Changed priorities ahead

For the past few months I have been toying with the idea of returning to blogging, having (rather reluctantly) given up the enterprise some time ago. The thing with bloggers these day, I find, is that they do it constantly or not at all: it's either job-like or it's not. Falling the category of 'almost-but-not-quite-willing-to-dedicate-my-life-to-blogging' of bloggers, I relinquished the task, only to be confronted by an old Oxford tutor of mine the other day, who immediately prompted to enquire about my absence from the blog-o-sphere. Perhaps his words were merely intended as polite chit-chat, or perhaps he was indeed genuine in his desire to see my thoughts plastered all over the internet -- either way, here I am back; inspired and ready and willing to reengage in discussion with those of you out there.

My time away has been quite curious, divided as it was between fieldwork in Addis Ababa, holidays on the American east coast, and -- of course -- Oxford. My research has shifted slightly, away from the more economical and towards the more political. My time in the field has led me to the (perhaps anticlimactic) conclusion that China's economic competition in Africa can largely be understood in simple market economic terms (i.e. competition), and save for curious loopholes and investment advantages enjoyed by Chinese firms, the story more or less stops there. Where it begins is with the political and cultural/societal implications of China's engagement with Africa: not only for the African countries themselves, but for the region and international community more generally.

The NYTime's David Sanger had a perhaps slightly obvious though nevertheless worthwhile piece on "the three faces of China" which very much speaks to this issue. Sanger argues:

In one sense, there’s nothing surprising about a rising power finding subtle ways to handle complex problems. But before China’s breakout from poverty to arguably the world’s No. 2 economy, its default position on foreign policy was to restate the principle of non-interference in other nations’ affairs and focus largely on its neighborhood.

That was before it had the military resources and the incentive to start thinking of how to secure and defend interests around the globe. Today, its interests include access to oil in places like Sudan and Iran, safe shipping around the Horn of Africa, the ability to manipulate its currency for its own gain.

And for the first time, the world is seeing a distinct range of behaviors, from aggressive to passive-aggressive to diplomatic, in places that 20 years ago China’s leaders rarely thought about.

What American diplomats and analysts now have to figure out is what drives China’s actions and responses, how to try to shape them and, some would argue, what limits to try to set

Not only American diplomats, but indeed international leaders generally. Though the 'China threat' theory was perhaps a bit too overplayed, China's global political rise remains largely underplayed, presented as an event that may or may not occur at some point in the distant future. A balance must be found, preferably sooner rather than later.

Learning Chinese in Liberia

Surely a sign of the times: Chinese officials operating in Liberia are offering free Chinese language lessons to young Liberians - and anyone keen to learn the language more generally:

As in much of Africa, China is heavily engaged in post-war Liberia, rebuilding roads with funding from the World Bank, managing hotels and restaurants, trading in medicines and other businesses.

Chinese mineral firm China Union became the largest investor in Liberia when it signed a $2.6bn deal to go into iron-ore mining earlier this year. There is even a Chinese-language radio station broadcasting across the country for the increasing number of migrant workers and expatriates.

The growing trade ties explain why the Chinese embassy and the Ministry of Youth and Sports have decided to put on free two-hour classes in the afternoon, five days a week.

While some may tout such lessons as an exercise in colonialism (an argument which many Liberians are likely to put forward themselves), such skills training may in fact be the harbinger of increased opportunity for the country's citizens, allowing them not only greater mobility in terms of movement to China, but also enabling them to eventually communicate with the Chinese thereby engaging in more meaningful business negotiations. Perhaps I'm feeling exceptionally optimistic this morning, or perhaps the Chinese are actually (finally?) working towards making their "mutually beneficial" partnership with Liberia precisely just that.

China becomes South Africa's top export destination

From Friday's Reuters:

China overtook the United States as South Africa's biggest export destination in the first half of 2009, reinforcing the Asian country's push to build trade links with Africa.

South African trade and industry department data also showed on Friday China replaced Germany as its largest country trade partner.

