Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya
Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels
Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared
Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati
The much anticipated announcement of Google's plans for its Chinese market has finally come down the pipeline. The company has pulled out of the Chinese market, with Mainland customers being redirected to Google.hk.com - Google's Hong Kong server - as of early this morning. From Google's official corporate blog:
Users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong. Users in Hong Kong will continue to receive their existing uncensored, traditional Chinese service, also from Google.com.hk. Due to the increased load on our Hong Kong servers and the complicated nature of these changes, users may see some slowdown in service or find some products temporarily inaccessible as we switch everything over.
Chinese officials have issued angry remarks over the decision (the full text of which may be found here), accusing Google of violating corporate promises made when the company initially entered the Chinese market.
What Google's move actually means for the Chinese government, citizen access to information and foreign firms with operations in the country, however, stands to be determined. A few immediate scenarios come to mind. With respect to the former two matters, China could block the Hong Kong site altogether or indeed on a case-by-case basis, perhaps further using the incident to regulate Hong Kong's freedoms - a dangerous path upon which to embark, to be sure. If pursued, such a move could potentially result in an increasing percentage of China's citizenry learning how to use circumvention techniques to get around such censorship - or, perhaps, not. It is, as Rebecca MacKinnon observes, a question of how aware the Chinese are of their government-imposed and managed tunnel vision, and how determined they are to shake themselves from its shackles.
Beyond this, it wouldn't be surprising to find the government imposing increasingly stringent regulations on foreign companies breaking into the market in the future. Again, however, such an approach could potentially hamper FDI inflows into the country if orchestrated on a large enough scale, subsequently obstructing the CCP's objectives of increased investment and growth. Equally, then, growing in realization of the unaccommodating nature of its policies on FDI inflows into the country, we might observe a gradual liberalizing of CCP policies. 'Might' being the operative word in this context.
Indeed, Google's move this morning has seemingly opened a Pandora's box of question and possible policy options. It will be most interesting to track this story as it unfolds. It is most interesting, too, to a observe a corporation affecting a country's domestic - and potentially international - politics in such a profound way. For a great collection of papers on corporations and global governance, do please take a look at the St. Antony's International Review April 2009 issue, which focuses precisely on this very issue.
Hello (!), and thanks very much for being so patient while I transitioned back to an Oxonian existence. I'm nearly all settled and on something resembling a routine, which is quite exciting. Research productivity is still a matter to be tackled, but I'm getting there... slowly, slowly.
News while I was away? - Lots, really! Below is a little collection of stories which caught my attention when I finally sat down to catch-up on the world's goings-on. These are but several among many, to be sure:
Or so say Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini in the WSJ:
American and Chinese officials said all the right things during this summer's inaugural round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue. President Barack Obama pledged to "forge a path to the future that we seek for our children." Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo wondered aloud whether America and China can "build better relations despite very different social systems, cultures and histories." He answered his own question, in English, with a "Yes we can."
They can, but they probably won't. Yes, Mr. Obama will visit China in November. But when it comes to international burden-sharing, Washington is focused on geopolitical headaches while China confines its heavy-lifting to geoeconomic challenges. The two sides have good reason to cooperate, but there's a growing gap between what Washington expects from Beijing and what the Chinese can deliver.
I couldn't have said it better myself. Indeed, despite the flowery rhetoric and displays of diplomacy, it is most unlikely that the United States and China will come to establish a strategic partnership anytime in the near future. This has less to do with Washington's efforts, and everything to do with Beijing's lack of desire.
In their WSJ piece, Bremmer and Roubini highlight several obvious and less obvious obstacles to partnership. Most important among them in my view (economic tensions aside) is the third, which stresses the divergence in geopolitical goals between China and the U.S. China currently has very little interest in assuming a broad global role: it has no desire to shoulder the responsibilities that come with involvement in Iraq or Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, etc. Beijing isn't interested in filling the shoes of the world's policeman, if for no other reason than its continued adherence to the 'non-interference policy' - its recent evolution notwithstanding. What's more, Beijing depends on many troublesome countries (Iran, for instance) for its energy imports, and thus isn't likely to take a stand against them in a way that would be pleasing to the United States (or the rest of the international community, for that matter) anytime soon.
