Sino-African relations during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.)

I've recently been working on a chapter which is to be included in a great forthcoming book edited by Emma Mawdsley and Gerard McCann on contemporary Indian-African relations. The chapter examines in a comparative perspective Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in the East African economies, ultimately arguing that the competitive advantages enjoyed by the Chinese enable them to out-compete their Indian-origin and African counterparts.

In conducting research for the piece, I stumbled across a fascinating source on Sino-African relations which - finally and thankfully - puts a lid on any claims of novelty surrounding present bilateral relations, tracing interactions between Chinese and African merchants back in time across the centuries. The source is the Yu-yang-tsa-tu written by Tuan Ch'eng-shih during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D). The Yu-yang-tsa-tu is a compendium of general knowledge written about the land of 'Po-pa-li,' i.e. present day Somalia, and it describes from a Chinese perspective daily life in Po-pa-li and, perhaps most curiously, the blood oaths taken between Chinese and Somali traders prior to engaging in the barter of goods. Those were the days.

Excerpts from the book may be found in Robert Collin's East African History v. 2 (African History in Documents), snippets of which are available through Google books. The work is, above all else, a fascinating insight into not only (very) early-day Somalia, but also early Chinese perceptions of Africa - some of which remain unaltered today.

Noteworthy...

Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya

Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels

Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared

Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati

China becomes South Africa's top export destination

From Friday's Reuters:

China overtook the United States as South Africa's biggest export destination in the first half of 2009, reinforcing the Asian country's push to build trade links with Africa.

South African trade and industry department data also showed on Friday China replaced Germany as its largest country trade partner.

[...] Data for South Africa -- Africa's biggest economy -- showed exports to China stood at 27.6 billion rand for the year to June, against 35.8 billion rand for the whole of 2008. Exports to the U.S. were 19.1 billion rand compared with 66.5 billion rand for 2008.

Doing business in China

Beginning this month and continuing through November, The Atlantic will be running a series of clips from the DVD series "Doing Business in China" - a three year project headed in part by James Fallows. The clips will offer footage from factory floors, peasant villages, CCP headquarters, and the offices of foreign firms which have learned to be financially successful in the Middle Kingdom. The idea is to present the "real China," beyond the hype and the noise. It appears to be a most interesting project, and certainly worthy of your attention.

The following is the project's introductory video:

On China's burgeoning relationship with Francophone Africa and oil-for-infrastructure contracts

The July issue of The China Monitor - a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch - is focused exclusively on the relationship between China and Francophone Africa. I find the focus most interesting, as it seems to suggest that the colonial history of African nations in some way affects the nature of China's engagement with them. Is China's engagement with Francophone Africa different, then, from its engagement with English Africa? Or Portuguese Africa? I admittedly hadn't given such a possibility much previous thought, but it is a hypothesis worth exploring.

Page 7 of this issue also features a piece by a colleague of mine, Dunia P. Zongwe, in which he interestingly writes on China's ore-for-infrastructure contracts, and the economic complementarities between China and Africa. The crux of Dunia's argument suggests that:

[...] the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China and resource-rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I [resource for infrastructure] form.

In their essence, R4I contracts mirror contrat d'echange (exchange contracts), which do not involve any direct transfer of money to host governments, thereby reducing the risk that governments will mishandle investments. According to Dunia, such contracts carry further positive distributive outcomes, as African countries are able to retain and spread more widely the benefits of FDI than under traditional investment contracts. Such positive externalities are visible in Angola, which was recently lauded for its effectiveness in managing Chinese investment.

The Angolan case indeed seems to suggest that R4I contracts may be a valuable tool by which to optimize China's FDI in Africa if managed accordingly. The case further does well to bring African governance back into the equation; ultimately it is up to African governments to devise appropriate investment policies which optimize Chinese FDI and assist in developing the state and economy. The Chinese are making their moves, and African leaders must make theirs.