[...] Data for South Africa -- Africa's biggest economy -- showed exports to China stood at 27.6 billion rand for the year to June, against 35.8 billion rand for the whole of 2008. Exports to the U.S. were 19.1 billion rand compared with 66.5 billion rand for 2008.

Understanding China's international behavior

The RAND Corporation has released a most worthwhile report on China's international behavior. Sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, the report:

analyzes the content, character, and execution of China’s international behavior. It examines how China views its security environment, how it defines its foreign policy objectives, how it is pursuing these objectives, and the consequences for U.S. economic and security interests.

While I haven't yet made my way through the document in its entirety, I can comfortably say that it does an excellent job of highlighting and explaining the breadth and rapidity of China's international exploits, without the sense of panic that now plagues the majority of such reports emanating from the U.S.. The report examines China's foreign policy strategy from the point of view of Beijing's objectives, and stresses especially the ways in which China is working within the current international system while at the same time altering it to its advantage. The full report may be found here.

Noteworthy...

Dear Readers: I will be on the road much of this week, so I'm afraid my blogging will be limited to... well, to be perfectly honest, I doubt I will be blogging at all! I'll be back next week with more news, analysis, and quips about this crazy field of international relations. Until then, today's Noteworthy reads:

Taking Africa beyond Aid. Yet another review of Moyo's book, Dead Aid, and a loud call for the development of African financial markets. As interesting as the piece itself are the comments, which inevitably turn to discussion of the Chinese presence on the continent

How can struggling countries break out of poverty if they're trapped in systems of bad rules? Paul Romer suggests "charter cities" as a possible solution

Something stinks. Must be Scotland's deal with Libya...

Osei Kofi on Africa's lagging contemporary art scene (and what to do about it)

Hugo Restall has an interesting piece in today's WSJ on the threesome that is Latin America (any country will do, really), the U.S. and China. While I tend to disagree with much of his analysis, it is an interesting argument nevertheless

For those among you who believed that China's alleged withdrawal from the deal with the Congo signaled China's retreat from the continent.... I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so: China was never intending to withdraw, it was merely revising its strategy

Have a great week everyone!

Where 21st century Asian socialism meets 21st century Latin American socialism

Don't blink, otherwise you might miss the litany of deals China has been making across Latin America! China has recently signed oil deals with Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela; and has contracts and cooperation deals with governments in Brazil, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay - effectively the entire Latin American continent.

In the early stages of Sino-Latin American cooperation, China seemed to be treading rather carefully, hesitant of both its foreign policy and place on the international global stage. The recent increase in overseas activity - from Africa to Latin America, and beyond - however, suggests that Chinese confidence is rapidly growing. The global financial crisis in particular has raised skepticism over America's hitherto seemingly unwavering preeminence, and has at the same time proffered China as a viable alternative. Indeed, an increasing number of countries are now saying "thanks, but no thanks" to U.S. cooperation and assistance, choosing instead to place their faith in the Chinese. Latin America is case in point.

The strategy the Chinese are employing across the continent appears identical to that which is being pursued in Africa, with oil-for-infrastructure contracts as the primary modus operandi. Like in Africa, too, Chinese investment is manifest on many economic levels - from high level government contracts all the way down to small-scale private entrepreneurs who sell vegetables and various knick-knacks on the side of the road. What's more interesting in the case of Latin America, however, is that the partnerships appear to be much more ideologically laden than those in Africa. This is especially true in Venezuela.

In a a great video from Al Jazeera English (HT: Double Handshake), Venezuelan economics professor Jesus Farias briefly touches on the issue of the Venezuelan socialist model and its seemingly logical intersection with its Chinese counterpart (this, around 2:34). He seems to be suggesting that cooperation between China and Venezuela is predicated not only on economic exchange, but has as its broader objective the restructuring of the global political landscape. I'm not wholly certain that this is necessarily the case - or that such is the objective of other Latin American countries engaged in relations with China - but it certainly is an interesting point worthy of further consideration. Viva la revolution...?

Noteworthy...