The underlying motive for much - if not all - of China's overseas exploits is its own self-interest: its growth and security. Where these objectives line up with global and U.S. demands, great. Where they don't... well, tough beans. As Bremmer and Roubini aptly note, one of course shouldn't be too quick to dismiss the value of U.S.-China dialogues and the surrounding political symbolism. When it comes to concretes, however, both parties are pulling in opposite directions - and likely will be for some time to come.
PS: I doubt that Chinese propaganda blaming the swine flu virus on America does much to further anything resembling a strategic partnership. At least the propaganda cartoon is cute....
Very rarely does one come across an authentically good foreign policy piece concerning U.S-China relations. Most analyses are highly polarized, stressing either engagement on the one hand or polarization on the other. What a joy it was to stumble upon today's Washington Post op-ed piece by Henry Kissinger! Independent of what one may think of Kissinger, his argument is an exemplar of brilliant realist foreign policy, which assumes a rather neutral position on U.S-China relations. No alarm bells or calls of 'can't we all just get along' involved. A snippet (you'll simply have to read the rest...):
China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America's largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides.
"The continent must not be like a beautiful fruit tree by the wayside. Every passer-by plucks a share and the fruit tree seems to forget that it could one day grow old.." Words of caution to Africans as both Russian and American leaders make trips to the continent
African leaders have denounced the ICC and refuse to extradite Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir, while others attempt to decipher what, exactly, this means
Niall Ferguson and James Fallows discuss the influence of China on the U.S. economy at the Aspen Ideas Festival
Win in China: a great documentary on the rise of entrepreneurship in China
As President Obama gets ready to make his first trip to Ghana this July, one cannot help but wonder how he will be received. Of course quite warmly, I imagine, especially in light of his Kenyan roots, but it will be quite curious to see how - if at all - China's growing influence on the continent has shifted African perceptions of American assistance. Bear in mind that this trip will be Obama's first to sub-Saharan Africa (and during his 8 years as President, Bush II visited the continent only twice); Chinese President Hu has visited 15 sub-Saharan states since 2004. And I needn't remind you of the litany of recent Chinese investments in the continent, dubious though some of them may be.
The question of U.S. versus Chinese influence in Africa is brought home quite nicely by Ken Maguire. In his article today, Maguire expounds on this battle of authorities, if you will, ultimately concluding that the U.S.-China relationship in Africa can be cooperative. There is no denying that it can't; the question, I feel is much more one of degrees. Obama's upcoming trip may indeed prove quite central in shedding light on this issue, along with countless others.
Despite the risks, though, there are good reasons for the Chinese to prod Kim Jong Il to keep those missiles coming. By permitting North Korea to rattle its sabers, the Chinese can monitor President Obama's reaction to a military threat -- without having to deploy a threat themselves. They can see how serious the new American administration is about controlling the spread of nuclear weapons -- without having to risk sanctions or international condemnation of their own nuclear industry. They can distract and disturb the new administration -- without harming Chinese American economic relations, which are crucial to their own regime's stability. And if the game goes badly, they can call it off altogether.
As long as its regime security and economic demands could be met, Pyongyang might be willing to give up its “nuclear car”. For the time being, it seems to me that all evidence points in the opposite direction. In fact, the recent nuclear testing by DPRK is not merely a slap in the Chinese face, but a sobering wake-up call for Chinese leadership to face up to the malign nature of their N. Korean counterparts.
This slap in the face may well "bring about the fundamental change of China's long-time policy of DPRK quickly." What this change will look like and what it will entail are not yet known. While I doubt that China will engage in measures such as the cutting off of oil and coal supplies, which would indubitably cripple the North Korean economy, it will find other ways to take a hard stand against North Korea's behavior. (Hopefully) it's just a matter of time.
