On China's burgeoning relationship with Francophone Africa and oil-for-infrastructure contracts

The July issue of The China Monitor - a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch - is focused exclusively on the relationship between China and Francophone Africa. I find the focus most interesting, as it seems to suggest that the colonial history of African nations in some way affects the nature of China's engagement with them. Is China's engagement with Francophone Africa different, then, from its engagement with English Africa? Or Portuguese Africa? I admittedly hadn't given such a possibility much previous thought, but it is a hypothesis worth exploring.

Page 7 of this issue also features a piece by a colleague of mine, Dunia P. Zongwe, in which he interestingly writes on China's ore-for-infrastructure contracts, and the economic complementarities between China and Africa. The crux of Dunia's argument suggests that:

[...] the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China and resource-rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I [resource for infrastructure] form.

In their essence, R4I contracts mirror contrat d'echange (exchange contracts), which do not involve any direct transfer of money to host governments, thereby reducing the risk that governments will mishandle investments. According to Dunia, such contracts carry further positive distributive outcomes, as African countries are able to retain and spread more widely the benefits of FDI than under traditional investment contracts. Such positive externalities are visible in Angola, which was recently lauded for its effectiveness in managing Chinese investment.

The Angolan case indeed seems to suggest that R4I contracts may be a valuable tool by which to optimize China's FDI in Africa if managed accordingly. The case further does well to bring African governance back into the equation; ultimately it is up to African governments to devise appropriate investment policies which optimize Chinese FDI and assist in developing the state and economy. The Chinese are making their moves, and African leaders must make theirs.

Noteworthy...

Dear Readers: I will be on the road much of this week, so I'm afraid my blogging will be limited to... well, to be perfectly honest, I doubt I will be blogging at all! I'll be back next week with more news, analysis, and quips about this crazy field of international relations. Until then, today's Noteworthy reads:

Taking Africa beyond Aid. Yet another review of Moyo's book, Dead Aid, and a loud call for the development of African financial markets. As interesting as the piece itself are the comments, which inevitably turn to discussion of the Chinese presence on the continent

How can struggling countries break out of poverty if they're trapped in systems of bad rules? Paul Romer suggests "charter cities" as a possible solution

Something stinks. Must be Scotland's deal with Libya...

Osei Kofi on Africa's lagging contemporary art scene (and what to do about it)

Hugo Restall has an interesting piece in today's WSJ on the threesome that is Latin America (any country will do, really), the U.S. and China. While I tend to disagree with much of his analysis, it is an interesting argument nevertheless

For those among you who believed that China's alleged withdrawal from the deal with the Congo signaled China's retreat from the continent.... I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so: China was never intending to withdraw, it was merely revising its strategy

Have a great week everyone!

Where 21st century Asian socialism meets 21st century Latin American socialism

Don't blink, otherwise you might miss the litany of deals China has been making across Latin America! China has recently signed oil deals with Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela; and has contracts and cooperation deals with governments in Brazil, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay - effectively the entire Latin American continent.

In the early stages of Sino-Latin American cooperation, China seemed to be treading rather carefully, hesitant of both its foreign policy and place on the international global stage. The recent increase in overseas activity - from Africa to Latin America, and beyond - however, suggests that Chinese confidence is rapidly growing. The global financial crisis in particular has raised skepticism over America's hitherto seemingly unwavering preeminence, and has at the same time proffered China as a viable alternative. Indeed, an increasing number of countries are now saying "thanks, but no thanks" to U.S. cooperation and assistance, choosing instead to place their faith in the Chinese. Latin America is case in point.

The strategy the Chinese are employing across the continent appears identical to that which is being pursued in Africa, with oil-for-infrastructure contracts as the primary modus operandi. Like in Africa, too, Chinese investment is manifest on many economic levels - from high level government contracts all the way down to small-scale private entrepreneurs who sell vegetables and various knick-knacks on the side of the road. What's more interesting in the case of Latin America, however, is that the partnerships appear to be much more ideologically laden than those in Africa. This is especially true in Venezuela.

In a a great video from Al Jazeera English (HT: Double Handshake), Venezuelan economics professor Jesus Farias briefly touches on the issue of the Venezuelan socialist model and its seemingly logical intersection with its Chinese counterpart (this, around 2:34). He seems to be suggesting that cooperation between China and Venezuela is predicated not only on economic exchange, but has as its broader objective the restructuring of the global political landscape. I'm not wholly certain that this is necessarily the case - or that such is the objective of other Latin American countries engaged in relations with China - but it certainly is an interesting point worthy of further consideration. Viva la revolution...?