US State Department's Africa Bureau receives less than rave reviews in a recent report from State's Office of the Inspector General

Today marks the 50th anniversary of the release of Miles Davis' Kind of Blue - the best selling jazz album of all time. Fred Kaplan examines the genius behind music (and see here for a great Legacy Recordings video tribute to the album - and Davis)

A recent International Crisis Group report briefing warns of increasing insecurity and political tension in Somalia's Puntland - a semi-autonomous region in north-eastern Somalia once touted as a success of the 'building blocks' approach to reestablishing national stability, and viewed as one of the most prosperous parts of the country

Is China revamping its climate change policy? The FT seems to think so...

Over-exaggerated Asian scrambles and praise-worthy Angolan management on a Monday morning

Chatham House released a new report today which provides a comparative study of the impact of Asian oil companies on Nigeria and Angola - the two leading oil-producing companies in sub-Saharan Africa. While the report considers Indian, South Korean and Japanese national oil companies, the primary focus is on Chinese oil strategy. Specifically, the report considers why Chinese oil strategy has been - and remains - so successful; how it is that Angola emerged as the second largest supplier of oil to China in 2008; how Chinese companies negotiate deals; and how such deals benefit Angola and Nigeria, respectively.

Among the more interesting findings emanating from the report is that which suggests that Angola does not fit the stereotype of a weak African state being exploited by the resource-hungry Chinese. Indeed, the Angolan government has been quite successful in managing its relationships with China and its oil companies, as well as handling its own version of the oil-for infrastructure scheme. The case of Angola is contrasted with Nigeria, where the Obasanjo government largely failed to manage the scheme:

While Nigeria was playing politics with its Asian partners, Angola was driven by economic necessity to quickly access funds to finance its reconstruction [...]

[...] The scale of corruption, mismanagement and non-execution of projects in the Obasanjo years has sent shockwaves through Nigeria. [...] His intentions were good but officials failed to spell out the full implications of the scheme. And many used the scheme for private profit.

The report further suggests that Western fears about an Asian takeover in the Nigerian and Angolan oil sectors are highly exaggerated:

Except for Japan, [Asian oil companies] only acquired equity participation in both countries in the last five years. More important, the [western] oil majors remain the leading players in both countries. They dominate production and hold the majority of reserves.

While Western oil companies do, indeed, still own much of Africa's oil reserves, the Chinese scramble for African soil should not be downplayed. As the report itself notes, Angola is now the second largest supplier of oil to China, with Nigeria, the Congo, Kenya, and other oil-producing states not too far behind. In 2005, China imported nearly 701,000 bpd of oil from Africa - approximately 30% of its total oil imports. This figure has been rising in recent years, and is estimated to reach some 40-50% in the next decade.

The full report - Thirst for African Oil: National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola - may be found here.

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

What's wrong with this picture?

Via Joshua Keating we learn that China's Economic Observer has put together the following map of overseas expansions by CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec - China's three major oil giants. Click here to access the interactive version, which provides (only some) added information:

Now I don't know about you, but I find this map to be highly inaccurate, and not just because the African countries have been mislabeled. The map grossly under-represents China's oil ventures in Africa; it's quite laughable, really! As Keating aptly observes, Sudan, where CNPC has extensive and very controversial holdings is absent. So is Niger, Gabon, Ethiopia (Sinopec is especially active in both); my goodness, where is Angola? Or Chad, for that matter? Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, and Algeria are all conspicuously absent as well. I really could go on. And while I'm not especially well-versed in China's energy holdings and exploration activities in Latin America, I'd venture to guess that the map greatly underestimates its ventures there, as well.

To be perfectly honest I feel as though I must be missing something; as though the map is intended to highlight specific cases of China's overseas oil activities, for instance, or perhaps is otherwise well outdated. Unfortunately, neither appears to be the case. There's no indication of any singling out of countries, and the sentence which begins "With China's recent $7.2 billion acquisition of oil explorer Addax Petroleum...." indicates that this map is very recent (Sinopec bought Addax in June of this year). So why in the world would the Observer put together such a misguided map? Is the Chinese public so unaware of its country's overseas activities, or do they think we are?

