Zambia

Noteworthy...

Conflict leads to state-building? The curious case of Kenya


Much of the over-hyped China rhetoric emanating from Washington is disregarding a crucial element of the story: China's strong import levels


Chinese and Indian defense planning, compared


Zambian views on Chinese firms from Zambian Trade Minister, Felix Mutati


On the Chinese presence in Zambia

A recent paper of mine, "From formal- to informal-sector employment: examining the Chinese presence in Zambia," has been published in the Review of African Political Economy. The paper in full can be found here (PDF; subscription may be required), and the abstract noted here below:

This paper analyses China's recent engagement with Zambia, examining especially Chinese hiring practices, methods of business organisation and the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated construction and mining firms. Moving beyond existing analyses which remain focused solely on Chinese trade, aid and investment, this study begins to explore the micro-level of Chinese ventures, arguing that the continued employment of co-nationals as well as the generally substandard labour conditions maintained by Chinese firms lead to the offloading of Zambian workers into the country's burgeoning informal economy. There, newly emerged Chinese businesses stand to threaten local entrepreneurs who lack the resources necessary to parry Chinese competition. The result is a rapidly growing national unemployment rate and an increasing number of Zambians left struggling to sustain their livelihoods. This paper further argues that the characteristics defining China's engagement with Zambia are not particular to the Zambian context alone, but are rather abiding characteristics of overseas Chinese businesses in general. The paper ultimately calls for a policy framework regulating Chinese business activities in Zambia, lest the negative consequences of the Sino-Zambian partnership prevail.
Keywords: Chinese entrepreneurs; labour relations; Zambia; mining; informal economy; economic development

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

Chinese agricultural techniques and African development: a hope for better things to come

China has been having a bit of a rough go here on China in Africa this week. First it's found to be de-industrializing other developing nations, then peddling fake drugs in Africa, its media outlets producing questionable maps, and today victimizing African labourers. Not at all a very rosy picture! There is good news, however: a report commissioned by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and prepared by my colleagues at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, finds that the very technologies employed in China's agricultural boom might be appropriate - and indeed highly beneficial - in the African context.


The report - "The Relevance of Chinese Agricultural Technologies for African Smallholder Farmers: Agricultural Technology Research in China" - finds that of particular benefit are water-saving technologies and soil-related techniques such as tilage and planting methods. Evidently, small-scale African farmers face similar challenges as do their Chinese counterparts, and there is much in the way of technology and knowledge exchange that might benefit the former. According to the report, Chinese experts are especially focused on seed and rice technologies, particularly in Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rapid advances in seed technology and new plant varieties have been a major factor in China's crop production increases, and it is believed that similar advancements may facilitate an agricultural boom across Africa.


In Mozambique, a 52 hectare agricultural demonstration centre is planned west of Maputo, at Boane. According to the report, crops will be planted this year to test whether the Mozambican climate is suited for various varieties of seeds, including maize, rice, vegetables and fruit. In Kampala, Uganda, Chinese contractors are building an aquaculture demonstration centre. The centre is envisaged to generate knowledge for fish farmers, fishers and researchers in the country.


The agricultural sector employs approximately 65% of Africa's population, and is the largest private sector on the continent. Poor agricultural planning, weak land tenure policies, and a low capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and markets have, however, generally hindered the sector from becoming a productive, profitable business. While the Chinese are incapable of ameliorating all these troubles, they may do well to provide the relevant technologies to farmers and place Africa's agricultural sector back on track to success. Fingers crossed.

"Among the worst employers everywhere"

Via Global Dispatch's Erin Conway-Smith I'm reminded of a report I've been meaning to link to for some time, but have continuously forgotten to do so - apologies! In May, the African Labour Research Network released a great 400+ page report on the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated firms in Africa. The report - "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective" - focuses especially on the cases of Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among the nations where the Chinese presence is most pronounced, and with which trade is particularly high.


Unfortunately for the Chinese, the findings are not at all favorable towards them. Quite generally, the report finds:

Chinese employers tend to be amongst the lowest paying in Africa when compared with other companies in the same sector. In Zambia, for example, the Chinese copper mine paid its workers 30% less than other copper mines in the country. In general, Chinese companies do not grant African workers any meaningful benefits and in some instances ignore even those that are prescribed by law. Wages above the national average were only found at those Chinese companies with a strong trade union presence. Chinese staff members enjoy significantly higher wages and more benefits than their African counterparts.


Collective bargaining hardly takes place in Chinese companies. They resort to union bashing strategies to discourage their workers from joining a trade union. In many instances, Chinese businesses were supported by host governments who defended Chinese investments against the demands of labour. Trade unions see the practices of Chinese companies as a threat to the limited social protection that unions have achieved over the years through collective bargaining.

