One world; one China; no Google

The much anticipated announcement of Google's plans for its Chinese market has finally come down the pipeline. The company has pulled out of the Chinese market, with Mainland customers being redirected to Google.hk.com - Google's Hong Kong server - as of early this morning. From Google's official corporate blog:

Users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong. Users in Hong Kong will continue to receive their existing uncensored, traditional Chinese service, also from Google.com.hk. Due to the increased load on our Hong Kong servers and the complicated nature of these changes, users may see some slowdown in service or find some products temporarily inaccessible as we switch everything over.

Chinese officials have issued angry remarks over the decision (the full text of which may be found here), accusing Google of violating corporate promises made when the company initially entered the Chinese market.

What Google's move actually means for the Chinese government, citizen access to information and foreign firms with operations in the country, however, stands to be determined. A few immediate scenarios come to mind. With respect to the former two matters, China could block the Hong Kong site altogether or indeed on a case-by-case basis, perhaps further using the incident to regulate Hong Kong's freedoms - a dangerous path upon which to embark, to be sure. If pursued, such a move could potentially result in an increasing percentage of China's citizenry learning how to use circumvention techniques to get around such censorship - or, perhaps, not. It is, as Rebecca MacKinnon observes, a question of how aware the Chinese are of their government-imposed and managed tunnel vision, and how determined they are to shake themselves from its shackles.

Beyond this, it wouldn't be surprising to find the government imposing increasingly stringent regulations on foreign companies breaking into the market in the future. Again, however, such an approach could potentially hamper FDI inflows into the country if orchestrated on a large enough scale, subsequently obstructing the CCP's objectives of increased investment and growth. Equally, then, growing in realization of the unaccommodating nature of its policies on FDI inflows into the country, we might observe a gradual liberalizing of CCP policies. 'Might' being the operative word in this context.

Indeed, Google's move this morning has seemingly opened a Pandora's box of question and possible policy options. It will be most interesting to track this story as it unfolds. It is most interesting, too, to a observe a corporation affecting a country's domestic - and potentially international - politics in such a profound way. For a great collection of papers on corporations and global governance, do please take a look at the St. Antony's International Review April 2009 issue, which focuses precisely on this very issue.

While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).

Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

• The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
• Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
• Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
• In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
• A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
• An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
• The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
• A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
• On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

Where have all the (good) African leaders gone?

It would seem that there are no worthwhile (past) African leaders in the entirety of Africa.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, established on the premise of improving the quality of governance across the continent, has for the past several years awarded the African Leadership Prize to previous leaders who have done well to support the cause of good governance in their respective countries. This year no such prize was awarded. While Ibrahim claims that there are "no issues of disrespect" surrounding the decision, it nevertheless comes as quite a low blow, especially to the likes of Mbeki and Kufour who - while no doubt boasting highly dubious governance records - were the likely contenders.

Aside from a nice pat on the back, however, the effectiveness of the prize (if the conferring of a prize can indeed be effective) is questionable. The general idea underpinning the award is that by singling out previous statesmen who supported democracy, the rule of law, and all other such things that have come to be lumped under the general notion of 'governance,' sitting leaders will be encouraged to act similarly. Yet, as the BBC rightly points out, this doesn't at all seem to be the case:

Uganda, Chad and Cameroon have all changed their constitutions so their leaders can retain their positions.

There have been coups in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, as well as several elections that fell well short of international standards. And the countries that have received most praise from Mo Ibrahim's foundation this year - Mauritius, Cape Verde and Seychelles - are far from the continent's centres of power.

That being said, perhaps withholding the prize this year sends a different, much more apt message: work harder.

Noteworthy...