New Chinese television channel targets North Africa, Middle East

China is continuing to make inroads into Africa, now with a clear view of targeting the continent's Arab population as well as the Middle East more generally. Via the New York Times:

Chinese state television has begun broadcasting an Arabic-language channel for the Middle East and Africa as part of efforts to expand the Communist government’s media influence abroad. The 24-hour channel, which began operating Saturday, will air in 22 Arabic-speaking countries and reach nearly 300 million people, China Central Television said in a statement. The channel “will serve as an important bridge to strengthen communication and understanding between China and Arab countries,” a CCTV vice president, Zhang Changming, said in the statement.

[...] The Arabic channel will carry news, feature stories, entertainment and education programs and will gradually expand its offerings, CCTV said. The network already broadcasts in English, French and Spanish as well as in Mandarin.

Chinese soft power at its finest.

China-Africa Development Fund expands its African ties

From today's WSJ:

The China-Africa Development Fund, which was founded by state-owned lender China Development Bank Corp., plans to raise $2 billion by November to help expand business links between Africa and China, CDB Vice Governor Li Jiping said.

[...] In an interview on the sidelines of the Australia-China Bilateral Investment Seminar, Mr. Li said the China-Africa Development Fund will raise the money for expansion from Chinese financial institutions, including insurers.

The fund, established in 2007 with an initial $1 billion investment by CDB, had said it aims to eventually increase its total assets for investment to $5 billion. Australia is also a part of CDB's global strategy, Mr. Li said.

Don't cry for me Latin America. Yet.

While this blog is mostly devoted to issues surrounding the Sino-African partnership, one must not forget that China is similarly active in other regions of the world, most recently Latin America. China's strategies in Latin America seem to differ little from those employed in Africa, with 'oil-for-infrastructure' deals, tech investments, extensive bilateral trade agreements, and the influx of cheap Chinese goods as the wooing tactics of choice. Trade between China and Latin America soared from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008.

As is true of Africa, Beijing's main interest in Latin America is the guaranteeing of access to the region's raw materials - oil, soybeans, copper, iron ore, etc. - to fuel its continued rapid growth. Yet as is also true in Africa, China's ambitions are also grandly geopolitical. According to Tyler Bridges:

China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio, and other tourism hot spots.

Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city, and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.

She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China.

"Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil," Yuan said with a big smile.

Chinese will be the language of more than just Brazil if Beijing's leaders have anything to do with it. As Bridges aptly observes, China is buying zinc from Peru, copper from Chile, and iron ore from Brazil. It's shipping equipment to Brazil, buses to Cuba, clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru. Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE are likewise grabbing business from established telecom suppliers across the continent, most prominently in Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Yet while China seemingly has a Latin America strategy (or perhaps a 'developing world' strategy more generally; it's hard to tell), Latin America doesn't appear to have a China strategy.

Writing in his excellent blog, Tom Pellman cites David Shambaugh who notes:

Latin America is acting toward China's expansion in the world in a reactive, disorganized or ad hoc fashion. When I asked Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) about its strategy on China, I got blank stares. There is no strategy.

Such a lack of strategy indubitably works to the detriment of Latin American states - as it does African nations which similarly lack much in the way of a policy of engagement with the eager Chinese - who stand to gain from Chinese investment. In Latin America, as much as in Africa, there are many benefits to be accrued from recent Chinese interest. Yet without a plan of action, it seems that China will walk away as the sole beneficiary when all is said and done.

New literature on China's expansion into Africa

Serge Michele, a West Africa correspondent for the French newspaper Le Monde and Michel Beuret, Foreign Editor of the prominent Swiss magazine l'Hebdo have recently come out with a new book on the economic partnership between China and Africa. Having just ordered it from Amazon, I'm not in much of a position to offer anything in the way of a review (do stay tuned, though...), but from what I was able to gather from the book's table of contents, as well as Harry Hurt's review in the NYTimes, it does appear quite promising - seemingly offering much greater substantive analysis than most hitherto published books.

