal experiment to discover whether the "big push" approach to African development will (finally) succeed.

The trouble with aid is precisely this "big push" approach. Programs must become increasingly tailored to the particular contexts for which they are intended, and targeted to achieve very specific aims. The Gates Foundation is seemingly growing cognizant of this fact as it is revamping its 'war on polio' campaign, moving away from its hitherto pursued strategy of vertical health programs towards investments in health systems. For any foreign assistance strategy to fulfill its intended function, an enabling framework must indeed be in place, be it a viable health system or a healthy government. Of course this is a tired argument, having been repeated ad nauseam within the development literature. Nevertheless, Epstein's piece does a wonderful job of highlighting this reality in the context of a country often left out of the development discourse.

Get real, Bob

I have in recent days been preparing myself for the St. Andrew's Economic Forum, which is to take place this weekend - volcanic ash cloud permitting. I've been invited to moderate an exceptional panel on China-Africa relations, which will explore the developmental potential China brings to the continent, as well as other key issues pertaining to environmental sustainability, human rights, trends in Chinese investment and so forth.

In the course of my preparations, I happened to stumble upon a great piece by Richard Dowden - Director of the Royal African Society and one of the panelists - regarding the discovery this past March that millions of dollars in Western aid money which were sent to Ethiopia to aid victims of the 1984-5 famine were used not for purposes of food supplies, but rather to purchase weapons. This news of course set off bells and whistles among the donor community and do-gooder, pseudo-intellectual, save-the-planet types like Bono and - most prominently - 80s rock star Bob Geldof, whose 1985 Live Aid concert was used to fundraise for the cause. Geldof went on something of a rampage against the BBC - who first revealed the news - stating (shouting, in fact!): "Produce me one shred of evidence and I promise you I will professionally investigate it, I will professionally report it, and if there is any money missing I will sue the Ethiopian government for that money back and I will spend it on aid." Yes, good. Good luck with that.

Whilst Geldof's anger may be understandable, it altogether demonstrates a fantastic ignorance of Africa: its issues, needs and complexities. An ignorance which, unfortunately, persists today among celebrities and aid agencies who have placed themselves on a do-or-die mission to "save Africa." With respect to the Ethiopian case, Dowden hits the nail on the head:

The impression was made that nature had caused the great hunger, a terrible Biblical plague, an act of God. All the poor Ethiopians needed was food.

They did need food but they also needed peace. Rebel movements were driving the government and its army out of two mountainous region, Tigray and Eritrea. The government, headed by the military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba and had the biggest army in Africa.

Mengistu ruled with brutal Soviet-style policies of forced migration and starvation. Traditional trade routes and the movement of much-needed food was impossible. The well-organised rebels received almost no help from anyone. They lived off the land, captured weapons from their enemy and taxed the people to buy more guns and ammunition.

Ethiopia's famine, Dowden goes on to aptly note, was ultimately caused not by a localised drought, but by a dictatorship that led to war. War disrupted trade, prevented food being moved in and caused famine. The aid community at the time failed to realize this - or perhaps chose not to. Raising funds for weaponry to support a rebel movement is arguably more difficult and less glamorous than fundraising to feed starving African children, whose pictures flash across TV screens and appear in glossy magazines. Yet the reality of aid politics in Africa is complex, messy and - often - unpleasant. The aid community must finally and fully come around to this realization and, moreover, must cease treating the continent as a helpless child in need of rescue. As the Ethiopian case makes plainly evident, Ethiopia in the 1980s understood what it needed - weapons. Africa today likewise understands what it needs - trade, aid, investment; the rise of a middle class and an educated, skilled population.

It's time to change the nature of the questions we've been posing regarding African development, and get real. And Bob, stop your shouting.

On the Chinese presence in Zambia

A recent paper of mine, "From formal- to informal-sector employment: examining the Chinese presence in Zambia," has been published in the Review of African Political Economy. The paper in full can be found here (PDF; subscription may be required), and the abstract noted here below:

This paper analyses China's recent engagement with Zambia, examining especially Chinese hiring practices, methods of business organisation and the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated construction and mining firms. Moving beyond existing analyses which remain focused solely on Chinese trade, aid and investment, this study begins to explore the micro-level of Chinese ventures, arguing that the continued employment of co-nationals as well as the generally substandard labour conditions maintained by Chinese firms lead to the offloading of Zambian workers into the country's burgeoning informal economy. There, newly emerged Chinese businesses stand to threaten local entrepreneurs who lack the resources necessary to parry Chinese competition. The result is a rapidly growing national unemployment rate and an increasing number of Zambians left struggling to sustain their livelihoods. This paper further argues that the characteristics defining China's engagement with Zambia are not particular to the Zambian context alone, but are rather abiding characteristics of overseas Chinese businesses in general. The paper ultimately calls for a policy framework regulating Chinese business activities in Zambia, lest the negative consequences of the Sino-Zambian partnership prevail.