• CNOOC wants a stake in Ghana's oil field. So does Exxon Mobil. A showdown in the making...
• Anti-Chinese sentiment appears to be escalating in the DRC. The Chinese firm Sinohydro suffered an attack earlier this month by unidentified gunmen. This is unfortunately one among a growing number of such instances in the DRC
• "Conservative Egyptian lawmakers have called for a ban on imports of a Chinese-made kit meant to help women fake their virginity and one scholar has even called for the 'exile' of anyone who imports of uses it." And here you thought China was engaged in resource extraction alone...
• Yet another reason why I'm skeptical that China will ever do anything about North Korea. *Sigh*
• Last week the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released its annual index of governance in Africa. You can find the rankings here, and several of Elizabeth Dickinson's reflections here
• China is in a push for Guinea's resources - minerals and [the hope of] oil. Guinea is one of the poorest states in West Africa, with a seriously dubious human rights and governance record.
• The Gates Foundation is exploring securitizing aid. Securitization seems to be a dirty word these days, but Gates may be onto something...

On China's burgeoning relationship with Francophone Africa and oil-for-infrastructure contracts

The July issue of The China Monitor - a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch - is focused exclusively on the relationship between China and Francophone Africa. I find the focus most interesting, as it seems to suggest that the colonial history of African nations in some way affects the nature of China's engagement with them. Is China's engagement with Francophone Africa different, then, from its engagement with English Africa? Or Portuguese Africa? I admittedly hadn't given such a possibility much previous thought, but it is a hypothesis worth exploring.

Page 7 of this issue also features a piece by a colleague of mine, Dunia P. Zongwe, in which he interestingly writes on China's ore-for-infrastructure contracts, and the economic complementarities between China and Africa. The crux of Dunia's argument suggests that:

[...] the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China and resource-rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I [resource for infrastructure] form.

In their essence, R4I contracts mirror contrat d'echange (exchange contracts), which do not involve any direct transfer of money to host governments, thereby reducing the risk that governments will mishandle investments. According to Dunia, such contracts carry further positive distributive outcomes, as African countries are able to retain and spread more widely the benefits of FDI than under traditional investment contracts. Such positive externalities are visible in Angola, which was recently lauded for its effectiveness in managing Chinese investment.

The Angolan case indeed seems to suggest that R4I contracts may be a valuable tool by which to optimize China's FDI in Africa if managed accordingly. The case further does well to bring African governance back into the equation; ultimately it is up to African governments to devise appropriate investment policies which optimize Chinese FDI and assist in developing the state and economy. The Chinese are making their moves, and African leaders must make theirs.

Noteworthy...

US State Department's Africa Bureau receives less than rave reviews in a recent report from State's Office of the Inspector General

Today marks the 50th anniversary of the release of Miles Davis' Kind of Blue - the best selling jazz album of all time. Fred Kaplan examines the genius behind music (and see here for a great Legacy Recordings video tribute to the album - and Davis)

A recent International Crisis Group report briefing warns of increasing insecurity and political tension in Somalia's Puntland - a semi-autonomous region in north-eastern Somalia once touted as a success of the 'building blocks' approach to reestablishing national stability, and viewed as one of the most prosperous parts of the country

Is China revamping its climate change policy? The FT seems to think so...

2009 Failed States Index (and a map!)

Foreign Policy has again joined forces with the Fund for Peace to compile the 2009 Failed States Index and a wonderful accompanying interactive map of state fragility.

The Index, which ranks 177 states in order from most to least risk of failure, is premised upon 12 social, political, economic and military indicators of state cohesion and performance, and an alleged 30,000 publicly available sources. The 12 indicators are: (1) demographic pressures; (2) refugees/IDPs; (3) group grievance; (4) human flight; (5) uneven development; (6) economic decline; (7) delegitimation of the state; (8) public services; (9) human rights; (10) security apparatus; (11) factionalized elites; (12) and external intervention. The data used are collected from May-December of the preceding year (in this case 2008). More information pertaining to the methodology employed may be found here.

