Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya
Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels
Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared
Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati
Further to last week's post on American military bases in Africa, Foreign Policy's William Moseley argues for a halt to the militarization of humanitarian aid across Africa. While Moseley is focused primarily on Mali, where he has been engaged in development work for some 20+ odd years, his line of reasoning may well be applied elsewhere in the continent:
In the West African country of Mali [...] there has been low-grade al Qaeda activity occurring in the northern frontier over the past few years. The marginal desert region between Mali and its neighbors is appealing real estate for would-be terrorists because it is difficult to control and monitor. It provides space for camps and opportunities for terrorist cells to tax cross-border trade and occasionally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. The U.S. government provides assistance to Mali's military to manage and contain the few, mostly foreign, al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country.
But now the U.S. military is getting involved in development work across Mali and in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa -- as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan -- despite the de minimis al Qaeda threat. Now, military personnel repair schools, wells, health centers, roads, and bridges. Army doctors provide basic treatment and vaccinations. In fiscal year 2008, the Defense Department gave the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Mali $9.5 million to run a counterterrorism program, with close coordination between the two. The program provides curriculum advice to Koranic schools and job training for young men (who are seen as highly susceptible to Islamist rhetoric). USAID has also built 14 community radio stations that broadcast programming on peace and tolerance.
But this reframing of aid to Mali within the fight against terrorism could prove counterproductive. The Pentagon has taken its conceptualization of the fight against al Qaeda in war zones and applied it broadly in a peaceful country. In the past, U.S. involvement in West African countries like Mali has focused intently on humanitarian assistance, not a geopolitical agenda.
Indeed, once you increase military involvement in development work to such an extent, such work comes to be viewed by locals as part of a broader military campaign. And while this is quite justified in conflict situations - as are Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance - it may indeed prove counterproductive in an altogether peaceful country, like Mali. While I have absolutely no problem with the U.S. military - or any other foreign military, for that matter - assisting the Malian army in managing the terrorist threat (even running a counterterrorism program if it feels so inclined and such a program is deemed to be of value), I do agree that military involvement in aspects of humanitarian aid in which other agencies are already active, and in many cases better suited, may elevate tensions rather than effectively assisting communities in their needs. This is not to suggest that all military-operated foreign assistance programs be dismantled, but rather that other existing alternatives exhausted before such a path is pursued. And with so many other alternatives, such a path should very rarely be embarked upon.
This week's issue of The New Statesman has a curious map tracking America's 'military footprint' around the world (i.e. the global distribution of American military bases):
Many African states have been - and remain - quite vocal over their displeasure with the presence of such bases, maintaining that they constitute a direct violation of their sovereignty. Equally so, other states appear quite enthused to garner the assistance of the United States military in dealing with various regional issues. While I do certainly have my opinions on the matter, none are yet fixed in stone. What are your thoughts on U.S. military presence in Africa?
David Axe of the War is Boring blog has a column in Wednesday's World Politics Review in which he suggests that Kenya might be funneling arms to South Sudan. Excellent. Well done, Kenya (of course I say this with complete and utter sarcasm).
According to Axe, the Ukrainian-owned vessel, Fania, which was captured by Somali pirates and returned to the port in Mombassa in February, was bound for the breakaway region in southern Sudan. The ship carried 33 Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tanks, plus other arms and ammunition - all of somewhat dodgy origin and ownership:
The Faina shipment apparently represented the third and final installment of a large batch of heavy weaponry for South Sudan, sourced from Ukraine and brokered by Nairobi. In November, the German magazine Der Spiegel claimed it had records proving an earlier shipment of 42 tanks that had largely escaped international scrutiny [...]
If this is indeed discovered to be true, it "would finger the Kenyan government in a sanctions-skirting arms race that some worry could result in another bloody civil warfare in Sudan." Kenyan military support for South Sudan would also put Nairobi at great odds with the U.S., which is one of the country's closest allies.
The Stop Arms to Sudan program of Human Rights First has a database of various countries' arms sales to Sudan between 2004-2006 (if anyone happens upon an updated version, do please let me know!). Not surprisingly, China is the foremost supplier of arms, but if you scroll down a ways you see that Kenya has done its fair share as well. The database is a conservative estimate at best as the data collected is that which the countries have divulged voluntarily (*chuckle chuckle*). The database also fails to specify where in Sudan the arms are being shipped, though it really isn't too difficult to guess.
Perhaps it is somewhat foolish to single out Kenya in such a way, as it is highly plausible that other African states are engaged in similar antics, though perhaps do a better job of remaining under the radar. At the same time, the outing of the Kenya-South Sudan relationship may perhaps do well to serve as a warning to other African countries embroiled in similar engagements. A comment by an Economist reader puts the matter in plain terms: "Kenyan Govt is fishing in a muddy waters. Beware what you do in the neighborhood."
I'm currently working on a paper examining Sino-Zambian relations, focusing especially on Chinese activity in Zambia's mining sector. I've been sitting on this project for quite some time, and finally managed to overcome what had been a most serious case of writer's block with the help of a lovely glass of Bandol (Tempier). Ok, fine, two glasses. In any event, while doing a bit of extra desk research, I happened upon an interesting piece in the recent edition of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief. Author Richard Bitzinger writes:
China is now, on average, the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, after the traditional leading suppliers: the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In fact, in 2007 it was fourth in terms of global arms transfer agreements, ahead of France, Germany and Spain.
Nearly all of China’s arms transfers are to developing countries, and in this arena the Chinese defense industry is emerging as a formidable competitor. In fact, China ranked third in terms of arms deliveries to the developing world in 2007. China's largest markets are in Asia, the Middle East, and particularly Africa. In fact, during the period 2004-2007, China was the single largest seller of arms to Africa; and its major customers include Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
Leading Chinese weapons exports (to Africa) include:
It remains difficult to gauge how successful China will be in the global arms marketplace, with countries like the U.S. and Russia out-exporting the country by rather wide margins (in 2007, for example, Russia exported $4.6 billion worth of arms - four times as much as China. Even Germany out-exported China by 60%). Yet China's foothold in the African marketplace appears to be quite favorable. In Zambia, for instance, China's North Industries Corp. (NORINCO) is allegedly in talks to upgrade Zambia's T-59 tanks engines, armor and fire control systems. The Nigerian air force has been eyeing China's K-8 trainer aircraft (Nigeria imported Chinese J-7 fighters in 2006). Zimbabwe is equipped with Chinese K-8 trainers and J-7 fighters, and in early 2009 was negotiating the purchase of one squadron of FC-1 fighters from. Chinese arms now equip Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya... the list goes on and on.
Chinese arms deals appear to be part and parcel of the "oil-for-infrastructure" deals China continues to strike across the continent. In Angola, for instance, arms are sold in exchange for the country's oil. In Zambia, copper is the currency of choice. While some argue that Chinese arms sales to Africa will drop once China acquires a satisfactory supply of natural resources, such claims are highly dubious. What constitutes a "satisfactory supply" for a country with massive energy demands? What's more, it's rather doubtful that China will be so foolish as to bypass a booming export market. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally savvy businessmen, and arms sales to Africa is a brilliant business opportunity. While China may not be supplanting or joining the U.S. and European states as a large supplier of sophisticated arms on a global scale anytime soon, they have seemingly already done so - and continue to do so - in Africa.