A most interesting piece by Bright Simons in the Asia Times suggests China's recent naval dispatch to the Gulf of Aden is part of a broader Chinese strategy of "localized strategic combat," wherein isolated contentions over given resources, interests, and geo-political positions serve to advance Chinese global influence. This is especially true in the Horn of Africa, a key strategic outpost, particularly in light of its proximity to, and strategic ties with, key Middle Eastern (oil) states:
In June of last year, police in the breakaway region of Somaliland in Northern Somalia made an arrest that suggests strongly that Chinese operatives of uncertain affiliation were working with Yemenis in shadowy activities that may involve espionage-related gun-running.
There have similarly been reports of a Chinese presence through Eritrean proxies in peace-building operations in the Eastern Sudan with the obvious aim of securing the 1,500-kilometer oil pipe that feeds Sudan's oil through the Red Sea into Chinese chimneys in Guangdong. (Contrast this with the US's persistent condemnation of Eritrean elements of fueling the Islamist insurrection in Somalia, and its dismissive attitude towards engagement with the Asmara elite.)
Unconfirmed reports also suggest a major expansion of Chinese installations in another Red Sea state, Djibouti, even as tensions between the latter and brigand elements in Somalia rise.
Incidents of this sort are even more interesting because, for several years now, PLA-dominated "multinationals" like Norinco and the Poly Group have been sharpening the capacity of Beijing to match the flair the West once showed in intermixing commerce, investment, arms trading and influence-peddling to minimize the scope for nationalist repercussions (the Horn of Africa receives roughly 70% of China's direct investment into Africa).
In the context of such activities, the piece proceeds to suggest that the recent naval dispatch is a component of this broader strategic effort at international expansionism - "expansionism by a thousand strides," if you will:
When all is said, it is far from difficult to lay out the pieces in the Gulf of Aden with respect to a "strategic combat" configuration.
China considers the Middle East treacherous and apparently prefers to undertake its penetration by circumnavigation, and Africa offers favorable currents for its choice of trajectory, which is not to say that the continent in and of itself is not a destination.
Many (including myself) frequently fail to analyze China through such a militaristic, strategic lens. Most often, Beijing's human rights record and its economic expansion (and recent market volatility) steal the spotlight in analyses. Yet inasmuch as these factors characterize the CCP's agenda, it must be recalled that they remain components of a broader international scheme. It was not too long ago that the Chinese Navy set out to acquire an aircraft carrier, for instance. Chinese investors likewise continue to break into an increasing number of developed markets.
If China is to continue its quest for international influence (and it will), it will likely be accomplished through precisely the sort of "localized strategic combat" Simons outlines. Western governments seeking to parry such expansionism are thus left with the daunting task of figuring out exactly how. (Hint: Military build-up is not the answer. At least not in the short-term).