While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).

Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

• The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
• Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
• Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
• In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
• A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
• An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
• The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
• A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
• On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

Noteworthy...

I had it in my mind to write something substantial here today, as there is indeed very much to talk about. Unfortunately I'm a bit under the weather and fear that any attempts at coherent argument or analysis will fall flat - and fast! Ergo, today's noteworthy reads...

Fred Kaplan asks: What's Bill Clinton doing in Pyongyang?

Perhaps the answer has something (or everything) to do with news that Burma is secretly building nukes

A great project in northern Uganda - Women's Income Generating Support - headed by Chris Blattman and Jeannie Annan provides women with grants and business training

Might China agree to an oil embargo on Iran?

What to do about climate change induced migration in Ghana (and arguably elsewhere)

North Korea is going too far.... even for China

Until recent days China has rebuffed all U.S. and Japanese calls for more stringent sanctions against North Korea, in part weary of the consequences of a destabilized regime in Pyongyang. Perhaps even further to the point, China has in many ways been supportive of North Korea's missile testing, as suggested by Anne Applebaum in her recent op-ed:

Despite the risks, though, there are good reasons for the Chinese to prod Kim Jong Il to keep those missiles coming. By permitting North Korea to rattle its sabers, the Chinese can monitor President Obama's reaction to a military threat -- without having to deploy a threat themselves. They can see how serious the new American administration is about controlling the spread of nuclear weapons -- without having to risk sanctions or international condemnation of their own nuclear industry. They can distract and disturb the new administration -- without harming Chinese American economic relations, which are crucial to their own regime's stability. And if the game goes badly, they can call it off altogether.

While the Chinese are not quite yet willing to call if off altogether, there is reason to believe that they are growing increasingly frustrated by Kim's behavior. Not so much because it stands in clear defiance of attempted (though - if we're going to be perfectly honest - altogether meaningless) U.N. resolutions, but because an increasingly active North Korea will likely signal rapid military buildup in Japan, threatening stability in the region. North Korea's missile tests have also begun to step on the toes of the increasingly disgruntled Chinese leadership, leading one to believe that a change in Chinese policy may be nigh.

Zhu Feng's recent piece is the first sliver of evidence suggesting such a shift (or at the very least the possibility of one). The piece is significant not only for what it says, but also because of who is saying it: Zhu is a top dog in Beijing, serving as he does as the Deputy Director of the Center for International & Strategic Studies at Peking University. China, he writes, has long been of the opinion that North Korea's nuclear efforts was a negotiable item:

As long as its regime security and economic demands could be met, Pyongyang might be willing to give up its “nuclear car”. For the time being, it seems to me that all evidence points in the opposite direction. In fact, the recent nuclear testing by DPRK is not merely a slap in the Chinese face, but a sobering wake-up call for Chinese leadership to face up to the malign nature of their N. Korean counterparts.

This slap in the face may well "bring about the fundamental change of China's long-time policy of DPRK quickly." What this change will look like and what it will entail are not yet known. While I doubt that China will engage in measures such as the cutting off of oil and coal supplies, which would indubitably cripple the North Korean economy, it will find other ways to take a hard stand against North Korea's behavior. (Hopefully) it's just a matter of time. 

Note to China: sooner would be better than later.

North Korea launches missile; China shrugs shoulders

Despite much international pressure to the contrary, North Korea launched a long-range missile this past Sunday. Though perhaps not particularly successful (wasn't it? I'm not so sure...) the launch has managed to stir some excitement (and not the good kind) among the international community, and has likewise lead many an analyst to raise an eyebrow or two over China's rather blasé response (the Chinese merely stated that they "took notice" of the launch, with no further commentary. As per usual, Danwei does a great job summarizing the Chinese headlines on the event).

To be perfectly honest, I don't see what all the huff and puff is about as far as the Chinese response is concerned. Does anyone really expect the Chinese to come forward and condemn North Korea for its actions? China is North Korea's most important ally, main source of food, fuel and arms, and its biggest trade partner. Trade between the two nations has been growing rapidly in recent years which, as the WSJ's China Journal observes:

is funded through credit from Beijing, which fears an influx of North Korean refugees if economic conditions in the isolated, poverty-ridden state worsen.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the Chinese were quick to block any formal U.N. condemnation of the launch, and are not about to make any pronouncements of their own. Moreover, I hesitate to agree with analyses that posit this recent fiasco as evidence of China's waning clout over the regime in Pyongyang. I'd rather be inclined to believe that the Chinese have by now learned the delicate balance between exerting pressure and keeping their lips sealed when it comes to their comrades to the North. It would appear they've opted to pursue the latter strategy this time around.

[Image: YaleGlobal Online]