According to the 2009 Index, the ten most fragile states are: (1) Somalia; (2) Zimbabwe; (3) Sudan; (4) Chad; (5) the Congo; (6) Iraq; (7) Afghanistan; (8) Central African Republic; (9) Guinea; (10) and Pakistan. This marks only slight shifts from 2008. No longer included in the top ten is Cote d'Ivoire, which has moved from #8 to #.. well, it appears to be absent from the 2009 ranking! Curious. Guinea, which in 2008 was #11 has now moved up to #9. Beyond this unfortunate bunch, other discernible jumps are those of Kenya (#26 to #14), Georgia (#57 to #33), Iran (#49 to #38), and China's appearance in the top sixty, at #57. Naturally, Norway, followed by Finland and Sweden remain the most stable.

Why has China grown faster than India? And what (if anything) does this mean for Africa?

Chris Blattman and Bill Easterly address the issue. See here, here and here for a great discussion.

While I find myself nodding in agreement with much of what both experts have to say, I hesitate slightly when discussion turns to a near-comparison between growth in China and Africa. While neither scholar seems to be suggesting that China's path to growth can inform a similar phenomenon in Africa - or otherwise delving into very nuanced discussion of the similarities and differences between the process in both regions - I nevertheless feel inclined to caution against any such analogies. There are, of course, lessons which various African countries can learn from China - particularly as regards agricultural policies - but there are many constraints which hinder a direct, general analysis.

Martin Ravallion of the World Bank's Development Research Group has compiled a brilliant presentation highlighting precisely these constraints. Foremost among them:

• Africa's higher levels of income inequality. At the time of China's economic reform, inequality was lower in China (a Gini index well under 30%) than found in all but a couple countries in sub-Saharan Africa today
• The continent's high dependency rates
• Africa's low population density, which impacts on matters such as technological innovation and the cost of supplying certain forms of basic infrastructure
• Africa's weaker state institutions (Blattman's point about differing political climes, etc.)

Of course drawing any comparisons between China and Africa is also somewhat ridiculous, as we're dealing with one country and an entire continent. While this is quite an obvious point to make, you would be surprised at how many people conflate the two.

In short, there are many factors which preclude one from deducing too much about growth in Africa based on how it was played out in China. From my reading, both Easterly and Blattman appear on the brink of such an analysis, but quite wisely never take the plunge. It is precisely for this reason that theirs proves a truly worthwhile debate. Do read it.

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

Show us the money (for health) !!

Namibia-based AIDS activist group, AIDS & Rights Alliance for Southern Africa, has compiled a creative video campaign to bring attention to the seemingly forgotten 2001 pledge made by African leaders to devote 15% of their national budgets to healthcare. Eight years later, nearly all countries have failed to meet this target.

The ARASA video, "Lords of the Bling (Vol. 1)" (funny because it's true, I suppose!) depicts the amount of treatment that could be paid for with the amount of money spent on extravagant purchases and events by the continent's political leaders. The figures are absolutely startling:

[HT: Shashank Bengali]

Finance in Africa: Looking backwards to move forward

Via VoxEU, Thorsten Beck, Michael Fuchs and Marilou Uy argue that Africa's financial stakeholders - bankers, donors and policymakers - must take the lead in implementing financial sector reforms in a way that maximizes Africa's opportunities:

Although the direct impact of the current crisis in the US and Europe on African financial systems is relatively contained – given that African banks are not as closely integrated in the global financial system as other regions of the developing world and hold most of their assets and commitments on rather than off the balance sheet – indirect effects through reduced real economic activity and reduced private capital inflows caused by reduced risk appetite might very well have negative repercussions for the real and financial sectors in Africa. Critically, the current crisis has put the debate on the appropriate role of government in the financial sector and the benefits and pitfalls of globalisation on policymakers’ agenda again. We will argue that it is important to study carefully past experience both in the region and other parts of the developing and developed world.

Beck et. al briefly expound on various approaches to the role of government in Africa's financial sectors - from activist to modernist, market-developing and market-enabling - and further explore the challenges and opportunities brought with the integration of African banks into international financial markets. Little is offered in the way of policy advice, other than to say that the strains placed on African markets as a consequence of the global market call for "further institution building as well as cautious and context-specific government intervention to help financial market participants expand financial services to the frontier of commercially sustainable possibilities." Yes: Quite right.

