Looking back, moving forward

With the year drawing to a close, it's often customary for individuals, organizations, bloggers, etc. to compile lists -- lists which, in their view, somehow encapsulate the passing year. Admittedly I have no such list to offer, though would like to draw your attention to a few rather worthwhile compilations. While not quite of the 'year in review' variety, I believe they actually say more than any such list would.

  • Arguably most interesting is Elizabeth Dickinson's post in Foreign Policy which examines what the leaked US diplomatic cables reveal about the world's rogue states. Dickinson conveniently breaks down the information into 'what we know' and 'what we learn,' with a few 'curve balls' thrown in for good measure. A most fascinating read.
  • Russell Leigh Moses of the WSJ points us to the top China political trends to watch in 2011, which say much about what transpired in 2010
  • In a similar vein, Reuters has compiled what they believe will be the leading global political risk trends for 2011 (all links are pdf), broken down regionally: Global risks/trends; Western Europe; Emerging Europe; Africa; Middle East; Latin America; United States
It is also incumbent upon me to call your attention to a new expert blog, written by the Council on Foreign Relation's senior fellow for Africa policy studies, Ambassador John Campbell. In 'Africa in Transition,' Campbell examines political and security developments in sub-Saharan Africa in a most astute fashion. Though much of the posting tends to focus on Nigeria in particular, there is much fascinating insight to be garnered.

And with that I wish you all the best for the coming New Year. May 2011 be kind to us all!

IMF releases Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Head-scratching ensues.

The IMF has recently released it Regional Economic Outlook (2010-2011) for Sub-Saharan Africa, the link to which may be found here (pdf file). What I find especially curious is the report's suggestion that Africa's national elections have little to no bearing on economic activity in the states in which they transpire. A rather erroneous wedge between politics and economics, I would be inclined to argue.

If one does follow the IMF's claim to its logical conclusion, however, the good news is that the 17 elections* scheduled to take place across the continent over the course of the coming year will have absolutely no impact on neither growth nor general investment prospects in any of these states.

What do we think?


* Countries where major elections in 2011 are planned or have been mooted include Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Changed priorities ahead

For the past few months I have been toying with the idea of returning to blogging, having (rather reluctantly) given up the enterprise some time ago. The thing with bloggers these day, I find, is that they do it constantly or not at all: it's either job-like or it's not. Falling the category of 'almost-but-not-quite-willing-to-dedicate-my-life-to-blogging' of bloggers, I relinquished the task, only to be confronted by an old Oxford tutor of mine the other day, who immediately prompted to enquire about my absence from the blog-o-sphere. Perhaps his words were merely intended as polite chit-chat, or perhaps he was indeed genuine in his desire to see my thoughts plastered all over the internet -- either way, here I am back; inspired and ready and willing to reengage in discussion with those of you out there.


My time away has been quite curious, divided as it was between fieldwork in Addis Ababa, holidays on the American east coast, and -- of course -- Oxford. My research has shifted slightly, away from the more economical and towards the more political. My time in the field has led me to the (perhaps anticlimactic) conclusion that China's economic competition in Africa can largely be understood in simple market economic terms (i.e. competition), and save for curious loopholes and investment advantages enjoyed by Chinese firms, the story more or less stops there. Where it begins is with the political and cultural/societal implications of China's engagement with Africa: not only for the African countries themselves, but for the region and international community more generally.


The NYTime's David Sanger had a perhaps slightly obvious though nevertheless worthwhile piece on "the three faces of China" which very much speaks to this issue. Sanger argues:

In one sense, there’s nothing surprising about a rising power finding subtle ways to handle complex problems. But before China’s breakout from poverty to arguably the world’s No. 2 economy, its default position on foreign policy was to restate the principle of non-interference in other nations’ affairs and focus largely on its neighborhood.

That was before it had the military resources and the incentive to start thinking of how to secure and defend interests around the globe. Today, its interests include access to oil in places like Sudan and Iran, safe shipping around the Horn of Africa, the ability to manipulate its currency for its own gain.

