Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya
Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels
Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared
Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati
Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).
Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:
I generally refrain from criticizing NYTimes coverage of African news, though for some inexplicable reason I now find myself unable to resist commentary. I suppose one can only read so many stereotyped and misinformed "news" stories before it becomes too much to bear. Texas in Africa, G. Pascal Zachary and the ladies at Wronging Rights, among others, have all been quick to stress the problems with NYTimes reporting on previous occasions (see here, here and here for instance), and if I may, I'd quite like to add my voice to theirs.
The story that has finally broken my silence is one written by Jeffrey Gettleman on the drought currently plaguing Kenya. Gettleman writes:
A devastating drought is sweeping across Kenya, killing livestock, crops and children. It is stirring up tensions in the ramshackle slums where the water taps have run dry, and spawning ethnic conflict in the hinterland as pastoralist communities fight over the last remaining pieces of fertile grazing land.
The twin hearts of Kenya’s economy, agriculture and tourism, are especially imperiled. The fabled game animals that safari-goers fly thousands of miles to see are keeling over from hunger and the picturesque savannah is now littered with an unusually large number of sun-bleached bones.
I don't at all question the severity of the drought, or the fact that it is indubitably a cause of great concern for Kenyans dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. As Gettleman notes, the drought is also increasing conflict in some parts of the country, with farmers struggling for access to arable land. Such conflict, however, is not "ethnic," but rather an instance of basic survival, devoid of any ethnic undertones. Where ethnicity does factor, I would venture to guess that it is of secondary, rather than primary, concern.
Aside from this point, what I find most troublesome about Gettleman's piece is his suggestion that the Kenyan economy will somehow crumble - or is crumbling - as a consequence of the drought. While the Kenyan economy is certainly still highly dependent on its agricultural exports and land more generally, there is certainly more to it than what Gettleman seems to be suggesting. The unknowing reader comes away from Gettleman's piece with an image of a completely impoverished, desert-like country on the brink of disaster - a stereotype of a "typical" African country, if such a thing exists (it doesn't). While Kenya surely does have its problems, Gettleman's imagery is highly misguiding. Technology in Kenya is expanding at a rapid pace, heralding much opportunity for development. Emphasis is also being placed on the country's private sector as an engine for growth, as well as small-scale (often creative) manufacturing. One doesn't get any of this from Gettleman's piece; quite the opposite, really.
Perhaps I'm being too harsh. Gettleman's likely objective is to call attention to a problem which is continuing to cause serious trouble for the East African country. Doing so, however, shouldn't entail a complete distortion of the country in question. This benefits no one and is, moreover, poor journalism. Can we work on this, please?
* Image: NYTimes. Incidentally also the image accompanying Gettleman's piece.
Posting here will likely be light(-ish) through the end of this month, as I'm currently in the process of moving back to Oxford after a year-long hiatus. As you might imagine, things are rather hectic, and I imagine that they will remain as such until I'm properly settled in the city of dreaming spires come the end of September/early October. Please do bear with me!
For now, some very noteworthy reads (now bulleted for your reading pleasure owing to their number. Slightly more optically pleasing, no?):
Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:
On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.
In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.
Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.
I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.
Via Global Dispatch's Erin Conway-Smith I'm reminded of a report I've been meaning to link to for some time, but have continuously forgotten to do so - apologies! In May, the African Labour Research Network released a great 400+ page report on the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated firms in Africa. The report - "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective" - focuses especially on the cases of Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among the nations where the Chinese presence is most pronounced, and with which trade is particularly high.
Unfortunately for the Chinese, the findings are not at all favorable towards them. Quite generally, the report finds:
Chinese employers tend to be amongst the lowest paying in Africa when compared with other companies in the same sector. In Zambia, for example, the Chinese copper mine paid its workers 30% less than other copper mines in the country. In general, Chinese companies do not grant African workers any meaningful benefits and in some instances ignore even those that are prescribed by law. Wages above the national average were only found at those Chinese companies with a strong trade union presence. Chinese staff members enjoy significantly higher wages and more benefits than their African counterparts.
Collective bargaining hardly takes place in Chinese companies. They resort to union bashing strategies to discourage their workers from joining a trade union. In many instances, Chinese businesses were supported by host governments who defended Chinese investments against the demands of labour. Trade unions see the practices of Chinese companies as a threat to the limited social protection that unions have achieved over the years through collective bargaining.
