On dealing with pirates

In an interesting letter to Barack Obama on the subject of Somalia, Senator Russ Feingold writes the following:

As you know, piracy off the coast of Somalia is a symptom of the state collapse and instability on land; thus, any military actions we take will only be stopgap measures.  In recent Congressional testimony, Director of National Intelligence Blair and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Army Lt. General Michael Maples cited lawlessness and economic problems on land for the rise in piracy at sea.  The ultimate solution to the problem of piracy, then, is the establishment of a functional government that can enforce the rule of law.  During the rule of the Council of Islamic Courts in 2006, there was a notable decline in piracy that can be attributed, in large part, to the rise of a central authority in southern Somalia. Without replicating the repressive rule of the Courts, we must keep in mind that establishing a central governing structure in Somalia is critical to resolving, not just stopping, the problem of piracy.

Feingold proposes closer U.S. cooperation with the Somali government to "help establish security and functional, inclusive governance within the country." At first glance this seems like the clear way forward. Given that a large portion of pirates are impoverished individuals attempting to make a livelihood for themselves in the absence of other options, an internal solution to the problem (i.e. establishing governance and subsequently creating opportunity) appears the right one. 

Yet while this nation-building route may be the most sensible of options, it does raise two questions. First, should the United States engage in yet another nation-building mission in the Islamic world? Recall that Somalia is in large measure (informally) controlled by al-Shabab, an extreme al-Qaeda aligned terrorist group that has been active in Somalia since 2006. Despite America's benevolent intentions, I remain highly skeptical that any sort of state-building activity would be welcomed, especially given America's recent track record (and reputation) in the Islamic world. And given, too, that Somalia is a sovereign nation. Arguably this would radicalize the pirates just as much as would the second option: military action.

The second option (and second question) is indeed that of air strikes on pirate land bases, an option currently being debated by the U.S. government. While I hesitate to believe that such action would do much to ameliorate the piracy problem in the long term, and would inevitably mar the vision of a peaceful, all-loving America which the Obama administration seems intent on creating, some argue that it may be the appropriate response to what are, in fact, acts of terror. Indeed, the fundamental question implicit in this option is that of what label we designate to pirates: are they merely (helpless) criminals (or a 'better class of criminal' as my colleague Jon Santiago comically muses), or are they terrorists? Hostis humani generis? 

Unfortunately, the recent string of events appears to point to the latter. Mortars were fired on upon a plane carrying U.S. Congressman Donald Payne as it took off from Mogadishu airport on Monday (al-Shabab has claimed responsibility for the act). Pirates attempted an attack on a second U.S. vessel today, and have hijacked four more ships since the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips. Where before I was willing to pass off acts of piracy as acts of desperate individuals attempting to sustain a livelihood, such events seem to suggest something quite different - no less so given the pirates' threats of defiant, bloody revenge.

The question of how to solve the piracy problem is fantastically complex, and I don't claim to have much in the way of a solution. There is much to consider and, as it stands, America appears caught between a rock and a hard place. Arrrghhh matey, indeed.

Noteworthy….

There is so much that I want to say today, but alas I woke up running, as it were, and am fantastically behind in all that I'm meant to accomplish. Nevertheless, I do want to bring several things to your attention:

China today released a Human Rights Plan, a lengthy document promising to Chinese citizens a myriad of civil liberties they have thus far been denied. The full text of the plan (in English) may be found here.

The U.S. is considering attacking Somali pirates' land bases. I'm not quite sure the U.S. knows what it's getting itself into should this go ahead. A horrible idea, if you ask me (more on this in upcoming posts!)

Arguably one of the better summaries of all that is right, and all that is wrong, with Dambisa Moyo's controversial book, Dead Aid.

Money as art: billboards, flyers and posters made from worthless Zimbabwean dollars (you can view the images here)

We all live in a (Chinese) submarine, a (Chinese) submarine, a (Chinese) submarine...

Is it just me, or are my postings increasingly coming to be inspired by Beatles' songs? The Anglophile in me is seemingly making a formidable comeback. No matter. Onto more important things - the Chinese navy, for instance.

China's increasingly capable navy has indeed been in the headlines lately for its first distant-waters deployment to combat Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. In early January, too, China's national defense spokesman made it clear that the Chinese navy is in the market for an aircraft carrier (though Chinese capacity to actually deploy carriers is at least a decade away - which, in fact, is not that long), and most recently, the government released its White Paper on National Defense, which highlights China's steadily growing military and naval capabilities. 

But what is really drawing attention from rival navies and the country's neighbors is action below the surface: Chinese submarine power! [enter Beatles' music here]. The Chinese have been making substantial investments in subs - buying from the Russians (typical) and building their own. Just last week, the Federation of American Scientists issued a report saying that U.S. naval intelligence counted 12 "patrols" by Chinese attack submarines in 2008 - twice the number in the previous year, and the highest thus far. 