Keywords: Chinese entrepreneurs; labour relations; Zambia; mining; informal economy; economic development

While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).

Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

• The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
• Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
• Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
• In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
• A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
• An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
• The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
• A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
• On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

Learning Chinese in Liberia

Surely a sign of the times: Chinese officials operating in Liberia are offering free Chinese language lessons to young Liberians - and anyone keen to learn the language more generally:

As in much of Africa, China is heavily engaged in post-war Liberia, rebuilding roads with funding from the World Bank, managing hotels and restaurants, trading in medicines and other businesses.

Chinese mineral firm China Union became the largest investor in Liberia when it signed a $2.6bn deal to go into iron-ore mining earlier this year. There is even a Chinese-language radio station broadcasting across the country for the increasing number of migrant workers and expatriates.

The growing trade ties explain why the Chinese embassy and the Ministry of Youth and Sports have decided to put on free two-hour classes in the afternoon, five days a week.

While some may tout such lessons as an exercise in colonialism (an argument which many Liberians are likely to put forward themselves), such skills training may in fact be the harbinger of increased opportunity for the country's citizens, allowing them not only greater mobility in terms of movement to China, but also enabling them to eventually communicate with the Chinese thereby engaging in more meaningful business negotiations. Perhaps I'm feeling exceptionally optimistic this morning, or perhaps the Chinese are actually (finally?) working towards making their "mutually beneficial" partnership with Liberia precisely just that.

Noteworthy...

• CNOOC wants a stake in Ghana's oil field. So does Exxon Mobil. A showdown in the making...
• Anti-Chinese sentiment appears to be escalating in the DRC. The Chinese firm Sinohydro suffered an attack earlier this month by unidentified gunmen. This is unfortunately one among a growing number of such instances in the DRC
• "Conservative Egyptian lawmakers have called for a ban on imports of a Chinese-made kit meant to help women fake their virginity and one scholar has even called for the 'exile' of anyone who imports of uses it." And here you thought China was engaged in resource extraction alone...
• Yet another reason why I'm skeptical that China will ever do anything about North Korea. *Sigh*
• Last week the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released its annual index of governance in Africa. You can find the rankings here, and several of Elizabeth Dickinson's reflections here
• China is in a push for Guinea's resources - minerals and [the hope of] oil. Guinea is one of the poorest states in West Africa, with a seriously dubious human rights and governance record.
• The Gates Foundation is exploring securitizing aid. Securitization seems to be a dirty word these days, but Gates may be onto something...

Noteworthy...

Hello (!), and thanks very much for being so patient while I transitioned back to an Oxonian existence. I'm nearly all settled and on something resembling a routine, which is quite exciting. Research productivity is still a matter to be tackled, but I'm getting there... slowly, slowly.

News while I was away? - Lots, really! Below is a little collection of stories which caught my attention when I finally sat down to catch-up on the world's goings-on. These are but several among many, to be sure:

• Owen Barder on when innovative finance is good for development - and when it isn't
• Despite China's rapid economic rebound in recent months, many Chinese companies are still operating at a lower level of activity than they had achieved in the boom years
• American chicken feet may be the US's saving grace in its recent (and ongoing) trade war with China
• Nestle is in a bit of a bind as it has been discovered that the company purchases milk from a Zimbabwean farm seized from its white owners and now owned by Mugabe's wife. Now that's a "whoops" moment if I ever saw one...
• The 24 September edition of the Economist had a wonderful special report on the positive potential of mobile money in Africa
• Writing in the European Voice, Jonathan Holslag and Gustaaf Geeraerts argue that Europe should expect to see a more assertive China in the coming years
• A rather biting review of Paul Collier's book, Wars, Guns & Votes written by Dr. Mutuma Ruteere, Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. The review is written from an anti-imperialist, anti-interventionist tone; certainly worth your time

Noteworthy...