From what I can tell, one of my gripes with the book will be its rather generic conclusion that "China's arrival has been a boon for a continent adrift" and that the Chinese have "given Africa a real sense of worth, as much in the eyes of Africans themselves as in the eyes of foreigners." While this is certainly true to a point, I'm still waiting for someone to deliver a much more nuanced analysis of the issue. Who knows, perhaps Michele and Beuret deliver elsewhere throughout what seems to be a worthwhile read on a most fascinating subject (naturally, I'm somewhat biased on the matter...).

When China rules the world...

Macleans - Canada's national weekly current affairs magazine - has a truly fascinating interview with academic and journalist Martin Jacques on the consequences of the coming global shift in power. The dialogue is particularly interesting because it discusses not only the ways in which China's political ideology will inform its (potential) hegemonic role, but it also does well to emphasize the particular tenets of Chinese culture which permeate its society and governance.

An excerpt:

If we want to try and understand what China’s going to be like, then the best place to start looking is East Asia, because that is China’s own region. China’s culture has had a major influence on the whole region in varying degrees for thousands of years—most obviously in the case of Japan, Korea and Vietnam. It’s a very sophisticated culture from its language to its literature to its food. These are elements of what we’ve termed soft power, and Chinese soft power is going to be hugely influential in East Asia in the future.

In East Asia, and in Africa, and in Latin America....

A correction

Much is being made of the Oriental Post, Botswana's first Chinese newspaper, about which I blogged in early June. The surrounding hype is, however, somewhat misleading. Last week, France 24's The Observers ran a story on the newspaper, heralding the arrival of "Africa's first Chinese newspaper." A similar kind enthusiasm was echoed in a post on Appfrica, and picked up by Bill Easterly and Blood and Milk's Alana Shaikh on their respective Twitter pages. My, how quickly news spreads!

Yet while the Post is Botswana's first Chinese newspaper, it surely is not the first in all of Africa. The Western African United Business Weekly, a Chinese newspaper run out of Lagos, Nigeria, has been in circulation since 2005. China Express has been publishing out of Johannesburg, South Africa (a SADC member), since 1994. And there may well be additional Chinese-language papers in other parts of the continent about which we are unaware. The Chinese community has been quite active in Cape Verde since the mid-1990s, for instance; I wouldn't be surprised if they have by now established a foothold in the country's print media.

While the Oriental Post further signals China's growing fascination with the African continent - and indeed the mass migration of Chinese to Africa - it is not novel in any way (save but signaling a significant intensifying of Sino-Botswanan relations). To state otherwise is, unfortunately, quite inaccurate.

And if the Chinese scramble wasn't enough, Russia wants a piece now, too

Via the WSJ, Ariel Cohen writes:

[...] Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and more than a hundred Russian businessmen last week visited Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola on the longest tour of Africa a Russian leader has undertaken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike President Obama, who is going to Africa next week for a brief stop to talk about global warming, Mr. Medvedev and his team targeted oil, gas, diamonds and uranium. Mr. Medvedev is trying to score points before his G-8 meeting with Western leaders in Italy July 8-10.

[...] By all appearances Mr. Medvedev and, by extension, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are reviving the old Soviet Africa strategy. The Soviet Union maintained friendly relations with many African countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

[...] Africa lost its significance as an ideological chessboard after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the current volume of trade between Africa and Russia is trivial. But the continent remains an economic prize. China has spent billions of dollars in the past few years gaining friends, influencing dictators, and tying African countries to Beijing.

Now the Kremlin is trying to regain its status as a global player, including re-asserting itself in Africa. Mr. Medvedev's visit to Africa appears to be the first coordinated attempt by Moscow to do so. Where once the Soviet Union sought political hegemony, today's Kremlin is after economic objectives like trade and access to raw materials. But a shift in Africa's relationship with Russia will have consequences for many.

Indeed, it will surely be fascinating to observe how Russia's Africa policy will unfold and the extent to which - if any at all - the Kremlin will seek cooperation with China, which currently has the upper hand in the continent - arguably even more so than do either the U.S. or Europe.