The number of patrols still remains below the likely level of U.S attack submarine patrols, though higher than that of Russia.  It's unclear as to what, exactly, constitutes a patrol, but it's thought to mean an extended voyage.

The larger question, however, is what does all of this mean? If we think about this linearly, we quickly come to the conclusion that China is harnessing its military and naval capabilities (duh). But for what purpose? If the submarines deployed into the Pacific, for instance, this would break with Chinese policy of not deploying nuclear weapons outside Chinese territory. So, either Chinese policy will change (which presently appears unlikely), or the focus is directed elsewhere, most likely Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province. 

Indeed, second only to its economic development, Beijing's foremost focus is on national unity - the so-called "One China" policy.  Now don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting a Chinese naval advance on Taiwan - heaven forbid! What I am suggesting, however, is that the buildup and modernization of China's naval forces is in the short term intended to secure China's sphere of influence in the Pacific. I would be very surprised if the motivation was discovered to be otherwise. If we accept this as the case, the subsequent question then becomes what does this mean for geo-politics and, from the American standpoint, how concerned should we be? Is China's naval buildup of greater consequence than its global economic and diplomatic advances? And how, if at all, should the U.S. parry this perceived threat? 

Let's chat Somalia again, shall we?

In mid-December I posted on the then quickly collapsing state of affairs in Somalia, hypothesizing that al-Shabab would quickly move in to assert its control (quick refresher: al-Shabab is an extreme al-Qaeda aligned terrorist group that has been active in Somalia since 2006). Sure enough, the Shabab captured Mogadishu on Monday and have since declared the ascendancy of Islamic Law, threatening punishment on anyone who acts in opposition to it. The country now hangs in a period of uncertainty (sadly nothing new for this Horn of Africa country) until its new president is sworn in. A number of individuals have announced their candidacy for the post, including the Islamist Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. 

Some analysts remain optimistic about Somalia's future (bless them), reasoning that if al-Shabab is anything like other rebel groups, it will likely fracture from within before it manages to do any serious damage to the country. Drawing on the experiences of other African Islamic states, however, I remain huuugely skeptical. Al-Shabab may be a rebel group, but they are really, really good at what they do. Lucky for them, not so much for the rest of us.

Promises of governance (in whatever form...) have also done little to bring to a halt Somali pirates, who today seized a German tanker off the coast of Somalia. Japan is now trying its hand at tackling the pirates (I wonder if we might see a Japan vs. China pirate showdown... kidding, kidding), adding to what are already largely international efforts aimed at averting this growing threat. 

Curiously, under his presidency, George W. Bush pressed for a larger international force in Somalia, but was met with little support. It would seem that *gasp!* he may have been right. Indeed, of all the African challenges Obama now faces, I'd place Somalia's turmoils at top of the list. We need to keep our eyes on this one. 

A theory on China and pirates

A most interesting piece by Bright Simons in the Asia Times suggests China's recent naval dispatch to the Gulf of Aden is part of a broader Chinese strategy of "localized strategic combat," wherein isolated contentions over given resources, interests, and geo-political positions serve to advance Chinese global influence. This is especially true in the Horn of Africa, a key strategic outpost, particularly in light of its proximity to, and strategic ties with, key Middle Eastern (oil) states:

In June of last year, police in the breakaway region of Somaliland in Northern Somalia made an arrest that suggests strongly that Chinese operatives of uncertain affiliation were working with Yemenis in shadowy activities that may involve espionage-related gun-running. 

There have similarly been reports of a Chinese presence through Eritrean proxies in peace-building operations in the Eastern Sudan with the obvious aim of securing the 1,500-kilometer oil pipe that feeds Sudan's oil through the Red Sea into Chinese chimneys in Guangdong. (Contrast this with the US's persistent condemnation of Eritrean elements of fueling the Islamist insurrection in Somalia, and its dismissive attitude towards engagement with the Asmara elite.) 

Unconfirmed reports also suggest a major expansion of Chinese installations in another Red Sea state, Djibouti, even as tensions between the latter and brigand elements in Somalia rise. 

Incidents of this sort are even more interesting because, for several years now, PLA-dominated "multinationals" like Norinco and the Poly Group have been sharpening the capacity of Beijing to match the flair the West once showed in intermixing commerce, investment, arms trading and influence-peddling to minimize the scope for nationalist repercussions (the Horn of Africa receives roughly 70% of China's direct investment into Africa). 

In the context of such activities, the piece proceeds to suggest that the recent naval dispatch is a component of this broader strategic effort at international expansionism - "expansionism by a thousand strides," if you will:

When all is said, it is far from difficult to lay out the pieces in the Gulf of Aden with respect to a "strategic combat" configuration. 