• Observing the evolution of the theory of evolution
• Via Marginal Revolution, a video on wine and cereal pairings. I can't quite decide whether to be intrigued or absolutely mortified, or whether to simply laugh it off given that all food and wine pairings are allegedly a scam, anyway
• Sub-Saharan African states are falling behind other regions in terms of competitiveness. While there have been some improvements in the past year (with Uganda registering as most improved), sub-Saharan states as a whole have slipped down the global rankings since they were first listed in 2000
• Freakanomics has a great piece on African entrepreneurship, which highlights the creative ingenuity present across the continent
• Bilateral relations between China and Cuba are at their best time in history, according to Chinese top legislator Wu Bangguo. Oh, and the U.N. has declared Castro a "World Hero of Solidarity." Makes you stop and think, doesn' it?
• Think your DSL is faster than a pigeon? Think again
• On this September 11, 2009 please take a moment to remember all those who sacrificed their lives eight years ago today. We will never forget

Trafficking in African stereotypes

I generally refrain from criticizing NYTimes coverage of African news, though for some inexplicable reason I now find myself unable to resist commentary. I suppose one can only read so many stereotyped and misinformed "news" stories before it becomes too much to bear. Texas in Africa, G. Pascal Zachary and the ladies at Wronging Rights, among others, have all been quick to stress the problems with NYTimes reporting on previous occasions (see here, here and here for instance), and if I may, I'd quite like to add my voice to theirs.

The story that has finally broken my silence is one written by Jeffrey Gettleman on the drought currently plaguing Kenya. Gettleman writes:

A devastating drought is sweeping across Kenya, killing livestock, crops and children. It is stirring up tensions in the ramshackle slums where the water taps have run dry, and spawning ethnic conflict in the hinterland as pastoralist communities fight over the last remaining pieces of fertile grazing land.

The twin hearts of Kenya’s economy, agriculture and tourism, are especially imperiled. The fabled game animals that safari-goers fly thousands of miles to see are keeling over from hunger and the picturesque savannah is now littered with an unusually large number of sun-bleached bones.

I don't at all question the severity of the drought, or the fact that it is indubitably a cause of great concern for Kenyans dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. As Gettleman notes, the drought is also increasing conflict in some parts of the country, with farmers struggling for access to arable land. Such conflict, however, is not "ethnic," but rather an instance of basic survival, devoid of any ethnic undertones. Where ethnicity does factor, I would venture to guess that it is of secondary, rather than primary, concern.

Aside from this point, what I find most troublesome about Gettleman's piece is his suggestion that the Kenyan economy will somehow crumble - or is crumbling - as a consequence of the drought. While the Kenyan economy is certainly still highly dependent on its agricultural exports and land more generally, there is certainly more to it than what Gettleman seems to be suggesting. The unknowing reader comes away from Gettleman's piece with an image of a completely impoverished, desert-like country on the brink of disaster - a stereotype of a "typical" African country, if such a thing exists (it doesn't). While Kenya surely does have its problems, Gettleman's imagery is highly misguiding. Technology in Kenya is expanding at a rapid pace, heralding much opportunity for development. Emphasis is also being placed on the country's private sector as an engine for growth, as well as small-scale (often creative) manufacturing. One doesn't get any of this from Gettleman's piece; quite the opposite, really.

Perhaps I'm being too harsh. Gettleman's likely objective is to call attention to a problem which is continuing to cause serious trouble for the East African country. Doing so, however, shouldn't entail a complete distortion of the country in question. This benefits no one and is, moreover, poor journalism. Can we work on this, please?

* Image: NYTimes. Incidentally also the image accompanying Gettleman's piece.

On China's burgeoning relationship with Francophone Africa and oil-for-infrastructure contracts

The July issue of The China Monitor - a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch - is focused exclusively on the relationship between China and Francophone Africa. I find the focus most interesting, as it seems to suggest that the colonial history of African nations in some way affects the nature of China's engagement with them. Is China's engagement with Francophone Africa different, then, from its engagement with English Africa? Or Portuguese Africa? I admittedly hadn't given such a possibility much previous thought, but it is a hypothesis worth exploring.

Page 7 of this issue also features a piece by a colleague of mine, Dunia P. Zongwe, in which he interestingly writes on China's ore-for-infrastructure contracts, and the economic complementarities between China and Africa. The crux of Dunia's argument suggests that:

[...] the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China and resource-rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I [resource for infrastructure] form.