And for the first time, the world is seeing a distinct range of behaviors, from aggressive to passive-aggressive to diplomatic, in places that 20 years ago China’s leaders rarely thought about.

What American diplomats and analysts now have to figure out is what drives China’s actions and responses, how to try to shape them and, some would argue, what limits to try to set

Not only American diplomats, but indeed international leaders generally. Though the 'China threat' theory was perhaps a bit too overplayed, China's global political rise remains largely underplayed, presented as an event that may or may not occur at some point in the distant future. A balance must be found, preferably sooner rather than later.

Sino-African relations during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.)

I've recently been working on a chapter which is to be included in a great forthcoming book edited by Emma Mawdsley and Gerard McCann on contemporary Indian-African relations. The chapter examines in a comparative perspective Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in the East African economies, ultimately arguing that the competitive advantages enjoyed by the Chinese enable them to out-compete their Indian-origin and African counterparts.


In conducting research for the piece, I stumbled across a fascinating source on Sino-African relations which - finally and thankfully - puts a lid on any claims of novelty surrounding present bilateral relations, tracing interactions between Chinese and African merchants back in time across the centuries. The source is the Yu-yang-tsa-tu written by Tuan Ch'eng-shih during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D). The Yu-yang-tsa-tu is a compendium of general knowledge written about the land of 'Po-pa-li,' i.e. present day Somalia, and it describes from a Chinese perspective daily life in Po-pa-li and, perhaps most curiously, the blood oaths taken between Chinese and Somali traders prior to engaging in the barter of goods. Those were the days.


Excerpts from the book may be found in Robert Collin's East African History v. 2 (African History in Documents), snippets of which are available through Google books. The work is, above all else, a fascinating insight into not only (very) early-day Somalia, but also early Chinese perceptions of Africa - some of which remain unaltered today.

Cruel Ethiopia

As an avid reader of the New York Review of Books and, equally, having a distinct interest in African politics, I was quite thrilled to read Helen Epstein's piece in the NYRB, "Cruel Ethiopia." In the piece, Epstein addresses the pitfalls of foreign aid as they are manifest in Ethiopia in particular and - I would argue - in Africa, generally:


The Western Renaissance helped to democratize “the word” so that all of us could speak of our own individual struggles, and this added new meaning and urgency to the alleviation of the suffering of others. The problem with foreign aid in Ethiopia is that both the Ethiopian government and its donors see the people of this country not as individuals with distinct needs, talents, and rights but as an undifferentiated mass, to be mobilized, decentralized, vaccinated, given primary education and pit latrines, and freed from the legacy of feudalism, imperialism, and backwardness. It is this rigid focus on the “backward masses,” rather than the unique human person, that typically justifies appalling cruelty in the name of social progress.

Epstien's piece does an apt job highlighting not only the herd mentality which continues to typify foreign assistance strategies, but further emphasizes a point which many fail to, or are otherwise unwilling to, appreciate: more often than not, the domestic policies maintained by the governments of recipient states are the culprits of poverty and oppression, and stand to be exacerbated by inflows of aid money. Ethiopia is, for instance, rapidly becoming among the most repressive and dictatorial countries on the continent, and yet simultaneously remains the subject of an informal experiment to discover whether the "big push" approach to African development will (finally) succeed.


The trouble with aid is precisely this "big push" approach. Programs must become increasingly tailored to the particular contexts for which they are intended, and targeted to achieve very specific aims. The Gates Foundation is seemingly growing cognizant of this fact as it is revamping its 'war on polio' campaign, moving away from its hitherto pursued strategy of vertical health programs towards investments in health systems. For any foreign assistance strategy to fulfill its intended function, an enabling framework must indeed be in place, be it a viable health system or a healthy government. Of course this is a tired argument, having been repeated ad nauseam within the development literature. Nevertheless, Epstein's piece does a wonderful job of highlighting this reality in the context of a country often left out of the development discourse.

Get real, Bob

I have in recent days been preparing myself for the St. Andrew's Economic Forum, which is to take place this weekend - volcanic ash cloud permitting. I've been invited to moderate an exceptional panel on China-Africa relations, which will explore the developmental potential China brings to the continent, as well as other key issues pertaining to environmental sustainability, human rights, trends in Chinese investment and so forth.