Note to China: sooner would be better than later.
[...] There are always plenty of security forces around -- soldiers in green uniforms, various kinds of police in blue uniforms, and "plainclothes" forces who are pretty easy to pick out, like strapping young men in buzz cuts all wearing similar-looking "leisure" clothes. But I have not seen before anything like the situation at the moment.
There are more representatives in all categories -- soldiers, police, obvious plainclothesmen -- than I recall seeing even during the Tibet violence in early 2008 or through the Olympic games. Also many people whom you would normally classify as fruit vendors, tourists from the Chinese provinces, youngish white collar workers male and female, and skateboarder-looking characters wearing cargo shorts and with fauxhawk haircuts, were last night walking up and down the sidewalks with their eyes constantly on visitors and drifting up next to people who were holding conversations.
The way to avoid their attention is keep moving briskly along the sidewalk rather than stopping as if you think there is something particular to look at in the square today. The way to draw it is to stop and look around, to pay attention to the security forces themselves, or to have a camera in your hand.
Most local residents seemed not to know what the commotion was about. One man asked if there was something going on because Malaysia’s Prime Minister arrived in the capital yesterday. Before he could continue talking, several officers swooped in and told him to leave the area.
The man offered minor resistance, then left. But as he walked away, a camera-toting cop followed him, recording the man’s departure. Not realizing that the camera cop, who was wearing a white T-shirt and no badge, was with the authorities, the man demanded to be left alone, splashed his bottled drink on the camera cop’s face, then threw the empty bottle at his head before walking off. “Why are you following me?” he yelled. “What’s wrong with you?”
Old newspaper articles and other 19th-century accounts show hundreds of Chinese workers in both Napa and Sonoma counties.Many were farmers who brought their agricultural skills to the industry, helping establish vines and working in cellars. "There's more to this story. There's this whole human side of how the valley was developed," says Fong, who has researched the region's history.A 1967 paper by a Napa school official on file at the Napa County Historical Society records that when rains turned the 1887 grape harvest into a muddy mess, keeping wagons out, Chinese workers waded in barefoot and hauled out the grapes.But 19th-century Chinese in California faced fierce discrimination, including laws banning them from owning property and campaigns urging farmers not to hire them. In 1882, Congress passed an immigration ban on Chinese. Populations dwindled and rural Chinatowns disappeared as workers headed to cities.
A curious tidbit to showcase at your next tasting excursion, and an interesting history to ponder the next time you take a sip of a brilliant Napa Valley wine (may I suggest the Joseph Phelps Insignia Napa Valley 2002. Simply amazing).
[HT: Vinography]
Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann is clueless about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. In fact, it seems she’s clueless about what a reserve currency is. That’s why, in reaction to China’s SDR proposal, she’s introducing legislation to “bar the dollar from being replaced by any foreign currency.” And apparently a lot of people are similarly confused and need a quick explanation of the difference between legal tender and currency reserves.
If Rep. Bachmann’s office needs some assistance with international economics, I’d be happy to provide some advice over the phone at a reasonable price.
Having had my fair share of economic discussions with Jonathan, I can readily vouch for his expertise.
Having had their fair share of international gaffes in recent weeks, too (see here and here, for instance), I would urge U.S. politicians to do engage in greater background research before making future pronouncements (pertaining to anything, really) or attempting gestures of goodwill. Unfortunately, things in this department do not appear especially promising: standing in front of the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe, which was "miraculously imprinted by Mary on the tilma, or cloak, or Juan Diego in 1531," Hilary Clinton on her recent trip to Mexico turned to the priest who was showing her the Basilica and asked, "Who painted it?"
Quite frankly I don't know how anyone is to take the U.S. seriously if such blunders continue to be made. Of course such slips of the tongue occur frequently in the wonderful world that is international relations, but one would hope that politicians in the world's superpower would be sufficiently knowledgeable on what really are commonplace matters. Even I understand the difference between legal tender and currency reserves, and I will be the first to admit that economics is not my forte.