In Namibia, for instance, some workers are paid $0.55 an hour by a Chinese company that is building the new Works and Transport Ministry headquarters - about half the legal minimum wage of $1.10 per hour for entry-level construction workers. In many cases workers don't wear safety helmets, as they are often required to pay for their own safety equipment - an investment they can ill afford. At a construction company in Malawi, too, workers had to mix cement with their bare hands. Many labour for 12 hours a day, 7 days a week. The general work day in much of Africa is 8 hours.


Of course it's difficult to expect high standards of working conditions in Chinese firms in Africa when Chinese firms in China don't fare any better. As I noted nearly a year ago, it's quite difficult to expect Chinese employers to improve labour conditions for foreign nationals working in their firms, when they have yet to do so for their own compatriots. For African states, the solution lies in legally regulating working conditions. But as the South African case demonstrates, where in place even such edicts are being circumvented. Thus while Africa stands to benefit from increased Chinese investment as such, it similarly stands to lose if such conditions continue. Change must occur, the lingering question is how.

On China as Africa's biggest arms dealer

I'm currently working on a paper examining Sino-Zambian relations, focusing especially on Chinese activity in Zambia's mining sector. I've been sitting on this project for quite some time, and finally managed to overcome what had been a most serious case of writer's block with the help of a lovely glass of Bandol (Tempier). Ok, fine, two glasses. In any event, while doing a bit of extra desk research, I happened upon an interesting piece in the recent edition of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief. Author Richard Bitzinger writes:

China is now, on average, the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, after the traditional leading suppliers: the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In fact, in 2007 it was fourth in terms of global arms transfer agreements, ahead of France, Germany and Spain.

Nearly all of China’s arms transfers are to developing countries, and in this arena the Chinese defense industry is emerging as a formidable competitor. In fact, China ranked third in terms of arms deliveries to the developing world in 2007. China's largest markets are in Asia, the Middle East, and particularly Africa. In fact, during the period 2004-2007, China was the single largest seller of arms to Africa; and its major customers include Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

Leading Chinese weapons exports (to Africa) include:

  • The K-8 trainer jet: China has exported nearly 250 of these lightweight trainer/attack jets since 2000, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms transfers. Its biggest client has been Egypt, which bought 120 K-8s, most of which were assembled locally from kits, between 2001 and 2008. Other customers include Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while Venezuela is in negotiations to purchase up to 24 K-8s.
  • The F-7MG fighter jet: This aircraft is the export version of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force’s F-7E, itself an upgraded adaptation of the MiG-21. The F-7MG features a larger wing and, reportedly, a British radar. China has sold more than a hundred of these fighters to Bangladesh, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, according the SIPRI Arms Transfers database, since the mid-1990s.
  • The WZ-551 armored personnel carrier: Although not a particularly high-tech system, the WZ-551 is notable for being sold widely around the world, including countries like Argentina, Gabon, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Oman, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tanzania

It remains difficult to gauge how successful China will be in the global arms marketplace, with countries like the U.S. and Russia out-exporting the country by rather wide margins (in 2007, for example, Russia exported $4.6 billion worth of arms - four times as much as China. Even Germany out-exported China by 60%). Yet China's foothold in the African marketplace appears to be quite favorable. In Zambia, for instance, China's North Industries Corp. (NORINCO) is allegedly in talks to upgrade Zambia's T-59 tanks engines, armor and fire control systems. The Nigerian air force has been eyeing China's K-8 trainer aircraft (Nigeria imported Chinese J-7 fighters in 2006). Zimbabwe is equipped with Chinese K-8 trainers and J-7 fighters, and in early 2009 was negotiating the purchase of one squadron of FC-1 fighters from. Chinese arms now equip Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya... the list goes on and on.


Chinese arms deals appear to be part and parcel of the "oil-for-infrastructure" deals China continues to strike across the continent. In Angola, for instance, arms are sold in exchange for the country's oil. In Zambia, copper is the currency of choice. While some argue that Chinese arms sales to Africa will drop once China acquires a satisfactory supply of natural resources, such claims are highly dubious. What constitutes a "satisfactory supply" for a country with massive energy demands? What's more, it's rather doubtful that China will be so foolish as to bypass a booming export market. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally savvy businessmen, and arms sales to Africa is a brilliant business opportunity. While China may not be supplanting or joining the U.S. and European states as a large supplier of sophisticated arms on a global scale anytime soon, they have seemingly already done so - and continue to do so - in Africa.

The most environmentally friendly transport you will (likely ever) find

Bamboo bicycles! Yes, you read correctly: bamboo bicycles.