China considers the Middle East treacherous and apparently prefers to undertake its penetration by circumnavigation, and Africa offers favorable currents for its choice of trajectory, which is not to say that the continent in and of itself is not a destination.

Many (including myself) frequently fail to analyze China through such a militaristic, strategic lens. Most often, Beijing's human rights record and its economic expansion (and recent market volatility) steal the spotlight in analyses. Yet inasmuch as these factors characterize the CCP's agenda, it must be recalled that they remain components of a broader international scheme. It was not too long ago that the Chinese Navy set out to acquire an aircraft carrier, for instance. Chinese investors likewise  continue to break into an increasing number of developed markets.

If China is to continue its quest for international influence (and it will), it will likely be accomplished through precisely the sort of  "localized strategic combat" Simons outlines. Western governments seeking to parry such expansionism are thus left with the daunting task of figuring out exactly how. (Hint: Military build-up is not the answer. At least not in the short-term).

Non-interference no longer

It appears that China's policy of military non-interference has come to an end. China has announced today that it is to send naval ships to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia:

State media suggested the force could consist of two destroyers and a supply ship, although officials did not confirm the details of the deployment [...] China's navy, along with the rest of its military, has not often strayed far from home. But China's military spending has increased dramatically in recent years as its armed forces undergo a thorough modernisation.

This is its first active deployment beyond the Pacific, and naval analysts will be watching closely to see how the Chinese cope with the complex maintenance and re-supply problems of operating so far from home, the BBC's diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus says.

[...] The Gulf of Aden is a region of key strategic importance for China whose economy depends heavily upon a secure supply of oil and raw materials from abroad, our correspondent says.

Four or five Chinese ships pass through the busy channel every day.

Call for governance in Somalia straight from the mouths of pirates.... well, sort of

"I started to hijack these fishing boats in 1998. I did not have any special training but was not afraid. For our first captured ship we got $300,000. With the money we bought AK-47s and small speedboats. I don't know exactly how many ships I have captured since then but I think it is about 60. Sometimes when we are going to hijack a ship we face rough winds, and some of us get sick and some die.

We give priority to ships from Europe because we get bigger ransoms. To get their attention we shoot near the ship. If it does not stop we use a rope ladder to get on board. We count the crew and find out their nationalities. After checking the cargo we ask the captain to phone the owner and say that have seized the ship and will keep it until the ransom is paid.

Our community thinks we are pirates getting illegal money. But we consider ourselves heroes running away from poverty. We don't see the hijacking as a criminal act but as a road tax because we have no central government to control our sea.

With foreign warships now on patrol we have difficulties. But we are getting new boats and weapons. We will not stop until we have a central government that can control our sea."

A Somali pirate, interviewed by Xan Rice of The Guardian. [HT: Africa Works].

Pirrrrates... and what to do about them

Somali pirates have been all over the news lately: they hijacked an oil tanker off the coast of Kenya and steered it to the Somali port city, Eyl. The Saudi Arabian vessel - the Sirus Star - is the largest ever raided at sea. According to the FT, apart from the 25 sailors taken hostages, the vessel carried 2m barrels of oil worth about $100m, and accounting for one-quarter of Saudi daily output. Very impressive stuff, indeed. 

Yet this recent hijacking is not an isolated incident. There have been 95 attacks by Somali pirates on vessels this year alone (!), with 39 ships captured and 800 crew held. Events such as this are beginning to raise heightened concern among already worried international governments - many of whom rely on the Gulf of Aden for transport of key exports. In an attempt to combat such piracy, NATO has begun considering significantly extending its anti-piracy mission - Allied Provider - off Somalia.  Members of the international community from the left and right have likewise taken to weighing their options. The UK-based think tank, Chathahm House, has put out a paper examining several such options. You can find this paper here. 

Having had a bit of time to think about much of this, though, I've come to side with those who argue that the culprit of the problem - and the solution - is governance. While international law may take us so far in regulating the problem, lawyers are discovering that it might not take us as far as we would like. And even if it did, how do you impose law upon a lawless people? Somalia has not had a functioning government since 1991, and remains divided between several warring factions. Given the circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the country's people often resort to desperate acts to sustain themselves. Indeed, the majority of these pirates are Somali fisherman living on less than $1 a day; when given the opportunity to acquire a potential $25million (or thereabouts) they take their chances. I'm not sure I wouldn't, too.

So what's the solution to Somali piracy? Well, governance. Opportunities. Alternatives. How do we go about actualizing it? The international community has been trying to figure this one out for over a decade. A valuable first step is to begin paying attention to a country that has been neglected - by its own people and the international community. Every cloud has a silver lining: maybe with this hijacking will come some serious attempts at reform.