Feeling the African beat... in Beijing

Afrokoko Roots is a 15-piece international Afrobeat band, formed by Ghanian/Nigerian percussionist and vocalist Sunny Dada (what a great name!). The members of the band hail from Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, the USA, the Philippines and China, and together perform Afrobeat style music and reggae classics. The band is based out of Beijing (!) and is performing tomorrow - Wednesday, 12 August - at Yugong Yishan, should any of you find yourself in the area.

[HT: Danwei]

Decoupling? No, a new coupling

Over the weekend The NYTimes had a rather cliched though nevertheless worthwhile article on declining foreign investments in Africa. This, as a consequence of the global financial crisis:

When the credit crisis erupted in September, many experts thought that Africa would be spared the financial turmoil of the American and European financial systems, because African banks had almost none of their assets tied up in the global subprime market.

But it has recently become clear that Africa is being hit hard. The World Bank estimates that its economies will grow an average of 3 percent this year, compared with an annual average of 6 percent from 2004 to 2008.

“The crisis could not have come at a worse time,” said Jose Gijon, chief Africa economist at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris. “Before the meltdown, many African countries had made significant progress in attracting foreign investment and private capital, and this could derail those efforts.”

But one must not forget about the Chinese, who show no intention of curtailing their African investments. Quite the contrary, really:

China which has become a major investor and trading partner for Africa, continues to invest. The China-Africa Development Fund, which has invested nearly $400 million in projects in Africa, said it planned to raise an additional $2 billion by November. African groups are also continuing to pump money into projects ranging from telecommunications to new oil fields.

Indeed, many in Africa believe that it is China - and China alone - that will spur and sustain the continent's growth. In the words of Martyn Davies, the relationship between China and the African continent is not decoupling - as is the case now between many emerging economies and America, for instance - but rather a "New Coupling." Africa is still open for business, and the Chinese are the continent's main customers.

"Among the worst employers everywhere"

Via Global Dispatch's Erin Conway-Smith I'm reminded of a report I've been meaning to link to for some time, but have continuously forgotten to do so - apologies! In May, the African Labour Research Network released a great 400+ page report on the labour conditions maintained by Chinese-operated firms in Africa. The report - "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective" - focuses especially on the cases of Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among the nations where the Chinese presence is most pronounced, and with which trade is particularly high.

Unfortunately for the Chinese, the findings are not at all favorable towards them. Quite generally, the report finds:

Chinese employers tend to be amongst the lowest paying in Africa when compared with other companies in the same sector. In Zambia, for example, the Chinese copper mine paid its workers 30% less than other copper mines in the country. In general, Chinese companies do not grant African workers any meaningful benefits and in some instances ignore even those that are prescribed by law. Wages above the national average were only found at those Chinese companies with a strong trade union presence. Chinese staff members enjoy significantly higher wages and more benefits than their African counterparts.

Collective bargaining hardly takes place in Chinese companies. They resort to union bashing strategies to discourage their workers from joining a trade union. In many instances, Chinese businesses were supported by host governments who defended Chinese investments against the demands of labour. Trade unions see the practices of Chinese companies as a threat to the limited social protection that unions have achieved over the years through collective bargaining.

In Namibia, for instance, some workers are paid $0.55 an hour by a Chinese company that is building the new Works and Transport Ministry headquarters - about half the legal minimum wage of $1.10 per hour for entry-level construction workers. In many cases workers don't wear safety helmets, as they are often required to pay for their own safety equipment - an investment they can ill afford. At a construction company in Malawi, too, workers had to mix cement with their bare hands. Many labour for 12 hours a day, 7 days a week. The general work day in much of Africa is 8 hours.

Of course it's difficult to expect high standards of working conditions in Chinese firms in Africa when Chinese firms in China don't fare any better. As I noted nearly a year ago, it's quite difficult to expect Chinese employers to improve labour conditions for foreign nationals working in their firms, when they have yet to do so for their own compatriots. For African states, the solution lies in legally regulating working conditions. But as the South African case demonstrates, where in place even such edicts are being circumvented. Thus while Africa stands to benefit from increased Chinese investment as such, it similarly stands to lose if such conditions continue. Change must occur, the lingering question is how.

What's wrong with this picture?