In Namibia, for instance, some workers are paid $0.55 an hour by a Chinese company that is building the new Works and Transport Ministry headquarters - about half the legal minimum wage of $1.10 per hour for entry-level construction workers. In many cases workers don't wear safety helmets, as they are often required to pay for their own safety equipment - an investment they can ill afford. At a construction company in Malawi, too, workers had to mix cement with their bare hands. Many labour for 12 hours a day, 7 days a week. The general work day in much of Africa is 8 hours.
Of course it's difficult to expect high standards of working conditions in Chinese firms in Africa when Chinese firms in China don't fare any better. As I noted nearly a year ago, it's quite difficult to expect Chinese employers to improve labour conditions for foreign nationals working in their firms, when they have yet to do so for their own compatriots. For African states, the solution lies in legally regulating working conditions. But as the South African case demonstrates, where in place even such edicts are being circumvented. Thus while Africa stands to benefit from increased Chinese investment as such, it similarly stands to lose if such conditions continue. Change must occur, the lingering question is how.
Via Joshua Keating we learn that China's Economic Observer has put together the following map of overseas expansions by CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec - China's three major oil giants. Click here to access the interactive version, which provides (only some) added information:
Now I don't know about you, but I find this map to be highly inaccurate, and not just because the African countries have been mislabeled. The map grossly under-represents China's oil ventures in Africa; it's quite laughable, really! As Keating aptly observes, Sudan, where CNPC has extensive and very controversial holdings is absent. So is Niger, Gabon, Ethiopia (Sinopec is especially active in both); my goodness, where is Angola? Or Chad, for that matter? Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, and Algeria are all conspicuously absent as well. I really could go on. And while I'm not especially well-versed in China's energy holdings and exploration activities in Latin America, I'd venture to guess that the map greatly underestimates its ventures there, as well.
To be perfectly honest I feel as though I must be missing something; as though the map is intended to highlight specific cases of China's overseas oil activities, for instance, or perhaps is otherwise well outdated. Unfortunately, neither appears to be the case. There's no indication of any singling out of countries, and the sentence which begins "With China's recent $7.2 billion acquisition of oil explorer Addax Petroleum...." indicates that this map is very recent (Sinopec bought Addax in June of this year). So why in the world would the Observer put together such a misguided map? Is the Chinese public so unaware of its country's overseas activities, or do they think we are?
Via VoxEU Jorg Mayer and Adrian Wood say 'yes':
A common concern is that China’s opening to trade has de-industrialised other developing countries. Their labour-intensive manufacturing has been hit by Chinese competition in their home markets – a complaint often heard in Africa and Latin America – and in export markets, while their primary exports have been pulled up by Chinese demand. This mixture of effects is worrying because industrialisation is vital for development, manufacturing provides jobs, and the ownership of natural resources is often highly unequal – so the net impact of China could be both slower growth and greater inequality in the rest of the developing world.
Standard trade theory is consistent with these concerns. The impact of China on other countries can be interpreted in a Heckscher-Ohlin model as occurring through a shift in world average factor endowments. The comparative advantage of a country depends on its endowments not in isolation but relative to the endowments of all other countries involved in trade. This comparator group was altered by China’s emergence from near-autarky, because of its size and distinctive endowment structure, and hence so was the comparative advantage of other countries.
More specifically, China’s opening to trade effectively lowered the world average land/labour ratio and increased the share of workers with a basic education in the world labour force. The relative endowments of other countries were thus shifted in the opposite directions, which tended to move their comparative advantage away from labour-intensive manufacturing, which requires many workers with a basic education but little land. The corresponding increase in comparative advantage for developing countries was in primary production, which uses a lot of land relative to labour.
Mayer and Wood present data depicting average changes in ratios of labor-intensive manufacturing in primary production in the 1980s and 1990s, and the differences between these decades, for output and two sets of export data. From this data it appears that the bulk of China's impact was concentrated in the 1990s. Figures from Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa further show negative differences between output and export ratios, which is consistent with the expected impact of China proffered by standard trade theory.
David Axe of the War is Boring blog has a column in Wednesday's World Politics Review in which he suggests that Kenya might be funneling arms to South Sudan. Excellent. Well done, Kenya (of course I say this with complete and utter sarcasm).