In the course of my preparations, I happened to stumble upon a great piece by Richard Dowden - Director of the Royal African Society and one of the panelists - regarding the discovery this past March that millions of dollars in Western aid money which were sent to Ethiopia to aid victims of the 1984-5 famine were used not for purposes of food supplies, but rather to purchase weapons. This news of course set off bells and whistles among the donor community and do-gooder, pseudo-intellectual, save-the-planet types like Bono and - most prominently - 80s rock star Bob Geldof, whose 1985 Live Aid concert was used to fundraise for the cause. Geldof went on something of a rampage against the BBC - who first revealed the news - stating (shouting, in fact!): "Produce me one shred of evidence and I promise you I will professionally investigate it, I will professionally report it, and if there is any money missing I will sue the Ethiopian government for that money back and I will spend it on aid." Yes, good. Good luck with that.


Whilst Geldof's anger may be understandable, it altogether demonstrates a fantastic ignorance of Africa: its issues, needs and complexities. An ignorance which, unfortunately, persists today among celebrities and aid agencies who have placed themselves on a do-or-die mission to "save Africa." With respect to the Ethiopian case, Dowden hits the nail on the head:

The impression was made that nature had caused the great hunger, a terrible Biblical plague, an act of God. All the poor Ethiopians needed was food.


They did need food but they also needed peace. Rebel movements were driving the government and its army out of two mountainous region, Tigray and Eritrea. The government, headed by the military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba and had the biggest army in Africa.


Mengistu ruled with brutal Soviet-style policies of forced migration and starvation. Traditional trade routes and the movement of much-needed food was impossible. The well-organised rebels received almost no help from anyone. They lived off the land, captured weapons from their enemy and taxed the people to buy more guns and ammunition.

Ethiopia's famine, Dowden goes on to aptly note, was ultimately caused not by a localised drought, but by a dictatorship that led to war. War disrupted trade, prevented food being moved in and caused famine. The aid community at the time failed to realize this - or perhaps chose not to. Raising funds for weaponry to support a rebel movement is arguably more difficult and less glamorous than fundraising to feed starving African children, whose pictures flash across TV screens and appear in glossy magazines. Yet the reality of aid politics in Africa is complex, messy and - often - unpleasant. The aid community must finally and fully come around to this realization and, moreover, must cease treating the continent as a helpless child in need of rescue. As the Ethiopian case makes plainly evident, Ethiopia in the 1980s understood what it needed - weapons. Africa today likewise understands what it needs - trade, aid, investment; the rise of a middle class and an educated, skilled population.


It's time to change the nature of the questions we've been posing regarding African development, and get real. And Bob, stop your shouting.

Noteworthy...

Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya


Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels


Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared


Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati


On the Chinese presence in Zambia

A recent paper of mine, "From formal- to informal-sector employment: examining the Chinese presence in Zambia," has been published in the Review of African Political Economy. The paper in full can be found here (PDF; subscription may be required), and the abstract noted here below:

This paper analyses China's recent engagement with Zambia, examining especially Chinese hiring practices, methods of business organisation and the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated construction and mining firms. Moving beyond existing analyses which remain focused solely on Chinese trade, aid and investment, this study begins to explore the micro-level of Chinese ventures, arguing that the continued employment of co-nationals as well as the generally substandard labour conditions maintained by Chinese firms lead to the offloading of Zambian workers into the country's burgeoning informal economy. There, newly emerged Chinese businesses stand to threaten local entrepreneurs who lack the resources necessary to parry Chinese competition. The result is a rapidly growing national unemployment rate and an increasing number of Zambians left struggling to sustain their livelihoods. This paper further argues that the characteristics defining China's engagement with Zambia are not particular to the Zambian context alone, but are rather abiding characteristics of overseas Chinese businesses in general. The paper ultimately calls for a policy framework regulating Chinese business activities in Zambia, lest the negative consequences of the Sino-Zambian partnership prevail.
Keywords: Chinese entrepreneurs; labour relations; Zambia; mining; informal economy; economic development

