Noteworthy...

Posting here will likely be light(-ish) through the end of this month, as I'm currently in the process of moving back to Oxford after a year-long hiatus. As you might imagine, things are rather hectic, and I imagine that they will remain as such until I'm properly settled in the city of dreaming spires come the end of September/early October. Please do bear with me!

For now, some very noteworthy reads (now bulleted for your reading pleasure owing to their number. Slightly more optically pleasing, no?):

• Protests have again broken out in Urumqi, the capital of China's Xinjiang province, two months after the initial turmoil. Thousands of Han Chinese have taken to the street touting the "uselessness" of the government and its failure to provide appropriate security protections in the region
• John Prendergast, co-chair of the ENOUGH Project, discusses the flaws in the Obama administration's Sudan policy and what should be done to remedy them. Mark Goldberg was right: Darfur activists appear to be losing their patience
• Gmail was down for a while this week, and it seems that the world nearly stood still. Why do we freak out over such seemingly insignificant technical glitches?
• It's no secret that the Chinese cook their books. What's perhaps less well known is that the cooking is done not by central CCP bureaucrats, but by local and provincial government officials. Such a reality speaks to the complexities of center-periphery relations in the country
• Is Kenya falling apart? It certainly appears that way, especially with the Kenyan state growing increasingly less visible and less relevant
• One-third of Chinese scientists want to switch careers and wouldn't recommend their profession to their children. Too little pay, too much work
• While I'm certainly no expert on Honduran politics, I nevertheless find it rather curious that the U.S. is threatening not to recognize the results of the Honduran elections to be held this November. This decision is based on the "current existing conditions" in the country, which have deteriorated since the June 28 coup. If this is indeed the sole guiding motive, surely the U.S. should not have recognized the Iranian election results either?
• Via Texas in Africa I learn of a brilliant series being run by Myles Estey over at The Esteyonage. The series, 'Gettin by,' looks at the micro-economy of Liberia and the means by which people outside the national statistics make a living. While the focus in solely on Liberia, the findings are indubitably applicable to other African states as well
• Amartya Sen's new book, The Idea of Justice, is 490-some pages of wise Sen-isms. Two themes predominate: economic rationality and social injustice. Occasional swings at John Rawls are also taken, which (depending on your guiding philosophy) make the book both witty and exceptionally informative. The Economist's review of the book may be found here

China's minority problems in (visual) perspective

New violence erupted in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Province, today as Chinese police shot dead two Uighur men. Despite an attempted return to normalcy, tensions in Xinjiang - and in China more generally - remain high. Jonathan Fenby has an excellent opinion piece in today's FT in which he explains how these recent events in Xinjiang highlight the nature of (and problems with) China's governing structure. Certainly worth a read.

The NYTimes also had a great graphic over the weekend showing the parts of China with significant minority populations. Minority here refers to one of the 55 recognized groups other than Han Chinese. The linked graphic enables you to view regions in China that have from 10 to 70% minority populations. The image below highlights the counties where at least half of the population is something other than Han:

While the graphic is somewhat misleading in that the Western provinces are very lightly populated compared to the highly populous eastern Han region, it nevertheless provides a very good visual of the control issues faced by China's central government. The very issues that Fenby does so well to outline in his OpEd piece, and the ones that stand to challenge the CCP's 'One China' ideology.

China's ethnic turmoil

When we talk about polities marred by ethnic divisions and unequal modernization and economic growth, China is often not the first country that comes to mind. One is perhaps more inclined to picture a Nigeria or a Sudan, for instance. Yet ethnic tensions have been and remain among the defining features of the Middle Kingdom, which is why the recent unrest is rather unsurprising, though nevertheless quite upsetting.

From what I've been able to gather, no one appears to know exactly what triggered the Uighur violence. While some blame it on exiled Uighur Rebiya Kadeer, others suggest the violence was triggered by a brawl which took place in factory several weeks ago and has since escalated. Naturally, leaders in Beijing blame the West for masterminding the whole thing, though I find little basis for such accusations if for no other reason than the simple fact that the West has little political or strategic interest in China's Muslim community. There were/are twenty-two Uighurs captive in Gitmo, though I doubt the protests have anything to do with this. Rather, the strife seems to be a purely domestic matter, with a historically marginalized sector of the populace acting out against state policies that continue to leave them on the periphery of economic growth, especially since large numbers of Han Chinese have moved into the traditionally Muslim province and are usurping jobs from resident Uighurs.

Of course this is no justification for such awful acts of violence. Since the Uighur riots began on Sunday, 156 individuals have been killed and over 1,400 arrested in what is said to be the worst ethnic violence since the Cultural Revolution. Despite the fact that the population in Xinjiang comprises less than 1.5% of China's overall population, the State is heavily cracking down on the violence so as to preserve the "stability of the state," which is another way of saying 'One China'.

It is important to remember that Beijing's 'One China' policy is directed not only at Tibet and Taiwan, but any separatist movements, of which the Uighurs in Xinjiang are one. Many Chinese likewise uphold the notion of 'One China' which adds yet another element of complexity to the ongoing protests. One could say that the Uighurs are protesting against their marginalization and (perhaps symbolically) for separation, while the Han Chinese are protesting against the protests and for One China. In a curious way, these protests call into question the very notion of Han nationalism, which has long been regarded as a sort of ideological superglue holding together a united China. I seriously question the strength of this glue to begin with, but it seems to be wearing off - if it was even there to begin with.

As with the ongoing turmoil in Iran, the outcome of the unrest in Xinjiang is unclear. Fresh demonstrations have started in the capital Urumqi despite ongoing internet restrictions aimed at quelling the violence. Yet it does seem unlikely that all of this will amount to much. The government in Beijing certainly isn't likely to change its policies, and I don't know that the Uighurs are powerful enough as a group to continue with their tactics in the face of a powerful State. As was the case with 2008 Tibetan unrest, I sense that the protests may go on for a little while longer until the costs of violence will outweigh the benefits and all will be calm (at least on the exterior) once again. After all, the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Communist takeover is fast approaching and the CCP has other matters to tend to. Dealing with an ethnic minority who resents the loss of its culture, freedom and the ability to determine its future is not one of them.

photo credit: UK Times