Decoupling? No, a new coupling

Over the weekend The NYTimes had a rather cliched though nevertheless worthwhile article on declining foreign investments in Africa. This, as a consequence of the global financial crisis:

When the credit crisis erupted in September, many experts thought that Africa would be spared the financial turmoil of the American and European financial systems, because African banks had almost none of their assets tied up in the global subprime market.

But it has recently become clear that Africa is being hit hard. The World Bank estimates that its economies will grow an average of 3 percent this year, compared with an annual average of 6 percent from 2004 to 2008.

“The crisis could not have come at a worse time,” said Jose Gijon, chief Africa economist at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris. “Before the meltdown, many African countries had made significant progress in attracting foreign investment and private capital, and this could derail those efforts.”

But one must not forget about the Chinese, who show no intention of curtailing their African investments. Quite the contrary, really:

China which has become a major investor and trading partner for Africa, continues to invest. The China-Africa Development Fund, which has invested nearly $400 million in projects in Africa, said it planned to raise an additional $2 billion by November. African groups are also continuing to pump money into projects ranging from telecommunications to new oil fields.

Indeed, many in Africa believe that it is China - and China alone - that will spur and sustain the continent's growth. In the words of Martyn Davies, the relationship between China and the African continent is not decoupling - as is the case now between many emerging economies and America, for instance - but rather a "New Coupling." Africa is still open for business, and the Chinese are the continent's main customers.

Has China de-industrialized other developing countries?

Via VoxEU Jorg Mayer and Adrian Wood say 'yes':

A common concern is that China’s opening to trade has de-industrialised other developing countries. Their labour-intensive manufacturing has been hit by Chinese competition in their home markets – a complaint often heard in Africa and Latin America – and in export markets, while their primary exports have been pulled up by Chinese demand. This mixture of effects is worrying because industrialisation is vital for development, manufacturing provides jobs, and the ownership of natural resources is often highly unequal – so the net impact of China could be both slower growth and greater inequality in the rest of the developing world.

Standard trade theory is consistent with these concerns. The impact of China on other countries can be interpreted in a Heckscher-Ohlin model as occurring through a shift in world average factor endowments. The comparative advantage of a country depends on its endowments not in isolation but relative to the endowments of all other countries involved in trade. This comparator group was altered by China’s emergence from near-autarky, because of its size and distinctive endowment structure, and hence so was the comparative advantage of other countries.

More specifically, China’s opening to trade effectively lowered the world average land/labour ratio and increased the share of workers with a basic education in the world labour force. The relative endowments of other countries were thus shifted in the opposite directions, which tended to move their comparative advantage away from labour-intensive manufacturing, which requires many workers with a basic education but little land. The corresponding increase in comparative advantage for developing countries was in primary production, which uses a lot of land relative to labour.

Mayer and Wood present data depicting average changes in ratios of labor-intensive manufacturing in primary production in the 1980s and 1990s, and the differences between these decades, for output and two sets of export data. From this data it appears that the bulk of China's impact was concentrated in the 1990s. Figures from Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa further show negative differences between output and export ratios, which is consistent with the expected impact of China proffered by standard trade theory.

On China as Africa's biggest arms dealer

I'm currently working on a paper examining Sino-Zambian relations, focusing especially on Chinese activity in Zambia's mining sector. I've been sitting on this project for quite some time, and finally managed to overcome what had been a most serious case of writer's block with the help of a lovely glass of Bandol (Tempier). Ok, fine, two glasses. In any event, while doing a bit of extra desk research, I happened upon an interesting piece in the recent edition of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief. Author Richard Bitzinger writes:

China is now, on average, the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, after the traditional leading suppliers: the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In fact, in 2007 it was fourth in terms of global arms transfer agreements, ahead of France, Germany and Spain.