One world; one China; no Google

The much anticipated announcement of Google's plans for its Chinese market has finally come down the pipeline. The company has pulled out of the Chinese market, with Mainland customers being redirected to Google.hk.com - Google's Hong Kong server - as of early this morning. From Google's official corporate blog:

Users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong. Users in Hong Kong will continue to receive their existing uncensored, traditional Chinese service, also from Google.com.hk. Due to the increased load on our Hong Kong servers and the complicated nature of these changes, users may see some slowdown in service or find some products temporarily inaccessible as we switch everything over.

Chinese officials have issued angry remarks over the decision (the full text of which may be found here), accusing Google of violating corporate promises made when the company initially entered the Chinese market.


What Google's move actually means for the Chinese government, citizen access to information and foreign firms with operations in the country, however, stands to be determined. A few immediate scenarios come to mind. With respect to the former two matters, China could block the Hong Kong site altogether or indeed on a case-by-case basis, perhaps further using the incident to regulate Hong Kong's freedoms - a dangerous path upon which to embark, to be sure. If pursued, such a move could potentially result in an increasing percentage of China's citizenry learning how to use circumvention techniques to get around such censorship - or, perhaps, not. It is, as Rebecca MacKinnon observes, a question of how aware the Chinese are of their government-imposed and managed tunnel vision, and how determined they are to shake themselves from its shackles.


Beyond this, it wouldn't be surprising to find the government imposing increasingly stringent regulations on foreign companies breaking into the market in the future. Again, however, such an approach could potentially hamper FDI inflows into the country if orchestrated on a large enough scale, subsequently obstructing the CCP's objectives of increased investment and growth. Equally, then, growing in realization of the unaccommodating nature of its policies on FDI inflows into the country, we might observe a gradual liberalizing of CCP policies. 'Might' being the operative word in this context.


Indeed, Google's move this morning has seemingly opened a Pandora's box of question and possible policy options. It will be most interesting to track this story as it unfolds. It is most interesting, too, to a observe a corporation affecting a country's domestic - and potentially international - politics in such a profound way. For a great collection of papers on corporations and global governance, do please take a look at the St. Antony's International Review April 2009 issue, which focuses precisely on this very issue.

The comeback kid

It truly is embarrassing, this unintended hiatus I've taken from posting here. Over the past several months I on occasion vowed to myself to "get back to it next week," but - as is plainly evident - with little success. I do wish I could proffer an explanation for my absence, but I must confess that there isn't one worthy of mention. Whatever the case, I've returned with high hope and intention to be more diligent in my writings on this space; indeed, there is much about which to write.


The past few months have been spent refining and focusing on my PhD dissertation which, I'm quite pleased to say, is slowly beginning to take form. My research has shifted slightly from its previous focus on Chinese entrepreneurs in East Africa (though this still very much informs my work), to asking broader questions of the geo-strategic sort - in the context of Sino-Ethiopian relations in particular. In the course of my research I have admittedly grown rather frustrated with the emergent body of literature on China-Africa relations, consisting as it does of the same themes repeated over and over and over again. There's a song out these days by Iyaz, an allegedly up-and-coming young rapper, entitled "Replay;" part of the song's refrain goes: "It's like my iPod stuck on replay, replay-ay-ay-ay....". Most applicable to literature on Sino-African relations, unfortunately.


It's not the the literature is bad per se, but rather that in both asking the same questions and in treating China's forays into Africa an an international anomaly unseen in any other time or place we are, I think, asking the wrong questions. We need to take a step back, I believe, and look at the big picture: the Chinese aren't the only investors in Africa; what else is going on? How do all of these intersection points of agency stand to influence the continent? And influence in what way? Politically? Socially? Economically? What about China? How does Africa fit into China's grand strategy? What is that strategy? Who's strategy? And on the African side of things, too, where is the agency? What are the key strategic interests? How does China fit into Africa's strategy and the strategies of its constituent member states? By asking these (and indeed other) questions the phenomenon known as "China in Africa" is seemingly removed from the vacuum in which it has hitherto been resident and begins to take on new and exciting dimensions. Indeed, we all know that China seeks Africa's resources - and Africa in turn China's investment. There is, however, more to the story.