China's minority problems in (visual) perspective

New violence erupted in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Province, today as Chinese police shot dead two Uighur men. Despite an attempted return to normalcy, tensions in Xinjiang - and in China more generally - remain high. Jonathan Fenby has an excellent opinion piece in today's FT in which he explains how these recent events in Xinjiang highlight the nature of (and problems with) China's governing structure. Certainly worth a read.

The NYTimes also had a great graphic over the weekend showing the parts of China with significant minority populations. Minority here refers to one of the 55 recognized groups other than Han Chinese. The linked graphic enables you to view regions in China that have from 10 to 70% minority populations. The image below highlights the counties where at least half of the population is something other than Han:

While the graphic is somewhat misleading in that the Western provinces are very lightly populated compared to the highly populous eastern Han region, it nevertheless provides a very good visual of the control issues faced by China's central government. The very issues that Fenby does so well to outline in his OpEd piece, and the ones that stand to challenge the CCP's 'One China' ideology.

Humming a familiar tune

Barack Obama delivererd his speech to Ghana's Parliament this past Saturday (full text of the speech may be found here) in what was his first presidential trip to sub-Saharan Africa. A collection of opinions on the speech may be found at the BBC's fantastic 'Africa Have Your Say' program.

What I have to say is this: While there is little denying the significance of Obama's trip or the importance of his now oft-repeated statement that "Africa's future is up to Africans," the content of his speech was altogether unsurprising and contained nothing that hasn't already been said. Like other Western leaders who have addressed African nations in the past, Obama came touting the need for Africans to embrace democracy and market capitalism; to battle corruption, cease the ongoing violence, work with the West to combat disease and - in short - embrace the 21st century. This is all well and good, but such catch-phrases amount to no more than empty suits when not substantiated with specifics. Even his claim that Africa's future rests with its own people has been made numerous times in the past; most recently by the likes of Bill Easterly, President Kagame of Rwanda, and Dambisa Moyo in her ever-controversial book Dead Aid.

There was a welcomed shift in tone when Obama promised to cut down on funding American consultants and administrators and instead put resources and training into the hands of those who need them (i.e. resident Africans), as well as when he highlighted the economic possibilities implicit in African entrepreneurship (which, again, Kagame has been stressing for some time). But overall the speech diverged little from previous U.S. policy statements on Africa, no less so given Obama's insistence on continuing Bush's terrible idea of Africa Command. As Bill Easterly aptly notes in today's post, "[...] goodwill for U.S. military is nonexistent after a long history of Cold War Africa interventions, post-Cold War fumbles, reinforced by the more recent fiascos of Iraq and Afghanistan. Africans will never see US military (or any other Western force) as a neutral and benevolent force." *Sigh* When will we learn?

Of course the speech was inspirational - as may of President Obama's speeches are - and quite empowering for many Africans (and, apparently, for the UK Times' Libby Purves who sees a fantastic "new start" where those who understand African history and politics see none). Yet it pales in comparison to the speech Obama gave in Cairo when he addressed the Islamic world, and fails to represent much in the way of a novel shift in U.S. policy towards Africa and its people. Yes, Africans must pull themselves up by their bootstraps if they are to make anything of themselves, but didn't we (and they) know that already?

"We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans"

President Obama delivered his speech before the Ghanian parliament in Accra today. Full text of the speech may be found here. I will circle back with comments (and perhaps criticisms) on Monday; until then, do enjoy a lovely weekend!

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king

Business Action for Africa recently released a new report on what businesses can do to sustain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) in Africa. The report brings together insights from various business leaders and NGOs, as well as from the likes of Paul Collier, Kofi Annan and Lord Malloch-Brown, among others. Many of the contributions seemingly follow the standard protocol of touting transparency, governance, business environment reforms, effective public-private partnerships, investments in the private sector, and other well-known policy prescriptions. As Richard Laing, Chief Executive of CDC aptly notes:

Much has already been said about the impact of the global downturn on Africa, but a great deal of the talk about solutions has been empty rhetoric full of generalisms that regard Africa as one homogenous place. Any simple prognosis for the continent’s economic future ignores the fact that there are 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa with differing economies and at varying stages of development. It is action, not talk, that is required.