According to Axe, the Ukrainian-owned vessel, Fania, which was captured by Somali pirates and returned to the port in Mombassa in February, was bound for the breakaway region in southern Sudan. The ship carried 33 Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tanks, plus other arms and ammunition - all of somewhat dodgy origin and ownership:
The Faina shipment apparently represented the third and final installment of a large batch of heavy weaponry for South Sudan, sourced from Ukraine and brokered by Nairobi. In November, the German magazine Der Spiegel claimed it had records proving an earlier shipment of 42 tanks that had largely escaped international scrutiny [...]
If this is indeed discovered to be true, it "would finger the Kenyan government in a sanctions-skirting arms race that some worry could result in another bloody civil warfare in Sudan." Kenyan military support for South Sudan would also put Nairobi at great odds with the U.S., which is one of the country's closest allies.
The Stop Arms to Sudan program of Human Rights First has a database of various countries' arms sales to Sudan between 2004-2006 (if anyone happens upon an updated version, do please let me know!). Not surprisingly, China is the foremost supplier of arms, but if you scroll down a ways you see that Kenya has done its fair share as well. The database is a conservative estimate at best as the data collected is that which the countries have divulged voluntarily (*chuckle chuckle*). The database also fails to specify where in Sudan the arms are being shipped, though it really isn't too difficult to guess.
Perhaps it is somewhat foolish to single out Kenya in such a way, as it is highly plausible that other African states are engaged in similar antics, though perhaps do a better job of remaining under the radar. At the same time, the outing of the Kenya-South Sudan relationship may perhaps do well to serve as a warning to other African countries embroiled in similar engagements. A comment by an Economist reader puts the matter in plain terms: "Kenyan Govt is fishing in a muddy waters. Beware what you do in the neighborhood."
Regarding President Obama's upcoming trip to Ghana, G. Pascal Gregory of Africa Works writes the following in Monday's Globe & Mail:
Scholars speak of “the empire striking back,” referring to former colonized peoples, such as immigrants from Africa and India, settling in Europe and North America and then challenging norms of race and identity. In his first official trip to Africa, U.S. President Barack Obama is striking back in a novel way. His visit to Ghana highlights the desirability of prominent people from the diaspora making a positive contribution to African affairs.
But Mr. Obama's visit, while heavy on symbolism, reveals the limits of his power. Burdened by economic problems in America and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he can't act boldly in Africa or make big promises.
There is certainly no denying the importance of Obama's trip to Africa... errr Ghana... but I am struggling to discover the novelty of the visit. Arguably the trip would have carried much more symbolism had he been 'returning' to Kenya, the birthplace of his father. As Kenya is the most corrupt state in east Africa, the President's decision to visit Ghana instead is being justified on the grounds that by his visit he is hoping to "lift up successful models of democracy" of which Ghana is surely one (and Kenya quite obviously not). If this truly is the objective, however, then he presumably should not have extended aid to Zimbabwe or made nice in Saudi Arabia or buddied up to Chavez, etc. etc. If one is keen to promote models of democracy, one would hope that this would apply on a global scale and not just in select regions.
I further hesitate to attach much significance to Obama's upcoming 'Africa' visit because a) he is in fact going only to one country which quite limits whatever impact he might have, even more so in light of the fact that he is not giving a speech as he did in Egypt when addressing the Islamic people. One would think that he would desire to address the people of Africa, if for no other reason to pay tribute to his roots. Moreover (point (b) as it were) as Gregory aptly notes, Obama cannot act boldly in Africa or make any big promises, though to be quite honest I haven't seen any signs signaling his intention to do so anyway.
While there certainly is much excitement surrounding the President's upcoming visit, much of it seems to stem from the symbolism surrounding the trip - a man born to a Kenyan father, elevated to the highest office in America, returning to his native continent. There is certainly much to be celebrated in this tale, but I fear that Obama's visit will be little more than that: another chapter in the history of a man. All the while, great expectations will be met with great disappointment.
Update: I stand corrected, President Obama will deliver a speech in Ghana, according to the White House blog. The speech is set to air at 6am EST on Saturday, 11 July for all of you early Americans risers (and at a much more reasonable hour for those in Europe and elsewhere!). The President's interview with allAfrica.com likely provides some insights into what we might expect from him. I very much look forward to learning what he has to say.