Debunking the 'China retreat' theory

Recent speculation over China's alleged disengagement from Africa (see earlier posts here and here, for instance) could not be further from the truth. While pundits continue to tout China's withdrawal from the continent in light of growing (global) economic troubles, the data seemingly suggests quite a different reality.

A report released yesterday by South Africa's Standard Bank (download pdf here) lends much credence to this claim. Among the report's key findings:

• Premature conclusions regarding China’s perceived reduction of interest in Africa due to a realignment of its global priorities in light of cyclical economic uncertainties should be guarded against.
• In stark contrast to Africa’s traditional partners, China’s diplomatic engagements of Africa have been escalated in H01 2009 in anticipation of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation Summit (FOCAC) in Egypt in November. Following this, bilateral assistance from China to Africa has remained steady in 2009.
• The large infrastructure-based component of China’s ambitious stimulus plan has bolstered demand for African commodities in 2009, averting potentially greater declines in Sino-Africa trade volumes. Meanwhile, African demand for low-cost consumer goods from China has remained relatively resilient. '

With respect to the DRC deal which initially lead some to raise red flags over China's withdrawal, the report notes the following:

Chinese firms are also taking the opportunity to re-price several of their commodity-based investments in Africa in order to ensure that valuations reflect current realities rather than those in place during the height of the commodities boom in 2007, when many of the investments were initiated. This prudent recalculation has been perceived in the DRC and Gabon as a cooling off of interest from relevant Chinese investors, where in truth it is a calculated strategy by Beijing to leverage its competitive advantage in still being able to engage commercially to negotiate more favourable terms.

I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so. Rather than retreating, China is merely shifting its strategy in the continent in response to ever-changing economic realities. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally quick on their feet. With that said:

Any discussion on the sustainability of bilateral ties is deficient without a realisation that a withdrawal of China from Africa presents only one side of a complex picture. It is not in Africa's interests, particularly in today's liquidity starved international environment, to see China withdraw from Africa. Neither [...] is it in China's interests to do so.

U.S. vs China, as played out in Africa

As President Obama gets ready to make his first trip to Ghana this July, one cannot help but wonder how he will be received. Of course quite warmly, I imagine, especially in light of his Kenyan roots, but it will be quite curious to see how - if at all - China's growing influence on the continent has shifted African perceptions of American assistance. Bear in mind that this trip will be Obama's first to sub-Saharan Africa (and during his 8 years as President, Bush II visited the continent only twice); Chinese President Hu has visited 15 sub-Saharan states since 2004. And I needn't remind you of the litany of recent Chinese investments in the continent, dubious though some of them may be.

The question of U.S. versus Chinese influence in Africa is brought home quite nicely by Ken Maguire. In his article today, Maguire expounds on this battle of authorities, if you will, ultimately concluding that the U.S.-China relationship in Africa can be cooperative. There is no denying that it can't; the question, I feel is much more one of degrees. Obama's upcoming trip may indeed prove quite central in shedding light on this issue, along with countless others.

China's place in the international aid architecture

Deborah Brautigam has a truly great and thought-provoking article on the ways in which China is challenging the international aid architecture (with significant focus on sub-Saharan Africa). According to Brautigam, it's not as doom and gloom as one might be inclined think:

... unlike the West, which buys oil in places like Angola without much caring how the government uses the revenue generated, Beijing buys Angola's oil while ensuring that the purchase price goes to pay its companies to build infrastructure. This is the essence of "win-win," as proposed by the Chinese in their African engagement.

While China's development program is indubitably flawed in many ways, it appears to be quite right in many others. What's more, Chinese foreign aid - largely in the form of oil-for-infrastructure contracts - is an attractive alternative for recipient states which are in dire need of infrastructure (and likewise tired of the Western ways of doing things). As Brautigam aptly observes, China's development aid reflects, among other things, its understanding and assumptions about the road out of poverty. As such, it stands as a challenge to the traditional aid architecture.