Nearly all of China’s arms transfers are to developing countries, and in this arena the Chinese defense industry is emerging as a formidable competitor. In fact, China ranked third in terms of arms deliveries to the developing world in 2007. China's largest markets are in Asia, the Middle East, and particularly Africa. In fact, during the period 2004-2007, China was the single largest seller of arms to Africa; and its major customers include Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

Leading Chinese weapons exports (to Africa) include:

• The K-8 trainer jet: China has exported nearly 250 of these lightweight trainer/attack jets since 2000, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms transfers. Its biggest client has been Egypt, which bought 120 K-8s, most of which were assembled locally from kits, between 2001 and 2008. Other customers include Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while Venezuela is in negotiations to purchase up to 24 K-8s.
• The F-7MG fighter jet: This aircraft is the export version of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force’s F-7E, itself an upgraded adaptation of the MiG-21. The F-7MG features a larger wing and, reportedly, a British radar. China has sold more than a hundred of these fighters to Bangladesh, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, according the SIPRI Arms Transfers database, since the mid-1990s.
• The WZ-551 armored personnel carrier: Although not a particularly high-tech system, the WZ-551 is notable for being sold widely around the world, including countries like Argentina, Gabon, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Oman, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tanzania

It remains difficult to gauge how successful China will be in the global arms marketplace, with countries like the U.S. and Russia out-exporting the country by rather wide margins (in 2007, for example, Russia exported $4.6 billion worth of arms - four times as much as China. Even Germany out-exported China by 60%). Yet China's foothold in the African marketplace appears to be quite favorable. In Zambia, for instance, China's North Industries Corp. (NORINCO) is allegedly in talks to upgrade Zambia's T-59 tanks engines, armor and fire control systems. The Nigerian air force has been eyeing China's K-8 trainer aircraft (Nigeria imported Chinese J-7 fighters in 2006). Zimbabwe is equipped with Chinese K-8 trainers and J-7 fighters, and in early 2009 was negotiating the purchase of one squadron of FC-1 fighters from. Chinese arms now equip Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya... the list goes on and on.

Chinese arms deals appear to be part and parcel of the "oil-for-infrastructure" deals China continues to strike across the continent. In Angola, for instance, arms are sold in exchange for the country's oil. In Zambia, copper is the currency of choice. While some argue that Chinese arms sales to Africa will drop once China acquires a satisfactory supply of natural resources, such claims are highly dubious. What constitutes a "satisfactory supply" for a country with massive energy demands? What's more, it's rather doubtful that China will be so foolish as to bypass a booming export market. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally savvy businessmen, and arms sales to Africa is a brilliant business opportunity. While China may not be supplanting or joining the U.S. and European states as a large supplier of sophisticated arms on a global scale anytime soon, they have seemingly already done so - and continue to do so - in Africa.

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king

Business Action for Africa recently released a new report on what businesses can do to sustain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) in Africa. The report brings together insights from various business leaders and NGOs, as well as from the likes of Paul Collier, Kofi Annan and Lord Malloch-Brown, among others. Many of the contributions seemingly follow the standard protocol of touting transparency, governance, business environment reforms, effective public-private partnerships, investments in the private sector, and other well-known policy prescriptions. As Richard Laing, Chief Executive of CDC aptly notes:

Much has already been said about the impact of the global downturn on Africa, but a great deal of the talk about solutions has been empty rhetoric full of generalisms that regard Africa as one homogenous place. Any simple prognosis for the continent’s economic future ignores the fact that there are 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa with differing economies and at varying stages of development. It is action, not talk, that is required.

That said, there is one particularly worthwhile analysis, written by Dr. Peter Eigen, Chairman of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Eigen writes:

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. When it comes to knowing how the global financial crisis will affect Africa we are all living in the land of the blind. Usually we can rely on the IMF to be the one-eyed man, but the IMF’s growth predictions for 2009 give such a mixture of signals that it is impossible to form a clear overall picture. We do know, however, that 2009 will see a series of difficult social and political changes in Africa: elections, strikes, civil unrest, rising fuel and food prices, and a more challenging environment for exports. Because of Africa’s unique finance and liquidity circumstances, and due to volatile exchange rates and commodities prices, it is safe to assume that the financial crisis will be felt differently in Africa than elsewhere.