Via Joshua Keating we learn that China's Economic Observer has put together the following map of overseas expansions by CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec - China's three major oil giants. Click here to access the interactive version, which provides (only some) added information:

Now I don't know about you, but I find this map to be highly inaccurate, and not just because the African countries have been mislabeled. The map grossly under-represents China's oil ventures in Africa; it's quite laughable, really! As Keating aptly observes, Sudan, where CNPC has extensive and very controversial holdings is absent. So is Niger, Gabon, Ethiopia (Sinopec is especially active in both); my goodness, where is Angola? Or Chad, for that matter? Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, and Algeria are all conspicuously absent as well. I really could go on. And while I'm not especially well-versed in China's energy holdings and exploration activities in Latin America, I'd venture to guess that the map greatly underestimates its ventures there, as well.

To be perfectly honest I feel as though I must be missing something; as though the map is intended to highlight specific cases of China's overseas oil activities, for instance, or perhaps is otherwise well outdated. Unfortunately, neither appears to be the case. There's no indication of any singling out of countries, and the sentence which begins "With China's recent $7.2 billion acquisition of oil explorer Addax Petroleum...." indicates that this map is very recent (Sinopec bought Addax in June of this year). So why in the world would the Observer put together such a misguided map? Is the Chinese public so unaware of its country's overseas activities, or do they think we are?

Don't cry for me Latin America. Yet.

While this blog is mostly devoted to issues surrounding the Sino-African partnership, one must not forget that China is similarly active in other regions of the world, most recently Latin America. China's strategies in Latin America seem to differ little from those employed in Africa, with 'oil-for-infrastructure' deals, tech investments, extensive bilateral trade agreements, and the influx of cheap Chinese goods as the wooing tactics of choice. Trade between China and Latin America soared from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008.

As is true of Africa, Beijing's main interest in Latin America is the guaranteeing of access to the region's raw materials - oil, soybeans, copper, iron ore, etc. - to fuel its continued rapid growth. Yet as is also true in Africa, China's ambitions are also grandly geopolitical. According to Tyler Bridges:

China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio, and other tourism hot spots.

Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city, and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.

She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China.

"Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil," Yuan said with a big smile.

Chinese will be the language of more than just Brazil if Beijing's leaders have anything to do with it. As Bridges aptly observes, China is buying zinc from Peru, copper from Chile, and iron ore from Brazil. It's shipping equipment to Brazil, buses to Cuba, clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru. Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE are likewise grabbing business from established telecom suppliers across the continent, most prominently in Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Yet while China seemingly has a Latin America strategy (or perhaps a 'developing world' strategy more generally; it's hard to tell), Latin America doesn't appear to have a China strategy.

Writing in his excellent blog, Tom Pellman cites David Shambaugh who notes:

Latin America is acting toward China's expansion in the world in a reactive, disorganized or ad hoc fashion. When I asked Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) about its strategy on China, I got blank stares. There is no strategy.

Such a lack of strategy indubitably works to the detriment of Latin American states - as it does African nations which similarly lack much in the way of a policy of engagement with the eager Chinese - who stand to gain from Chinese investment. In Latin America, as much as in Africa, there are many benefits to be accrued from recent Chinese interest. Yet without a plan of action, it seems that China will walk away as the sole beneficiary when all is said and done.

Lending a new meaning to the term "south-south cooperation"

David Axe of the War is Boring blog has a column in Wednesday's World Politics Review in which he suggests that Kenya might be funneling arms to South Sudan. Excellent. Well done, Kenya (of course I say this with complete and utter sarcasm).

According to Axe, the Ukrainian-owned vessel, Fania, which was captured by Somali pirates and returned to the port in Mombassa in February, was bound for the breakaway region in southern Sudan. The ship carried 33 Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tanks, plus other arms and ammunition - all of somewhat dodgy origin and ownership:

The Faina shipment apparently represented the third and final installment of a large batch of heavy weaponry for South Sudan, sourced from Ukraine and brokered by Nairobi. In November, the German magazine Der Spiegel claimed it had records proving an earlier shipment of 42 tanks that had largely escaped international scrutiny [...]

If this is indeed discovered to be true, it "would finger the Kenyan government in a sanctions-skirting arms race that some worry could result in another bloody civil warfare in Sudan." Kenyan military support for South Sudan would also put Nairobi at great odds with the U.S., which is one of the country's closest allies.

The Stop Arms to Sudan program of Human Rights First has a database of various countries' arms sales to Sudan between 2004-2006 (if anyone happens upon an updated version, do please let me know!). Not surprisingly, China is the foremost supplier of arms, but if you scroll down a ways you see that Kenya has done its fair share as well. The database is a conservative estimate at best as the data collected is that which the countries have divulged voluntarily (*chuckle chuckle*). The database also fails to specify where in Sudan the arms are being shipped, though it really isn't too difficult to guess.