While on the surface such slips may not appear to be a big deal, they do go a long way in discrediting the United States in the global arena, and are likewise utilized by leaders in countries who are interested in asserting their superiority over (or equality to) the U.S. in doing precisely that. China is no exception.
[HT: Andrew Sullivan]
A nation that freed itself from an apartheid government, South Africa would seem to have much in common with leading liberation figures like the Dalai Lama, who speaks for about 5.4 million Tibetans, who live under Chinese rule.But as a nation that depends heavily on Chinese markets for buying its rich natural resources, South Africa has given the appearance of having chosen commerce over principle. It's a decision that could cost South Africa its moral voice on the global stage.
Todd Moss, quoting Nelson Mandela's grandson, organizer of the peace conference which was to host the Dalai Lama, observes:
This rejection by the government, to not issue a visa, is really tainting our efforts at democracy. It’s a sad day for South Africa. It’s a sad day for Africa…Where are we heading in the future?
Straight into the open arms of the Chinese, I would argue. Indeed, they must be quite pleased with themselves in Beijing, what with a growing number of countries wrapped around their finger - in Africa and beyond. While many countries are quick to pledge their allegiance to the Chinese for purely economic purposes, in some cases the reasoning is rooted in greater historical motivations, as appears to be the case in El Salvador:
The FMLN has never forgotten that ARENA founder Roberto D'Aubuisson, who organized and led the death squads which tortured and killed thousands of civilians and who directly ordered the assassination of Archbishop of San Salvador Monsignor Oscar Romero on March 24, 1980 that sparked the civil war, was trained in "police techniques" in Taiwan.
Moreover, unlike Nicaragua, Guatemala or Paraguay, Taiwan has been unable to develop solid political dialogue with the FMLN even under DPP President Chen Shui-bian.
Dual recognition appears to be out of the question for El Salvador, handing another diplomatic win (of sorts) to the Chinese. Indeed, it's important to recall that for the leaders in Beijing, national unity is of utmost importance, second only to economic growth. And for developing countries struggling to sustain their growth rates in the face of an ongoing economic crisis, acknowledging Chinese national integrity is a small price to pay for the goods handed in return. While scholars and policymakers alike sometimes tend to bypass the centrality of the "One China" principle, it remains a central tenet of Chinese foreign policy, not to be overlooked.
As for South Africa awarding Castro the Order of Companions of O.R. Tambo in Gold award... your guess is as good as mine.
In the ocean immediately beyond the city are a few islands of particular interest to China:
- Japan: the old rival, whose rapid modernisation preceded China’s, but now eclipsed and reduced to a few harmless islands.
- Taiwan: similarly superseded by China’s massive economic progress, but still relevant as the rival claimant to be China’s ‘legitimate’ government. Even more repulsive to mainland China is a competing strand of current Taiwanese politics, striving for ‘independence’ and thus eschewing the ‘One China’ policy still officially espoused by both the communist mainland and nationalist Taiwan.
- Hong Kong: the former British crown colony that was handed back to China in 1997 and which has been allowed a degree of autonomy unthinkable elsewhere in China (e.g. Tibet) under an agreement often referred to as ‘One Country, Two Systems’, whereby Hong Kong was allowed to retain its capitalist system and its civil liberties, including inchoate democratic institutions.
- Spratly Islands: a sprawling archipelago of over 600 islets, atols and reefs in the South China Sea, between Vietnam and the Philippines, with barely 5 square kilometers of dry land between them. Because of their strategic location, the Spratlys, or parts of them, are claimed and partly occupied by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia - and as such are a flashpoint waiting to happen.
Across a narrow representation of the Pacific Ocean lies the continent apparently most on China’s mind - America. And especially, apart from a tiny slice labelled Canada and a small appendage being dug up for minerals called South America, the United States. The US is a crumbling empire, with the Statue of Liberty clutching a begging bowl and holding up a sign saying: Please give generously. Next to some shacks is a sign saying Foreclosure Sale (a reference to the house repossessions that are symptomatic of the credit crunch which triggered the present economic recession). Wall Street is a fault almost splitting the US in two.