Eigen's acknowledgment of the uncertain is quite refreshing; for as much as we think we may know about Africa's future trajectory and development needs, there is indeed that much more than we don't. Eigen is also particularly prudent in his discussions of EITI - the very organization of which he is Chairman: "The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has long been held up as a shining example of how multi-stakeholder initiatives can address these kinds of challenges. But much of this praise has been premature. The initiative is still young." Such rhetoric comes in stark contrast to others in the development field who proclaim with overwhelming conclusiveness the merits of their formulaic approaches to poverty alleviation/aid/whatever, embryonic though these approaches may still be. Every now and again it's nice to be reminded that there are people in the field who are guided not by grandiose visions but by practical, thought-out solutions to given problems. Thank you, Mr. Eigen

In any event, do read the report; it will surely be worth your while.

And if the Chinese scramble wasn't enough, Russia wants a piece now, too

Via the WSJ, Ariel Cohen writes:

[...] Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and more than a hundred Russian businessmen last week visited Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola on the longest tour of Africa a Russian leader has undertaken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike President Obama, who is going to Africa next week for a brief stop to talk about global warming, Mr. Medvedev and his team targeted oil, gas, diamonds and uranium. Mr. Medvedev is trying to score points before his G-8 meeting with Western leaders in Italy July 8-10.

[...] By all appearances Mr. Medvedev and, by extension, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are reviving the old Soviet Africa strategy. The Soviet Union maintained friendly relations with many African countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

[...] Africa lost its significance as an ideological chessboard after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the current volume of trade between Africa and Russia is trivial. But the continent remains an economic prize. China has spent billions of dollars in the past few years gaining friends, influencing dictators, and tying African countries to Beijing.

Now the Kremlin is trying to regain its status as a global player, including re-asserting itself in Africa. Mr. Medvedev's visit to Africa appears to be the first coordinated attempt by Moscow to do so. Where once the Soviet Union sought political hegemony, today's Kremlin is after economic objectives like trade and access to raw materials. But a shift in Africa's relationship with Russia will have consequences for many.

Indeed, it will surely be fascinating to observe how Russia's Africa policy will unfold and the extent to which - if any at all - the Kremlin will seek cooperation with China, which currently has the upper hand in the continent - arguably even more so than do either the U.S. or Europe.

U.S. vs China, as played out in Africa

As President Obama gets ready to make his first trip to Ghana this July, one cannot help but wonder how he will be received. Of course quite warmly, I imagine, especially in light of his Kenyan roots, but it will be quite curious to see how - if at all - China's growing influence on the continent has shifted African perceptions of American assistance. Bear in mind that this trip will be Obama's first to sub-Saharan Africa (and during his 8 years as President, Bush II visited the continent only twice); Chinese President Hu has visited 15 sub-Saharan states since 2004. And I needn't remind you of the litany of recent Chinese investments in the continent, dubious though some of them may be.

The question of U.S. versus Chinese influence in Africa is brought home quite nicely by Ken Maguire. In his article today, Maguire expounds on this battle of authorities, if you will, ultimately concluding that the U.S.-China relationship in Africa can be cooperative. There is no denying that it can't; the question, I feel is much more one of degrees. Obama's upcoming trip may indeed prove quite central in shedding light on this issue, along with countless others.

A regulatory framework for international farmland deals in Africa

It would seem that I have inadvertently been placed on Columbia University's Vale Center mailing list. Yet unlike other mailing lists from which I generally unsubscribe as quickly as is humanly possible, I think I'll stick around on this one. The Center's most recent publication is both quite interesting and timely, speaking as it does to the issue of international farmland deals in Africa. An excerpt:

Trends in foreign direct investment in land for agriculture reflect deep global economic and social transformations, with potentially profound implications for the future of world agriculture. The role of food in human consumption makes it fundamentally different from other commodities. In many parts of the world, land is central to identity, livelihoods and food security, and decisions taken today will have major repercussions for many, for decades to come. While bilateral negotiations are unfolding fast, there is a need for vigorous public debate in recipient countries, so as to base decisions on strategic thinking about the future of agriculture, the place of large and small-scale farming within it, and the role and nature of outside investment.