In their essence, R4I contracts mirror contrat d'echange (exchange contracts), which do not involve any direct transfer of money to host governments, thereby reducing the risk that governments will mishandle investments. According to Dunia, such contracts carry further positive distributive outcomes, as African countries are able to retain and spread more widely the benefits of FDI than under traditional investment contracts. Such positive externalities are visible in Angola, which was recently lauded for its effectiveness in managing Chinese investment.

The Angolan case indeed seems to suggest that R4I contracts may be a valuable tool by which to optimize China's FDI in Africa if managed accordingly. The case further does well to bring African governance back into the equation; ultimately it is up to African governments to devise appropriate investment policies which optimize Chinese FDI and assist in developing the state and economy. The Chinese are making their moves, and African leaders must make theirs.

Noteworthy...

Dear Readers: I will be on the road much of this week, so I'm afraid my blogging will be limited to... well, to be perfectly honest, I doubt I will be blogging at all! I'll be back next week with more news, analysis, and quips about this crazy field of international relations. Until then, today's Noteworthy reads:

Taking Africa beyond Aid. Yet another review of Moyo's book, Dead Aid, and a loud call for the development of African financial markets. As interesting as the piece itself are the comments, which inevitably turn to discussion of the Chinese presence on the continent

How can struggling countries break out of poverty if they're trapped in systems of bad rules? Paul Romer suggests "charter cities" as a possible solution

Something stinks. Must be Scotland's deal with Libya...

Osei Kofi on Africa's lagging contemporary art scene (and what to do about it)

Hugo Restall has an interesting piece in today's WSJ on the threesome that is Latin America (any country will do, really), the U.S. and China. While I tend to disagree with much of his analysis, it is an interesting argument nevertheless

For those among you who believed that China's alleged withdrawal from the deal with the Congo signaled China's retreat from the continent.... I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so: China was never intending to withdraw, it was merely revising its strategy

Have a great week everyone!

Why has China grown faster than India? And what (if anything) does this mean for Africa?

Chris Blattman and Bill Easterly address the issue. See here, here and here for a great discussion.

While I find myself nodding in agreement with much of what both experts have to say, I hesitate slightly when discussion turns to a near-comparison between growth in China and Africa. While neither scholar seems to be suggesting that China's path to growth can inform a similar phenomenon in Africa - or otherwise delving into very nuanced discussion of the similarities and differences between the process in both regions - I nevertheless feel inclined to caution against any such analogies. There are, of course, lessons which various African countries can learn from China - particularly as regards agricultural policies - but there are many constraints which hinder a direct, general analysis.

Martin Ravallion of the World Bank's Development Research Group has compiled a brilliant presentation highlighting precisely these constraints. Foremost among them:

• Africa's higher levels of income inequality. At the time of China's economic reform, inequality was lower in China (a Gini index well under 30%) than found in all but a couple countries in sub-Saharan Africa today
• The continent's high dependency rates
• Africa's low population density, which impacts on matters such as technological innovation and the cost of supplying certain forms of basic infrastructure
• Africa's weaker state institutions (Blattman's point about differing political climes, etc.)

Of course drawing any comparisons between China and Africa is also somewhat ridiculous, as we're dealing with one country and an entire continent. While this is quite an obvious point to make, you would be surprised at how many people conflate the two.

In short, there are many factors which preclude one from deducing too much about growth in Africa based on how it was played out in China. From my reading, both Easterly and Blattman appear on the brink of such an analysis, but quite wisely never take the plunge. It is precisely for this reason that theirs proves a truly worthwhile debate. Do read it.

Of rape, video cameras, and Clinton in the Congo. What did I miss?

I forthrightly admit that neither am I an expert in matters pertaining to the Congo, nor do I know much about preventing or otherwise dealing with cases of rape - in the Congo or elsewhere. Having said that, I'm quite certain that I'm not the only one absolutely baffled (floored is more like it, actually) by Hilary Clinton's announcement yesterday of a $17 million plan to combat the abysmal levels of sexual violence in the Congo, part of which entails "supplying rape victims with video cameras to document the violence." Really? Video cameras? To rape victims? Hmm.....