Relatedly (or perhaps not), together with a friend and colleague, I've published a paper as part of Afrobarometer's Working Paper Series. The paper focuses on African perceptions of the bourgeoning Chinese presence in the continent, further deciphering the factors informing the views held. The full paper may be found here. I will leave it to you to decide in which category of writing it should be placed.

While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).


Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

  • The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
  • Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
  • Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
  • In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
  • A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
  • An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
  • The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
  • A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
  • On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

A market for aid?

In his new essay on aid, Owen Barder argues that policies to improve aid have - and continue to - rely too much on a planning paradigm that attempts to ignore, rather than change, the political economy of aid:

It is tempting to conclude that the answer is for donors to defer to the leadership of developing country governments, especially given the commitments to this in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. But that assumes away the problem. The balance of power between donors and recipients converges on an equilibrium which balances the various interests of the givers and receivers of aid, and the implementing agents. If we find this equilibrium unsatisfactory, we have to change the determinants of the equilibrium, not simply try to move away from it.

Barder posits a combination of market mechanisms, networked collaboration and collective regulation as more likely to herald the desired results than the hitherto pursued policy approaches. Such coordination, he argues, can improve accountability, reduce information asymmetries, and reduce principal-agent problems currently faced by donor agencies. In so doing, they can help to change the political economy of aid, and so move the political equilibrium.


Arguably Barder's most controversial suggestion is the unbundling of funding from aid management to create more explicit markets for aid delivery. What this means in practice is opening up contracts to competition among a range of aid delivery agencies, both public and private. Such competition could lead to greater specialisation and division of labour, incentives to define and measure results, etc.


The UNDP (among countless such aid agencies, to be sure!) must be reeling. What are your thoughts?


(PS. For more from Owen have a look at his blog, found here)

Where have all the (good) African leaders gone?

It would seem that there are no worthwhile (past) African leaders in the entirety of Africa.


The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, established on the premise of improving the quality of governance across the continent, has for the past several years awarded the African Leadership Prize to previous leaders who have done well to support the cause of good governance in their respective countries. This year no such prize was awarded. While Ibrahim claims that there are "no issues of disrespect" surrounding the decision, it nevertheless comes as quite a low blow, especially to the likes of Mbeki and Kufour who - while no doubt boasting highly dubious governance records - were the likely contenders.


Aside from a nice pat on the back, however, the effectiveness of the prize (if the conferring of a prize can indeed be effective) is questionable. The general idea underpinning the award is that by singling out previous statesmen who supported democracy, the rule of law, and all other such things that have come to be lumped under the general notion of 'governance,' sitting leaders will be encouraged to act similarly. Yet, as the BBC rightly points out, this doesn't at all seem to be the case:

Uganda, Chad and Cameroon have all changed their constitutions so their leaders can retain their positions.


There have been coups in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, as well as several elections that fell well short of international standards. And the countries that have received most praise from Mo Ibrahim's foundation this year - Mauritius, Cape Verde and Seychelles - are far from the continent's centres of power.

That being said, perhaps withholding the prize this year sends a different, much more apt message: work harder.

Learning Chinese in Liberia

Surely a sign of the times: Chinese officials operating in Liberia are offering free Chinese language lessons to young Liberians - and anyone keen to learn the language more generally:

As in much of Africa, China is heavily engaged in post-war Liberia, rebuilding roads with funding from the World Bank, managing hotels and restaurants, trading in medicines and other businesses.


Chinese mineral firm China Union became the largest investor in Liberia when it signed a $2.6bn deal to go into iron-ore mining earlier this year. There is even a Chinese-language radio station broadcasting across the country for the increasing number of migrant workers and expatriates.


The growing trade ties explain why the Chinese embassy and the Ministry of Youth and Sports have decided to put on free two-hour classes in the afternoon, five days a week.