This couldn't be more on the mark. As I've noted in earlier posts (see here and here), 'land grabs' by foreign entities are becoming a growing threat to the (often customary) land rights of citizens, and in many cases fail to provide any benefit to the host communities - economic or otherwise. In light of this, it behooves recipient governments to establish regulatory frameworks governing such transactions. The costs of not doing so are too high.

Well done, Vale Center. I look forward to receiving more updates.

PS. Further to the issue of 'land grabs,' it would appear that Tsvangirai's niece is trying to pull off one of her own ...

Kenya's jua kali and Chinese businesses - and a shameless plug

Yours truly has a paper published in the July 2009 issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies on the nature of Chinese business networks in Kenya. The paper can be found here (subscription required).

Chinese language newspaper launched in Botswana

The Oriental Post, a Chinese-language newspaper, was launched in Gaborone, Botswana last week.

Man Niles, president of the Oriental Post, said he hopes the newspaper will enable better communication between service providers, product developers and the Chinese community in Botswana. Since "most of the Chinese do not understand English and speak very little Setswana," there presently exists a rather sizable information gap and communications barrier for the Chinese resident in the country. The newspaper is the first attempt aimed at closing this gap.

China is a major actor in both the rural and urban areas in Botswana. Just this April China agreed to establish a major textile industrial park in Phakalane, and is quite eagerly investing in the country's diamond industry.

New research on Sino-Timorese relations

A new report on China's relations with East Timor by Loro Horta has recently been published by France's Institut de Recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia). The report traces the alleged successes and limitations of China's strategy in East Timor and hopes to:

[...] shed some light not only on the intricacies of relations between the two countries, but also on China’s relations with other small, poor but resource rich countries like Timor-Leste. Finally it is the hoped by the author that the current article may give a modest contribution to the study of China’s foreign relations and its diplomacy in the developing world.

The report is written from quite an IR realist perspective, though does well to highlight several consistencies in China's "go out" policy and the nature of its bilateral relations with developing states, particularly insofar as its oil and energy, infrastructure, and technology investments are concerned.

Free trade as a tool for development

Via VoxEU Kimberly Elliott suggests the United States should lower tariffs on imports from small, poor economies:

... the Doha Round, under the best of circumstances, will take some time to conclude, and the US and other rich countries should move as quickly as possible to further open their markets to the world’s poorest countries. The eighth of the Millennium Development Goals adopted at a UN summit in 2000 calls on the rich countries to provide duty-free-quota-free market access for the least-developed countries (LDCs). This goal was reiterated at the WTO’s 2005 Hong Kong ministerial meeting, but US negotiators would only commit to provide access for 97% of products and only in conjunction with the conclusion of the Doha Round.

Importantly, the pledge to provide duty-free-quota-free access is not part of the round’s “single undertaking,” and the LDCs are not being asked to undertake liberalisation commitments. So President Obama would lose nothing and could gain a great deal of good will, as well as providing an economic boost to struggling developing countries, by asking Congress to act now and provide access on 100%of products, as the European Union already does, rather than just 97% as promised in Hong Kong. Three percent may not sound like much, but such liberalisation would unblock a number of items that that are of the most interest to poor countries.

Providing full market access will not reverse the decline in trade flows, but it would open opportunities for some of the poorest countries in the world. It would also address a fundamental unfairness created by the fact that US trade policy, like that of other rich countries, discriminates against poor countries and poor people. The highest US tariffs fall on agricultural products and labour-intensive light manufactures, where many developing countries have a comparative advantage.

I have generally found such an argument to be quite compelling, and tend to agree with Ms. Elliott's assessment of the matter.