Texas in Africa and the ladies at Wronging Rights have virtually summed up my thoughts on the matter quite well, raising among other matters questions pertaining to who, exactly, will be receiving said camcorders; where the footage will be sent (do bear in mind that both the Congolese government and military hierarchy are quite generally unwilling to prosecute rape perpetrators); and indeed how the camcorders will be charged given that the country lacks a power grid on which to charge portable electronic devices (a most astute observation). Might I also add that it is most, most improbable that a rapist will cease his evil actions upon being confronted with a recording device. Again, while claiming absolutely no expertise on the matter, intuition leads me to believe that he might indeed become more violent in his actions.

Given all of these considerations and quandries, what on earth would lead someone to believe that video cameras are part and parcel of the solution to combatting rape in the Congo? Having brought my initial frustrations over the matter under control, I began to ponder the logic by which one could possibly arrive at such a conclusion. A cursory glance through my Google history is enough to frighten just about anyone, with phrases like "rape victim, video"; "rape, congo"; "rape, video, persecution" floating about - evidence of my feeble attempt at discovering existing cases (in the developing world) where video cameras effectively served as preventative measures or lead to the prosecution of the perpetrators; or otherwise research suggesting that the distribution of such devices may indeed be the way forward. Presumably Clinton's statement is premised on some research that someone must have conducted at some point in time, right?

Maybe I'm not a very diligent Googler (though this is highly doubtful; of the countless skills one acquires whilst writing a Master's dissertation and subsequently tackling a PhD, Googling ranks quite high among them), but the results of my several hours of searching are indeed just as laughable as the proposition in question. Among my findings/musings:

• Video footage of rape acts has in some cases lead to the persecution and conviction of the perpetrators (see here, here, here and here, for instance), but in all such cases the acts were documented by either the perpetrators themselves or their cronies, or otherwise a passerby who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time - or indeed the right place at the right time, depending on your perspective. I wasn't able to find a single case in which a rape act was prevented or otherwise persecuted in which the victim was the one pressing the 'record' button. Perhaps Secretary Clinton has a CCTV-style system in mind, but then where would you install the cameras?
• According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, a significant percentage of rapes in the Congo are committed by senior army officials, over whom the government and donors have little leverage. This ties into the earlier point regarding where footage would be sent and how it would be handled upon receipt. It moreover leads one to conclude that the focus should be on combatting the overall culture of corruption, rather than the supplying of video cameras. Alas.
• Suggesting video cameras as a means by which rape victims can "document the violence" operates on the assumption that the victims will bring such videos forward as evidence (though we still haven't established to whom). The problem with this, though, is that rape victims in the Congo - and elsewhere in Africa - are often grossly stigmatized, and in some cases jailed. Given such a reality, documenting the act (especially by the victim) may prove quite counterproductive.
• If the surrounding culture is one laden with corruption and embodying "entrenched notions of gender hierarchy and the sexual entitlement of men" (to quote Prof. Rachel Jewkes of the Medical Research Council speaking on South Africa's culture of sexual violence), video footage isn't going to assist victims in any significant way. Such measures will only be effective if the external environment is one in which such acts are outrightly condemned, of which the Congo isn't (yet) one.

I really could go on, but would nevertheless fail to understand how the camcorder proposition makes sense - or indeed discover any research suggesting its merits in the developing world. The effective use of camcorders for such means in the Western context is a moot point in my opinion, precisely because the surrounding culture is one in which acts of sexual violence are not only regarded with contempt, but are severely punished. While I'm sure Clinton's suggestion is well-intentioned and put forward with all the right motives, I cringe at such cases of "headless hearts" - arguably my favorite of Paul Collier's phrases - who fail to properly understand the realities of the countries they are somehow hoping to save. Inevitably, the law of unintended consequences always prevails. And while I certainly am no expert on the Congo, even I can make out the blatant flaws implicit in such a proposition. One would hope that the U.S. government could, too.

But then again, I'm no expert. Will someone please kindly inform me: what did I miss? ....

Update: For a different perspective on the issue of "Camcorders for the Congo," see Shshank Bengali's post. I'm not sure that it lends any credibility to the proposition, but it does well to suggest that this isn't the craziest U.S. initiative for Africa. I'm sure it ranks up there, though...