Established by two Californians and two Zambians, the company Zambikes has taken to producing bamboo-made bicycles in Lusaka and then selling them in the United States. These bamboo bikes are sold for around $475 (£290) for road or mountain bike frames, and more than $900 (£550) for a finished cycle - fitted with wheels, pedals, handlebars and brakes.


Zambikes' mission is to "provide high quality bicycles and educational training to unprivileged and service based Zambians." The company produces sturdy cargo bikes, a bike trailer and a bike-drawn "zambulance," now used in 10 clinics around Lusaka. Zambikes also provides technical skills training, business coaching and discretionary loans to its employees. Says Mwewa Chikamba, one of the company's founders: "It was never just about bikes. We wanted to give our workers practical skills and reward their dedication. We want to change lives."


With environmentally friendly bicycles, job creation, job training and useful products, I'd say Zambikes is en route (pun entirely intended) to success.


photo credit: www.bbc.co.uk

A new take on the bottom (three) billion

Three billion individuals. That's the approximate number of people that would be scrapped if we were to eliminate the bottom 5% global GDP contributors, the vast majority of which are found in either Africa or Southeast Asia. 81 countries comprise this bottom 5%. Together they represent half of the 192 UN member states and nearly 43% of the world population.


What would the world look like without them? Via Strange Maps we are offered a glimpse:


















In reverse order of magnitude the 81 countries are:

Zimbabwe, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Afghanistan, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, the Gambia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Lesotho, Ghana, Haiti, Tajikistan, the Comoros, Cambodia, Laos, Benin, Kenya, Chad, the Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, India, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Ivory Coast, Zambia, the Yemen, Cameroon, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nigeria, Guyana, the Sudan, Bolivia, Moldova, Honduras, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Egypt, Vanuatu, Tonga, Paraguay, Morocco, Syria, Swaziland, Samoa, Guatemala, Georgia, the Congo, Iraq, Armenia, Jordan, Cape Verde, the Maldives, Fiji and Namibia.


It is equally curious to note which countries are not included among the bottom 5%. Any surprises?

The easiest, most obvious way to help poor people

Give them money.


No, seriously, give them money. 


Aid Watch's Laura Freschi has a brilliant post on the innovative (though arguably really, truly obvious) aid approach taken by Oxfam GB and Concern WorldWide after the horrible flash floods that swept through the Western Province of Zambia in 2007. People lost their homes, livestock, and crops - in short, their livelihoods. Yet where USAID sent $280,000 worth of seeds and fertilizer, training for farmers, and emergency supplies, Oxfam and Concern Worldwide gave every affected family from $20 to $50 monthly, with absolutely no conditions:

An evaluation found that common fears about cash transfers—that the cash infusion will cause inflation in the market, that the money will be squandered, or that men will take control of the money—were unrealized.


What did people buy with the money? The list includes maize, beans, salt, cooking oil, meat, vegetables, clothes and blankets, paraffin, transport, soap and body lotion, and lots of other mundane household items. They also loaned it to friends, used it to pay back debts, purchased health care, education and transport, and rebuilt their homes. Only a very small fraction of the money (less than .5%) was spent on “unproductive” items, like liquor for the men.

Huh, go figure: poor people are capable of determining the depth and breadth of their particular needs! Shock horror! Who would have thought? And why didn't anyone discover this sooner?! *sigh* 


Of course such cash transfers remain laden with concerns as those noted above and others, among them targeting the right people and equipping individuals with the knowledge to truly capitalize on the funds given to them. Regardless, such cash transfer programs appear to be the logical way to help people who have lost their livelihoods regain control once again. As Freschi writes:

With the cash transfers, the people can decide for themselves how to meet their most urgent needs. This gives people who have lost their livelihoods, belongings or loved ones a new feeling of control over their lives, builds money-management skills, and restores to them their power to make economic decisions. If you were in their shoes, which would you prefer?

A 21st century scramble for African land

A reader from the University of Toronto alerted me to the following article in Tuesday's Globe and Mail on the issue of land acquisition in Africa:

Wealthy foreign investors have acquired, or begun negotiating for, an estimated 15 to 20 million hectares of farmland in the developing world – equal to roughly half the size of Newfoundland and Labrador – since 2006. Most of this is in Africa, where the soil is fertile, costs are low and the owners are weak.


Critics are calling it a “global land grab” with neocolonial overtones. The African Union has warned that Africans could be exploited by the massive farmland deals because of their weak bargaining position. Overwhelmed by the rapidly developing trend, they are failing to get sufficient benefits in return, the AU says.

The buyers and leasers of African farmland are the rich and powerful (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) or the hugely populous and land-hungry (China and India). For all of them, Africa is the jackpot, a region where vast tracts of land are cheap and underutilized.

Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, is a prime target of those hungry for land. But there are plenty of other African targets, too. China is seeking 2 million hectares in Zambia to grow crops for biofuels. Saudi Arabian investors are spending $100-million to acquire land in Ethiopia, $45-million for land in Sudan, and millions more for 500,000 hectares in Tanzania. Libya has secured 100,000 hectares in Mali to grow rice. Qatar has obtained 40,000 hectares in Kenya.

The land deals are a sign of a shift in the world's priorities. Farmland is becoming as much of a strategic resource as oil fields.

The issue is admittedly one about which I am not too well educated, though now realize I ought to be: implicit in the notion of 'China in Africa' (i.e. the arrival of Chinese in Africa) is the question of how they are acquiring land! Obviously! While the article tends to focus on larger-scale investors, I'd venture to guess that the matter is even more pronounced on the micro scale, with entrepreneurs scrambling for spaces from which to run their shops, restaurants, etc. Chinese in Africa tend not to be particularly active in any farmland activities at present, so my guess is that much of their 'land grabs' center around urban areas. That said, I wouldn't be surprised if they began to diversify their interests in the not too distant future. This may well be worth looking into in greater detail.

Hu, the Chinese Santa Claus

Today concludes Hu Jinato's 'magical mystery tour' across Africa ('magical' for all the 'gifts' Hu left behind; 'mystery' because, well, much of Chinese foreign policy remains precisely that). Despite the economic downturn and decreased demand for African resources, Hu did his best to persuade African leaders that China cares. 

In a speech in Tanzania, to which China has now promised substantial aid, Hu stated that: 
During times of adversity, it is all the more important for China and Africa to support each other, work in concert and tide over the difficulties together [...] As for problems that may arise from our cooperation, we want to properly resolve them through consultations with our African friends on an equal footing so as to maintain the larger interests of our friendly cooperation
How "friendly" this cooperation actually is for Africans, bypassing the political hacks sitting in Chinese-built mansions (a general overstatement, of course, but it does well to drive the point home), remains uncertain. With increasing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs moving into cities across the continent, Chinese companies driving out indigenous firms - in both the formal and informal economic sectors - and dubious labor conditions maintained in cases where Africans are hired, protests continue to mount. In a bow to this reality, Hu repeated support for Chinese companies to "to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local communities."

He said as much after the riots at Chambishi mine in Zambia, as well as on several other occasions. Only minor improvements in labor conditions and 'friendly cooperation' have been reported. Umpteenth time's a charm?

What positive spillovers?

An article in today's Business Day drives home the point that China's recent adventures into Africa aren't about Africa -- they're about China, driven entirely by Beijing's opportunistic motives. Those who continue to optimistically muse over the ways in which China might bolster Africa's economic development may quickly find themselves out of arguments: not only has the commodity 'super-cycle' created by the Chinese imploded (or finds itself close to doing so), but with the recent economic downturn, Chinese investors who previously flocked to the continent are now exiting faster than they entered, seeking economic opportunities elsewhere: 
TWO pieces of conventional wisdom have been overturned in recent months. First, that the commodity “super-cycle” of the past five years would, if not last forever, plateau at a higher level than ever before, based on demand from India and China.

This has not happened, with potentially disastrous results for some African countries, which have enjoyed, on average, growth rates of 5% or more for the past few years. Such growth has been based on economic reforms, but fuelled by the large increases in commodity prices.

Second, that the Chinese were in Africa to stay, as part of a long-term strategy. In practice, Chinese entrepreneurs have been the first to leave when the market turned. More than 60 Chinese mining companies have left the mineral-rich Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the past two months, as cobalt and copper prices have more than halved. More than 100 small Chinese operators are reported to have left Zambian mines for the same reason.

The implications for Africa are many. Economic growth will be slashed. Indeed, the price declines have been so sudden and so brutal many African leaders, who believed they were doing what the west recommended, suddenly find their economies again in tatters.

Non-interference? Please.

The Chinese government recently released a statement saying that democracy hurts Kenya; this statement coming in light of the recent post-election violence in the country. The irony of this statement is quite fantastic when one considers Chinese claims of "non-interference" in the domestic politics of African - and indeed all other - states.

Curiously, the Chinese appear to be doing anything but not interfering. Beijing continues to sustain despotic regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe; African states signing bilateral agreements with China are required to renounce their allegiance to Taiwan and support the "One China" policy (Malawi is a recent case in point); the 2006 Zambian election hinged on the 'China question,' which Chinese officials threatening to cut diplomatic ties with the country if the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, was elected (he ultimately wasn't); and now the Chinese are making pronouncements on the disadvantage of democracy in Kenya! Non-interference? Please.