Decreasing the number of currencies in Africa as a means of stimulating growth and trade

Via VoxEU, Thorvaldur Gylfason writes:

Does every country in Africa need a currency of its own? No. Because national currencies constitute an exchange and trade restriction, a further reduction of the number of currencies in Africa would likely encourage trade and growth in Africa. This is why the African Union aims at pooling all the continent’s currencies into a single currency by 2028. In the meantime, several regional monetary unions are on the drawing board, and two monetary unions already exist, one de jure and the other de facto. First, fourteen countries belonging to the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa and the West African Economic and Monetary Union use the CFA franc. Second, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and now Zimbabwe use the South African rand. Botswana used the South African rand for ten years following independence, 1966-76, before introducing the pula.

... A strive for efficiency dictates the use of fewer and larger currencies and so do foreign investors who are understandably wary of weak and volatile currencies. This centripetal force is opposed by a centrifugal force rooted partly in national pride but also, more importantly, in the belief that sovereign national currencies make it possible to pursue independent and flexible monetary policies to foster economic and social development. This was the vision of Nigeria’s leaders in 1973, even if things turned out differently.

Lula in Beijing to "defend a new economic order"

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva arrived in Beijing today where it is expected that he and President Hu will strengthen bilateral relations between their two countries, promote oil contracts, strike deals on the sale of Embraer aircraft, and negotiate meat exports and biofuel for cars, among other top agenda items.

Already in March, China surpassed the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trade partner, and the trip seems to signal even further shifts in the global economic arena: namely, the U.S. out, China in. Or, perhaps more realistically - the U.S. down, but not (yet?) out; China up, and rising: 

"I think the trip that I am about to embark on... is one of the most important I am going on to defend a new economic order and a new commercial policy in the world," Lula told reporters before leaving Brazil.

Roberto Jaguaribe, a Brazilian foreign ministry official, said last week the trip represented a "reorganisation of the international scene" in which the top emerging economies were playing a bigger role in world affairs.

Among the more curious agenda items to be discussed between Lula and Hu is Lula's proposal that the countries conduct bilateral trade through each nation's currency, removing the U.S. dollar as an intermediary. Silva has been urging the end of the use of the American dollar in South American trade for some time now, suggesting such a move would reduce transaction costs for both exporters and importers, especially those operating on a smaller scale. Brazil and Argentina have agreed to trade with each other using their own currencies, and China and Argentina have likewise agreed to establish a 70 billion yuan ($10.24 billion) currency swap system that will enable trade between the two nations to be settled in Chinese currency. Might we be witnessing the gradual usurping of the U.S. dollar as the world's currency reserve by the Chinese yuan?

Such a reality may still be some way off, but the Chinese are slowly laying the ground for the yuan's ascendance, one bilateral negotiation at a time.

Chinatown, Angola

A superb video from Current TV examining the growing presence of Chinese in Angola. While the video's focus remains largely on China's infrastructure projects across the country, it nevertheless does a great job touching upon the variety of sectors in which the Chinese have become quite active. The video itself is somewhat lengthy, but certainly worth a viewing for those seeking to gain a better sense of 'China in Africa' (or Angola, as the case may be):

HT: Africa is a Country

On China's shifting strategy in Africa. Finally, somebody gets it right.

Ever since the reality of the economic crisis took hold, international attention has remained squarely focused on the governments in both Washington and Beijing. What are they doing? What will they do? What does all of this mean? With respect to Beijing in particular, myths of China's withdrawal from Africa began to surface around the time the China-Congo deal began to flounder and seemingly haven't seized in their cries of armageddon (see here and here, for instance). Well, stop already. Not only is this annoying, it's horribly misinformed. The Asia Times finally gets it right:

China's engagement with Africa has barely begun. As far as the stock of foreign investment in Africa is concerned, the Asian giant is still dwarfed by the West 10 to 1, but not for long if Beijing has anything to do with it. For China, Africa is a strategic play, requiring the stamina for which its strategists have always been famous. 

It is true that Beijing is hurting badly from the global economic crisis much more than its Ministry of Commerce's massaged statistics will let on, but it would be analytically unsound to treat any perceived change in Sino-African trends as a panic-response dictated by the souring global economy. China is engaged in a deliberate, calculated, and carefully scheduled re-pricing of risk in its African project.

A long-term project, I might add.