Africa does not need more hot air

I must admit that I've been rather disappointed with the present US administration's policies towards Africa. To be perfectly frank, I was much happier with America's African policies under Bush (*gasp* yes, I said it), with few exceptions (AFRICOM, which I have spoken about in the past) is indubitably one of them. What Bush tried to do - and was moderately successful in achieving - was positively engaging with the continent: increasing development assistance where needed, introducing programs to reduce the burden of AIDS and malaria, AGOA, working to secure a peace deal between north and south Sudan in 2005, etc. His policies weren't perfect - many were seriously flawed - but there appeared to be a genuine sense of engagement and interest. Whether that was driven by humanitarian goodwill or geopolitical interests I will leave for you to decide; the point is that the US appeared to be active in creating opportunity for Africans. In short, they not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.

Not only does the Obama administration appear disinterested, but it is seemingly failing to capitalize on opportunities where they exist. I bring this up because Hilary Clinton is presently in Africa. Like many others, I am following the news hoping to discover something - anything - of substance (indeed, something to blog about!), but am seemingly failing in this endeavor (if someone has managed to stumble upon anything worthwhile pertaining to Clinton's time in Africa, do please send it my way). Her rhetoric - much like President Obama's in Ghana earlier this year - is filled with the same empty jargon uttered by Western politicians of yore. Yes, Kenya needs to reform; and yes, we all know that the continent has "enormous potential for progress;" and we all understand the importance of stability in Somalia. Blah, blah, blah. By the by, overemphasizing agricultural policy to the neglect of manufacturing and entrepreneurship does little to foster sustainable development across the continent. And publicly making promises to Somalia's Sheik Sharif is tantamount to wishing death upon his administration. While I do understand that the trip was all quite last minute, there are some things on which a Secretary of State must absolutely be briefed.

While I do further realize that Africa isn't much of a priority for the US government at present (a grave flaw, indeed, given especially China's growing influence across the continent!) and is constrained by the financial crisis and domestic politics, there are things the administration can do besides simply blowing about hot air: increasing diplomacy with leading economies, improving foreign assistance and trade, and being actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, are foremost among them. Indeed, if the United States seeks genuine relations with African nations, it is in the interest of both parties to move beyond the one-dimensional quality that characterizes them today. One of my favorite bloggers, Texas in Africa, has an absolutely brilliant open letter to Secretary Clinton posted today in which she stresses precisely this point, and goes even further to suggest how the US might actively work to aid the continent. The post is focused primarily on the Congo, but several of the points are indeed quite applicable elsewhere around the continent. Its message even more so.

Where do I sign?

[image: the NYTimes]

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

Noteworthy...

I had it in my mind to write something substantial here today, as there is indeed very much to talk about. Unfortunately I'm a bit under the weather and fear that any attempts at coherent argument or analysis will fall flat - and fast! Ergo, today's noteworthy reads...

Fred Kaplan asks: What's Bill Clinton doing in Pyongyang?

Perhaps the answer has something (or everything) to do with news that Burma is secretly building nukes

A great project in northern Uganda - Women's Income Generating Support - headed by Chris Blattman and Jeannie Annan provides women with grants and business training

Might China agree to an oil embargo on Iran?

What to do about climate change induced migration in Ghana (and arguably elsewhere)

On the militarization of foreign assistance, and why it should remain the road less traveled

Further to last week's post on American military bases in Africa, Foreign Policy's William Moseley argues for a halt to the militarization of humanitarian aid across Africa. While Moseley is focused primarily on Mali, where he has been engaged in development work for some 20+ odd years, his line of reasoning may well be applied elsewhere in the continent:

In the West African country of Mali [...] there has been low-grade al Qaeda activity occurring in the northern frontier over the past few years. The marginal desert region between Mali and its neighbors is appealing real estate for would-be terrorists because it is difficult to control and monitor. It provides space for camps and opportunities for terrorist cells to tax cross-border trade and occasionally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. The U.S. government provides assistance to Mali's military to manage and contain the few, mostly foreign, al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country.

But now the U.S. military is getting involved in development work across Mali and in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa -- as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan -- despite the de minimis al Qaeda threat. Now, military personnel repair schools, wells, health centers, roads, and bridges. Army doctors provide basic treatment and vaccinations. In fiscal year 2008, the Defense Department gave the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Mali $9.5 million to run a counterterrorism program, with close coordination between the two. The program provides curriculum advice to Koranic schools and job training for young men (who are seen as highly susceptible to Islamist rhetoric). USAID has also built 14 community radio stations that broadcast programming on peace and tolerance.