While some may tout such lessons as an exercise in colonialism (an argument which many Liberians are likely to put forward themselves), such skills training may in fact be the harbinger of increased opportunity for the country's citizens, allowing them not only greater mobility in terms of movement to China, but also enabling them to eventually communicate with the Chinese thereby engaging in more meaningful business negotiations. Perhaps I'm feeling exceptionally optimistic this morning, or perhaps the Chinese are actually (finally?) working towards making their "mutually beneficial" partnership with Liberia precisely just that.

Noteworthy...

  • CNOOC wants a stake in Ghana's oil field. So does Exxon Mobil. A showdown in the making...
  • Anti-Chinese sentiment appears to be escalating in the DRC. The Chinese firm Sinohydro suffered an attack earlier this month by unidentified gunmen. This is unfortunately one among a growing number of such instances in the DRC
  • "Conservative Egyptian lawmakers have called for a ban on imports of a Chinese-made kit meant to help women fake their virginity and one scholar has even called for the 'exile' of anyone who imports of uses it." And here you thought China was engaged in resource extraction alone...
  • Yet another reason why I'm skeptical that China will ever do anything about North Korea. *Sigh*
  • Last week the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released its annual index of governance in Africa. You can find the rankings here, and several of Elizabeth Dickinson's reflections here
  • China is in a push for Guinea's resources - minerals and [the hope of] oil. Guinea is one of the poorest states in West Africa, with a seriously dubious human rights and governance record.
  • The Gates Foundation is exploring securitizing aid. Securitization seems to be a dirty word these days, but Gates may be onto something...

China becomes South Africa's top export destination

From Friday's Reuters:

China overtook the United States as South Africa's biggest export destination in the first half of 2009, reinforcing the Asian country's push to build trade links with Africa.


South African trade and industry department data also showed on Friday China replaced Germany as its largest country trade partner.


[...] Data for South Africa -- Africa's biggest economy -- showed exports to China stood at 27.6 billion rand for the year to June, against 35.8 billion rand for the whole of 2008. Exports to the U.S. were 19.1 billion rand compared with 66.5 billion rand for 2008.

Don't get on their bad side...

Yesterday's FT had a fascinating piece about China's lesser-known (though absolutely no less important!) Central Organisation Department:

To glean a sense of the dimensions of the organisation department’s job, conjure up a parallel body in Washington. The imaginary department would oversee the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric,ExxonMobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.

Such continued adherence to a distinctly authoritarian political system is among the many reasons I don't see China evolving into a 'Western-style' democracy anytime in the near future. It furthermore presents a significant hurdle to the formation of genuine strategic partnerships between China and the West, which consists primarily of democracies.

It's the oil, stupid

Following on yesterday's post about China's pursuit of Nigerian oil, the CS Monitor today has an interesting piece on why China is unlikely to support sanctions on Iran - even if today's US-Iran talks go badly (which many suspect they will). The bottom line: oil, of course! China imports nearly 15% of its crude oil from Iran, and has recently started selling refined gasoline to Iran. What's more:

Chinese state-owned oil companies have signed three multi-billion dollar deals with Iran this year to develop oil and gas fields there, in a bid to establish a strategic hold over resources not under the control of Western oil firms.

"Iran has bountiful energy resources, its natural gas reserves are the second largest in the world, and all are basically under its own control," former Chinese ambassador to Tehran Sun Bigan wrote in the latest issue of "Asia and Africa Review," published by a prominent government think tank.

China also became a partner this year in a proposed pipeline carrying gas from Iran to Pakistan. Since India dropped out of the project, the pipe is now due to carry gas north from Pakistan into China, indicating Beijing's strategic vision of its future energy supplies.

As I've noted on countless previous occasions, China is in many respects the classic textbook case of realist politics, with primacy placed on its national interests and security over all other matters and considerations. It comes as little surprise, then, that Beijing remains unwilling to crack down on Tehran: Tehran has what Beijing wants and needs, and the Chinese will be damned if anything gets in the way of that. If you're waiting for Chinese sanctions on any oil-exporting country, you may be waiting a while...