That said, there is one particularly worthwhile analysis, written by Dr. Peter Eigen, Chairman of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Eigen writes:

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. When it comes to knowing how the global financial crisis will affect Africa we are all living in the land of the blind. Usually we can rely on the IMF to be the one-eyed man, but the IMF’s growth predictions for 2009 give such a mixture of signals that it is impossible to form a clear overall picture. We do know, however, that 2009 will see a series of difficult social and political changes in Africa: elections, strikes, civil unrest, rising fuel and food prices, and a more challenging environment for exports. Because of Africa’s unique finance and liquidity circumstances, and due to volatile exchange rates and commodities prices, it is safe to assume that the financial crisis will be felt differently in Africa than elsewhere.

Eigen's acknowledgment of the uncertain is quite refreshing; for as much as we think we may know about Africa's future trajectory and development needs, there is indeed that much more than we don't. Eigen is also particularly prudent in his discussions of EITI - the very organization of which he is Chairman: "The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has long been held up as a shining example of how multi-stakeholder initiatives can address these kinds of challenges. But much of this praise has been premature. The initiative is still young." Such rhetoric comes in stark contrast to others in the development field who proclaim with overwhelming conclusiveness the merits of their formulaic approaches to poverty alleviation/aid/whatever, embryonic though these approaches may still be. Every now and again it's nice to be reminded that there are people in the field who are guided not by grandiose visions but by practical, thought-out solutions to given problems. Thank you, Mr. Eigen

In any event, do read the report; it will surely be worth your while.

China's ethnic turmoil

When we talk about polities marred by ethnic divisions and unequal modernization and economic growth, China is often not the first country that comes to mind. One is perhaps more inclined to picture a Nigeria or a Sudan, for instance. Yet ethnic tensions have been and remain among the defining features of the Middle Kingdom, which is why the recent unrest is rather unsurprising, though nevertheless quite upsetting.

From what I've been able to gather, no one appears to know exactly what triggered the Uighur violence. While some blame it on exiled Uighur Rebiya Kadeer, others suggest the violence was triggered by a brawl which took place in factory several weeks ago and has since escalated. Naturally, leaders in Beijing blame the West for masterminding the whole thing, though I find little basis for such accusations if for no other reason than the simple fact that the West has little political or strategic interest in China's Muslim community. There were/are twenty-two Uighurs captive in Gitmo, though I doubt the protests have anything to do with this. Rather, the strife seems to be a purely domestic matter, with a historically marginalized sector of the populace acting out against state policies that continue to leave them on the periphery of economic growth, especially since large numbers of Han Chinese have moved into the traditionally Muslim province and are usurping jobs from resident Uighurs.

Of course this is no justification for such awful acts of violence. Since the Uighur riots began on Sunday, 156 individuals have been killed and over 1,400 arrested in what is said to be the worst ethnic violence since the Cultural Revolution. Despite the fact that the population in Xinjiang comprises less than 1.5% of China's overall population, the State is heavily cracking down on the violence so as to preserve the "stability of the state," which is another way of saying 'One China'.

It is important to remember that Beijing's 'One China' policy is directed not only at Tibet and Taiwan, but any separatist movements, of which the Uighurs in Xinjiang are one. Many Chinese likewise uphold the notion of 'One China' which adds yet another element of complexity to the ongoing protests. One could say that the Uighurs are protesting against their marginalization and (perhaps symbolically) for separation, while the Han Chinese are protesting against the protests and for One China. In a curious way, these protests call into question the very notion of Han nationalism, which has long been regarded as a sort of ideological superglue holding together a united China. I seriously question the strength of this glue to begin with, but it seems to be wearing off - if it was even there to begin with.