Three billion individuals. That's the approximate number of people that would be scrapped if we were to eliminate the bottom 5% global GDP contributors, the vast majority of which are found in either Africa or Southeast Asia. 81 countries comprise this bottom 5%. Together they represent half of the 192 UN member states and nearly 43% of the world population.
What would the world look like without them? Via Strange Maps we are offered a glimpse:
Zimbabwe, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Afghanistan, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, the Gambia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Lesotho, Ghana, Haiti, Tajikistan, the Comoros, Cambodia, Laos, Benin, Kenya, Chad, the Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, India, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Ivory Coast, Zambia, the Yemen, Cameroon, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nigeria, Guyana, the Sudan, Bolivia, Moldova, Honduras, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Egypt, Vanuatu, Tonga, Paraguay, Morocco, Syria, Swaziland, Samoa, Guatemala, Georgia, the Congo, Iraq, Armenia, Jordan, Cape Verde, the Maldives, Fiji and Namibia.
It is equally curious to note which countries are not included among the bottom 5%. Any surprises?
Wealthy foreign investors have acquired, or begun negotiating for, an estimated 15 to 20 million hectares of farmland in the developing world – equal to roughly half the size of Newfoundland and Labrador – since 2006. Most of this is in Africa, where the soil is fertile, costs are low and the owners are weak.
Critics are calling it a “global land grab” with neocolonial overtones. The African Union has warned that Africans could be exploited by the massive farmland deals because of their weak bargaining position. Overwhelmed by the rapidly developing trend, they are failing to get sufficient benefits in return, the AU says.
The buyers and leasers of African farmland are the rich and powerful (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) or the hugely populous and land-hungry (China and India). For all of them, Africa is the jackpot, a region where vast tracts of land are cheap and underutilized.
Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, is a prime target of those hungry for land. But there are plenty of other African targets, too. China is seeking 2 million hectares in Zambia to grow crops for biofuels. Saudi Arabian investors are spending $100-million to acquire land in Ethiopia, $45-million for land in Sudan, and millions more for 500,000 hectares in Tanzania. Libya has secured 100,000 hectares in Mali to grow rice. Qatar has obtained 40,000 hectares in Kenya.
The land deals are a sign of a shift in the world's priorities. Farmland is becoming as much of a strategic resource as oil fields.
Four Chinese contractors have become the latest casualties of a global purge on corruption in World Bank-funded projects with a huge impact on Kenya’s construction scene.
Caught in a corruption muddle that was instigated by a construction tender award scandal in the Philippines are two Chinese companies — China Road and Bridge Corporation and China Wu Yi — that control a significant share of the Kenyan construction market [...]
A statement from the World Bank said China Road and Bridge Corporation has been disbarred from taking part in Bank-financed projects for eight years with an offer to cut the period to five years if the firm puts in place a satisfactory compliance programme.
China Wu Yi Company Limited has been debarred for six years with an offer to terminate the ban in four years should the firm put in place a satisfactory compliance programme.
Many Kenyans are skeptical that a local tribunal can be impartial and prefer the cases be handled by the ICC because some alleged perpetrators could have a role in designing their own justice system.
A successful court here would be a major step in gaining back Kenyans' shattered confidence in their justice system, says Florence Simbiri-Jaoko, chairwoman of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "There is a possibility of manipulation," she said. "It's up to us to be vigilant."
You can read the article in full here.
The rise of the mobile phone as a bank account substitute in Africa was reinforced on Monday as Vodafone announced the launch of a cross-border mobile money transfer service between the UK and Kenya.
The service will allow remittances to be sent from selected Western Union branches in the UK to Safaricom subscribers in Kenya, who can then redeem the money or send it on to another mobile user. The maximum amount that can be transferred internationally is £200 ($296).
The service follows the success of M-PESA, amobile money transfer service in Kenya offered by Vodafone and Safaricom which has signed up over 4m customers since its launch in March 2007, and has been extended to Tanzania and Afghanistan.
M-PESA allows poor people without bank accounts to deposit, transfer and withdraw cash with their mobile phones. The service is often used by men who live and work in cities and send money to their wives and children in their home villages.
