Uncle Sam's African footprint

This week's issue of The New Statesman has a curious map tracking America's 'military footprint' around the world (i.e. the global distribution of American military bases):

From the map it is quite clear that the majority of U.S. bases are found in parts of Europe and the Middle East. In Africa, bases are located in Algeria, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. Many of these countries were considered for the home of AFRICOM, the US-Africa military command established under Bush (Esquire, of all places, had a great piece on the Africa Command programme back in 2007. Certainly worth a read!)

Many African states have been - and remain - quite vocal over their displeasure with the presence of such bases, maintaining that they constitute a direct violation of their sovereignty. Equally so, other states appear quite enthused to garner the assistance of the United States military in dealing with various regional issues. While I do certainly have my opinions on the matter, none are yet fixed in stone. What are your thoughts on U.S. military presence in Africa?

Chinese agricultural techniques and African development: a hope for better things to come

China has been having a bit of a rough go here on China in Africa this week. First it's found to be de-industrializing other developing nations, then peddling fake drugs in Africa, its media outlets producing questionable maps, and today victimizing African labourers. Not at all a very rosy picture! There is good news, however: a report commissioned by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and prepared by my colleagues at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, finds that the very technologies employed in China's agricultural boom might be appropriate - and indeed highly beneficial - in the African context.

The report - "The Relevance of Chinese Agricultural Technologies for African Smallholder Farmers: Agricultural Technology Research in China" - finds that of particular benefit are water-saving technologies and soil-related techniques such as tilage and planting methods. Evidently, small-scale African farmers face similar challenges as do their Chinese counterparts, and there is much in the way of technology and knowledge exchange that might benefit the former. According to the report, Chinese experts are especially focused on seed and rice technologies, particularly in Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rapid advances in seed technology and new plant varieties have been a major factor in China's crop production increases, and it is believed that similar advancements may facilitate an agricultural boom across Africa.

In Mozambique, a 52 hectare agricultural demonstration centre is planned west of Maputo, at Boane. According to the report, crops will be planted this year to test whether the Mozambican climate is suited for various varieties of seeds, including maize, rice, vegetables and fruit. In Kampala, Uganda, Chinese contractors are building an aquaculture demonstration centre. The centre is envisaged to generate knowledge for fish farmers, fishers and researchers in the country.

The agricultural sector employs approximately 65% of Africa's population, and is the largest private sector on the continent. Poor agricultural planning, weak land tenure policies, and a low capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and markets have, however, generally hindered the sector from becoming a productive, profitable business. While the Chinese are incapable of ameliorating all these troubles, they may do well to provide the relevant technologies to farmers and place Africa's agricultural sector back on track to success. Fingers crossed.

A new take on the bottom (three) billion

Three billion individuals. That's the approximate number of people that would be scrapped if we were to eliminate the bottom 5% global GDP contributors, the vast majority of which are found in either Africa or Southeast Asia. 81 countries comprise this bottom 5%. Together they represent half of the 192 UN member states and nearly 43% of the world population.

What would the world look like without them? Via Strange Maps we are offered a glimpse:

In reverse order of magnitude the 81 countries are:

Zimbabwe, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Afghanistan, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, the Gambia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Lesotho, Ghana, Haiti, Tajikistan, the Comoros, Cambodia, Laos, Benin, Kenya, Chad, the Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, India, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Ivory Coast, Zambia, the Yemen, Cameroon, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nigeria, Guyana, the Sudan, Bolivia, Moldova, Honduras, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Egypt, Vanuatu, Tonga, Paraguay, Morocco, Syria, Swaziland, Samoa, Guatemala, Georgia, the Congo, Iraq, Armenia, Jordan, Cape Verde, the Maldives, Fiji and Namibia.

It is equally curious to note which countries are not included among the bottom 5%. Any surprises?

A 21st century scramble for African land

A reader from the University of Toronto alerted me to the following article in Tuesday's Globe and Mail on the issue of land acquisition in Africa:

Wealthy foreign investors have acquired, or begun negotiating for, an estimated 15 to 20 million hectares of farmland in the developing world – equal to roughly half the size of Newfoundland and Labrador – since 2006. Most of this is in Africa, where the soil is fertile, costs are low and the owners are weak.

Critics are calling it a “global land grab” with neocolonial overtones. The African Union has warned that Africans could be exploited by the massive farmland deals because of their weak bargaining position. Overwhelmed by the rapidly developing trend, they are failing to get sufficient benefits in return, the AU says.

The buyers and leasers of African farmland are the rich and powerful (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) or the hugely populous and land-hungry (China and India). For all of them, Africa is the jackpot, a region where vast tracts of land are cheap and underutilized.

Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, is a prime target of those hungry for land. But there are plenty of other African targets, too. China is seeking 2 million hectares in Zambia to grow crops for biofuels. Saudi Arabian investors are spending $100-million to acquire land in Ethiopia, $45-million for land in Sudan, and millions more for 500,000 hectares in Tanzania. Libya has secured 100,000 hectares in Mali to grow rice. Qatar has obtained 40,000 hectares in Kenya.

The land deals are a sign of a shift in the world's priorities. Farmland is becoming as much of a strategic resource as oil fields.

The issue is admittedly one about which I am not too well educated, though now realize I ought to be: implicit in the notion of 'China in Africa' (i.e. the arrival of Chinese in Africa) is the question of how they are acquiring land! Obviously! While the article tends to focus on larger-scale investors, I'd venture to guess that the matter is even more pronounced on the micro scale, with entrepreneurs scrambling for spaces from which to run their shops, restaurants, etc. Chinese in Africa tend not to be particularly active in any farmland activities at present, so my guess is that much of their 'land grabs' center around urban areas. That said, I wouldn't be surprised if they began to diversify their interests in the not too distant future. This may well be worth looking into in greater detail.

Hu, the Chinese Santa Claus

Today concludes Hu Jinato's 'magical mystery tour' across Africa ('magical' for all the 'gifts' Hu left behind; 'mystery' because, well, much of Chinese foreign policy remains precisely that). Despite the economic downturn and decreased demand for African resources, Hu did his best to persuade African leaders that China cares. 

In a speech in Tanzania, to which China has now promised substantial aid, Hu stated that: 

During times of adversity, it is all the more important for China and Africa to support each other, work in concert and tide over the difficulties together [...] As for problems that may arise from our cooperation, we want to properly resolve them through consultations with our African friends on an equal footing so as to maintain the larger interests of our friendly cooperation

How "friendly" this cooperation actually is for Africans, bypassing the political hacks sitting in Chinese-built mansions (a general overstatement, of course, but it does well to drive the point home), remains uncertain. With increasing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs moving into cities across the continent, Chinese companies driving out indigenous firms - in both the formal and informal economic sectors - and dubious labor conditions maintained in cases where Africans are hired, protests continue to mount. In a bow to this reality, Hu repeated support for Chinese companies to "to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local communities."

He said as much after the riots at Chambishi mine in Zambia, as well as on several other occasions. Only minor improvements in labor conditions and 'friendly cooperation' have been reported. Umpteenth time's a charm?