As with the ongoing turmoil in Iran, the outcome of the unrest in Xinjiang is unclear. Fresh demonstrations have started in the capital Urumqi despite ongoing internet restrictions aimed at quelling the violence. Yet it does seem unlikely that all of this will amount to much. The government in Beijing certainly isn't likely to change its policies, and I don't know that the Uighurs are powerful enough as a group to continue with their tactics in the face of a powerful State. As was the case with 2008 Tibetan unrest, I sense that the protests may go on for a little while longer until the costs of violence will outweigh the benefits and all will be calm (at least on the exterior) once again. After all, the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Communist takeover is fast approaching and the CCP has other matters to tend to. Dealing with an ethnic minority who resents the loss of its culture, freedom and the ability to determine its future is not one of them.

photo credit: UK Times

Development in dangerous places (aka a symposium on Paul Collier and his policies)

In the July/August issue of Boston Review one can find Paul Collier's essay on development in dangerous places (which appears to be a fantastic cut-and-paste exercise from both The Bottom Billion and Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places), along with a host of commentary from the likes of William Easterly, Nancy Birdsall and Larry Diamond, among others.

Easterly for one is not particularly pleased, neither with Collier's policy prescriptions nor the means by which he arrives at them:

I have been troubled by Paul Collier’s research and policy advocacy for some time. In this essay he goes even further in directions I argued were dangerous in his previous work. Collier wants to de facto recolonize the “bottom billion,” and he justifies his position with research that is based on one logical fallacy, one mistaken assumption, and a multitude of fatally flawed statistical exercises.

[...] Collier’s convoluted stories are made up after the fact to fit whatever random collection of data points he is working with at the moment. So the specious rationalizations keep changing—too bad for those who took the precise recommendations in The Bottom Billion as gospel.

Larry Diamond adopts a more cautionary tone, stressing the salience of governance as a key to development:

None of these endemically poor countries can climb out of misery without better governance. Collier appreciates this, but he does not fully grasp the vital distinction between Asia’s developmental dictatorships and Africa’s dictatorial disasters. The classic authoritarian Asian tigers—Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia—all had near-death experiences with communism that led them to realize it was time to “develop or die. [...] Whatever their other faults, all of these countries’ ruling elites (and later the regimes in China and Vietnam) came to identify their own political interests with generating the public goods necessary for transformative development.

I strongly endorse Collier’s appeal for a much more serious and sustained international commitment to reinforce or guarantee security and peace in the world’s most fragile and miserable states. [...] However, I cannot go along with Collier’s suggestion that we implicitly threaten to tolerate a military coup against a civilian leader who has stolen an election. How would that have made Kenya or Nigeria better off? [...] The answer to any unconstitutional seizure of power—whether by a civilian in a rigged election or a soldier in a coup—is cutting off international aid; targeted sanctions against the overseas personal assets and travel options of the power-usurper, his family, and supporters; and a credible threat of indictment and prosecution by the International Criminal Court for predatory corruption, which should be made a crime against humanity—for that is surely what it is.

Much more commentary, criticism and insights may be found at the Boston Review link.

[HT: Marginal Revolution]

PS. Don't call Collier's policies colonialist...

Great expectations

Regarding President Obama's upcoming trip to Ghana, G. Pascal Gregory of Africa Works writes the following in Monday's Globe & Mail:

Scholars speak of “the empire striking back,” referring to former colonized peoples, such as immigrants from Africa and India, settling in Europe and North America and then challenging norms of race and identity. In his first official trip to Africa, U.S. President Barack Obama is striking back in a novel way. His visit to Ghana highlights the desirability of prominent people from the diaspora making a positive contribution to African affairs.

But Mr. Obama's visit, while heavy on symbolism, reveals the limits of his power. Burdened by economic problems in America and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he can't act boldly in Africa or make big promises.