But this reframing of aid to Mali within the fight against terrorism could prove counterproductive. The Pentagon has taken its conceptualization of the fight against al Qaeda in war zones and applied it broadly in a peaceful country. In the past, U.S. involvement in West African countries like Mali has focused intently on humanitarian assistance, not a geopolitical agenda.

Indeed, once you increase military involvement in development work to such an extent, such work comes to be viewed by locals as part of a broader military campaign. And while this is quite justified in conflict situations - as are Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance - it may indeed prove counterproductive in an altogether peaceful country, like Mali. While I have absolutely no problem with the U.S. military - or any other foreign military, for that matter - assisting the Malian army in managing the terrorist threat (even running a counterterrorism program if it feels so inclined and such a program is deemed to be of value), I do agree that military involvement in aspects of humanitarian aid in which other agencies are already active, and in many cases better suited, may elevate tensions rather than effectively assisting communities in their needs. This is not to suggest that all military-operated foreign assistance programs be dismantled, but rather that other existing alternatives exhausted before such a path is pursued. And with so many other alternatives, such a path should very rarely be embarked upon.

Decoupling? No, a new coupling

Over the weekend The NYTimes had a rather cliched though nevertheless worthwhile article on declining foreign investments in Africa. This, as a consequence of the global financial crisis:

When the credit crisis erupted in September, many experts thought that Africa would be spared the financial turmoil of the American and European financial systems, because African banks had almost none of their assets tied up in the global subprime market.

But it has recently become clear that Africa is being hit hard. The World Bank estimates that its economies will grow an average of 3 percent this year, compared with an annual average of 6 percent from 2004 to 2008.

“The crisis could not have come at a worse time,” said Jose Gijon, chief Africa economist at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris. “Before the meltdown, many African countries had made significant progress in attracting foreign investment and private capital, and this could derail those efforts.”

But one must not forget about the Chinese, who show no intention of curtailing their African investments. Quite the contrary, really:

China which has become a major investor and trading partner for Africa, continues to invest. The China-Africa Development Fund, which has invested nearly $400 million in projects in Africa, said it planned to raise an additional $2 billion by November. African groups are also continuing to pump money into projects ranging from telecommunications to new oil fields.

Indeed, many in Africa believe that it is China - and China alone - that will spur and sustain the continent's growth. In the words of Martyn Davies, the relationship between China and the African continent is not decoupling - as is the case now between many emerging economies and America, for instance - but rather a "New Coupling." Africa is still open for business, and the Chinese are the continent's main customers.

Chinese agricultural techniques and African development: a hope for better things to come

China has been having a bit of a rough go here on China in Africa this week. First it's found to be de-industrializing other developing nations, then peddling fake drugs in Africa, its media outlets producing questionable maps, and today victimizing African labourers. Not at all a very rosy picture! There is good news, however: a report commissioned by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and prepared by my colleagues at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, finds that the very technologies employed in China's agricultural boom might be appropriate - and indeed highly beneficial - in the African context.

The report - "The Relevance of Chinese Agricultural Technologies for African Smallholder Farmers: Agricultural Technology Research in China" - finds that of particular benefit are water-saving technologies and soil-related techniques such as tilage and planting methods. Evidently, small-scale African farmers face similar challenges as do their Chinese counterparts, and there is much in the way of technology and knowledge exchange that might benefit the former. According to the report, Chinese experts are especially focused on seed and rice technologies, particularly in Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rapid advances in seed technology and new plant varieties have been a major factor in China's crop production increases, and it is believed that similar advancements may facilitate an agricultural boom across Africa.

In Mozambique, a 52 hectare agricultural demonstration centre is planned west of Maputo, at Boane. According to the report, crops will be planted this year to test whether the Mozambican climate is suited for various varieties of seeds, including maize, rice, vegetables and fruit. In Kampala, Uganda, Chinese contractors are building an aquaculture demonstration centre. The centre is envisaged to generate knowledge for fish farmers, fishers and researchers in the country.

The agricultural sector employs approximately 65% of Africa's population, and is the largest private sector on the continent. Poor agricultural planning, weak land tenure policies, and a low capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and markets have, however, generally hindered the sector from becoming a productive, profitable business. While the Chinese are incapable of ameliorating all these troubles, they may do well to provide the relevant technologies to farmers and place Africa's agricultural sector back on track to success. Fingers crossed.