Europe is much smaller and more irrelevant than America, in the ocean beyond it. All that distinguishes it are Prada and Hermes, two brands of luxury fashion accessories, and presumably very popular with the wealthy Chinese elite - suggesting that Europe is only interesting to China as a glorified shopping mall.
Next to Europe is Africa, equally distant from China, but at least decked out with some of the implements of industry, referring to the large investments China is making in Africa, benefiting the poorest continent with new infrastructure and providing China with access to much-needed raw materials for its burgeoning industry.
The United States can do more to collaborate with China in the developing world, particularly in the areas of energy, health, agriculture, and peacekeeping. If such collaboration were to take place, the United States and China would find themselves working toward a greater global public good.Perhaps of particular interest to readers of this blog will be the chapter on 'China's Soft Power in Africa,' written by Jennifer Cooke. Though much of Cooke's analysis has now been relegated to mere common knowledge (e.g. the Chinese are foremost interested in access to resources; much of China's loan money is given in the form of concessional loans; the Chinese government emphasizes the 'win-win' nature of Sino-African partnerships, etc.), she does an interesting job of comparing Chinese engagements in the continent with current U.S. engagements.
Analysts speculate as to Chinese intentions, but in a sense it really does not matter what Beijing is trying to accomplish. Its conduct is simply unacceptable. Washington, however, seeks to establish “dialogue” with China’s generals, admirals, and officials as if their belligerent acts are the result of the lack of contact. It is simply ludicrous for the Obama White House to claim that the Chinese want to “strengthen cooperation” or build a “positive and constructive” relationship after engaging in such truculent behavior.And it is wrong to suggest that incidents can be avoided in the future if we only increase the level of communication or its frequency. We have had formal and informal military relations with China for decades, and now there is even a brand new mil-to-mil hotline connecting the United States to China. So it is an attack on common sense for the Pentagon to claim that “face-to-face dialogue in Beijing and in Washington will go a long way to clearing up any misunderstanding about this incident.” The problem is not that we don’t talk to the Chinese enough or that we misunderstand them. It is that they are hostile.
The hostile Chinese? David Axe doesn't appear to think so:
To be clear, Beijing and Washington are not enemies, Robert Kaplan stressed in a recent article for Foreign Affairs. Rather, China is a "legitimate peer competitor" of the United States. The task of the U.S. Navy will therefore be to quietly leverage the sea power of its closest allies -- India in the Indian Ocean and Japan in the western Pacific -- to set limits on China's expansion.
One would be hard-pressed to deny China as a "legitimate peer competitor," yet I would argue that some of this legitimacy is lost when harassment is adopted as a strategic tactic. There is nothing wrong with a state wanting to mark its territory; it is the fashion by which it goes about doing so, however, that sets the tone. As the old adage goes, actions speak louder than words.
Iranian state television quoted a senior government official as saying the deal with a Chinese consortium, announced two days after the Obama administration renewed U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic, would eventually include an unnamed European country as a partnerUnder the three-year deal, China will help develop the South Pars field, a sprawling cavity beneath the Persian Gulf seabed that is part of what geologists describe as the world's largest natural gas reservoir.
[T]his now-traditional Chinese approach is fast approaching the limits of its utility. By refusing to use China’s immense leverage with Iran to nudge Tehran toward verifying to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council that Iran’s nuclear programs are not in pursuit of nuclear weapons, Beijing is allowing the Persian Gulf to drift toward increased instability that is not in China’s own best interests. The two probable outcomes of the current course of events over the Iran nuclear imbroglio are these. First, war triggered by Israeli pre-emptive attack, with or without U.S. support. Or, second, increased international rivalry via increased Iranian assertiveness once Iran possesses nuclear weapons or the capability to fabricate those in short order. The already wobbling Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime would also be further weakened, perhaps fatally by Iranian nuclear weapons capability. None of these outcomes is in China’s interests. Nor the world’s.