There is certainly no denying the importance of Obama's trip to Africa... errr Ghana... but I am struggling to discover the novelty of the visit. Arguably the trip would have carried much more symbolism had he been 'returning' to Kenya, the birthplace of his father. As Kenya is the most corrupt state in east Africa, the President's decision to visit Ghana instead is being justified on the grounds that by his visit he is hoping to "lift up successful models of democracy" of which Ghana is surely one (and Kenya quite obviously not). If this truly is the objective, however, then he presumably should not have extended aid to Zimbabwe or made nice in Saudi Arabia or buddied up to Chavez, etc. etc. If one is keen to promote models of democracy, one would hope that this would apply on a global scale and not just in select regions.

I further hesitate to attach much significance to Obama's upcoming 'Africa' visit because a) he is in fact going only to one country which quite limits whatever impact he might have, even more so in light of the fact that he is not giving a speech as he did in Egypt when addressing the Islamic people. One would think that he would desire to address the people of Africa, if for no other reason to pay tribute to his roots. Moreover (point (b) as it were) as Gregory aptly notes, Obama cannot act boldly in Africa or make any big promises, though to be quite honest I haven't seen any signs signaling his intention to do so anyway.

While there certainly is much excitement surrounding the President's upcoming visit, much of it seems to stem from the symbolism surrounding the trip - a man born to a Kenyan father, elevated to the highest office in America, returning to his native continent. There is certainly much to be celebrated in this tale, but I fear that Obama's visit will be little more than that: another chapter in the history of a man. All the while, great expectations will be met with great disappointment.

Update: I stand corrected, President Obama will deliver a speech in Ghana, according to the White House blog. The speech is set to air at 6am EST on Saturday, 11 July for all of you early Americans risers (and at a much more reasonable hour for those in Europe and elsewhere!). The President's interview with allAfrica.com likely provides some insights into what we might expect from him. I very much look forward to learning what he has to say.

China extends $950 million loan to Zimbabwe

Well, the post title says it all. Not to be outdone by recent American and U.K. offers of foreign aid, China has today agreed to a huge loan for Zimbabwe. The figure is nearly double what Prime Minister Tsvangirai received on his visits to the US and Europe earlier this month, and is meant to help the country revive its economy.

China has also promised increased investments in Zimbabwe, with more companies moving in to set up shop. While the obvious concerns over propping up rogue regimes persist, few appear interested in articulating them. What's more, where before Western nations were lambasting China for its assistance to questionable regimes, they now appear to be following suit (to an extent, mind you). It would seem that China is perhaps reshaping the international aid architecture after all.

More on international land purchases (and what to do about them)

Further to last week's post on international land purchases in developing countries (mainly in Africa, really), an interesting piece in today's VoxEU suggests that such purchases could be good news "if the objectives of the land purchasers are reconciled with the investment needs of developing countries." Quite an obvious statement, really, but how does one go about ensuring that this is the case?

According to authors Denis Drechsler and David Hallam:

Apart from improving the conditions of land deals, several looser contractual arrangements should also be considered. In fact, the purchase and direct use of land resources is only one strategic response to the food security problems of countries with limited land and water. A variety of other mechanisms can offer just as much – or even higher – security of supply, such as contract farming and out-grower schemes, bilateral agreements including counter-trade, and improvement of international food market information systems.

Investment could be in much-needed infrastructure and institutions that currently constrain agriculture in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This, together with efforts to improve the efficiency and reliability of world markets as sources of food could raise food security for all concerned through an expansion of production and trade possibilities.

What Drechsler and Hallam are effectively proposing is a "binding code of conduct" which would govern land purchases, as well as a thorough search for alternatives, as noted above. What neither they nor anyone else have been able to tease out, however, is what a regulatory framework will look like, should there be one. Will each recipient state have the authority to establish its own guidelines, or will they be enforced through an agency like the UN FAO, for instance?

While many questions abound, it's heartening to see that the debate on land purchases and food security is finally being brought to the forefront, where it arguably should have been several years ago.