Perhaps it is somewhat foolish to single out Kenya in such a way, as it is highly plausible that other African states are engaged in similar antics, though perhaps do a better job of remaining under the radar. At the same time, the outing of the Kenya-South Sudan relationship may perhaps do well to serve as a warning to other African countries embroiled in similar engagements. A comment by an Economist reader puts the matter in plain terms: "Kenyan Govt is fishing in a muddy waters. Beware what you do in the neighborhood."

Debunking the 'China retreat' theory

Recent speculation over China's alleged disengagement from Africa (see earlier posts here and here, for instance) could not be further from the truth. While pundits continue to tout China's withdrawal from the continent in light of growing (global) economic troubles, the data seemingly suggests quite a different reality.

A report released yesterday by South Africa's Standard Bank (download pdf here) lends much credence to this claim. Among the report's key findings:

• Premature conclusions regarding China’s perceived reduction of interest in Africa due to a realignment of its global priorities in light of cyclical economic uncertainties should be guarded against.
• In stark contrast to Africa’s traditional partners, China’s diplomatic engagements of Africa have been escalated in H01 2009 in anticipation of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation Summit (FOCAC) in Egypt in November. Following this, bilateral assistance from China to Africa has remained steady in 2009.
• The large infrastructure-based component of China’s ambitious stimulus plan has bolstered demand for African commodities in 2009, averting potentially greater declines in Sino-Africa trade volumes. Meanwhile, African demand for low-cost consumer goods from China has remained relatively resilient. '

With respect to the DRC deal which initially lead some to raise red flags over China's withdrawal, the report notes the following:

Chinese firms are also taking the opportunity to re-price several of their commodity-based investments in Africa in order to ensure that valuations reflect current realities rather than those in place during the height of the commodities boom in 2007, when many of the investments were initiated. This prudent recalculation has been perceived in the DRC and Gabon as a cooling off of interest from relevant Chinese investors, where in truth it is a calculated strategy by Beijing to leverage its competitive advantage in still being able to engage commercially to negotiate more favourable terms.

I hate to say 'I told you so,' but I told you so. Rather than retreating, China is merely shifting its strategy in the continent in response to ever-changing economic realities. If nothing else, the Chinese are exceptionally quick on their feet. With that said:

Any discussion on the sustainability of bilateral ties is deficient without a realisation that a withdrawal of China from Africa presents only one side of a complex picture. It is not in Africa's interests, particularly in today's liquidity starved international environment, to see China withdraw from Africa. Neither [...] is it in China's interests to do so.

Kenya's jua kali and Chinese businesses - and a shameless plug

Yours truly has a paper published in the July 2009 issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies on the nature of Chinese business networks in Kenya. The paper can be found here (subscription required).

More on contemporary land grabs: the case of the DRC

A brief follow-up on my previous post, if I may.

While it is true that the vast majority of farmland investments in Africa are those of foreign entities, this is not always the case as an interesting piece in the WSJ makes clear:

[South African farmers] are scrambling to get on board an ambitious venture to reclaim farmland in Congo's interior and help relieve that country of a reliance on food imports. Already some 70 farmers have booked a Congo tour and more than 3,000 have expressed interest, said Agri-SA, the South African farming group organizing the venture.

... According to a draft memorandum of understanding, Congo is willing to sign long-term leases and provide tax breaks and waivers on duties of imported supplies for approved projects. The South Africans in turn would build infrastructure, employ locals and instruct them in modern farming techniques. People familiar with the matter say the initial focus will be on restarting state-owned farms abandoned in 1992.

... South African commercial farmers, mostly the descendants of Dutch and French pioneers who began settling the continent's southern tip centuries ago, are renowned for their ability to coax food out of African soil. Eager for their expertise and capital, African countries from Ghana to Nigeria have offered them incentives to set up shop. South African farmers have turned Mozambique into a banana powerhouse. Zambia became self-sufficient in maize after welcoming farmers from Zimbabwe and from South Africa.

As with foreign (i.e. non African) land investments/grabs, such programs are equally controversial, as they raise the very same issues of land tenure, colonialism, and eviction as do those by China, the United States, Saudi Arabia or any other countries. According to the contract governing the investment, South African farmers will enjoy a five-year holiday on corporate tax and the dismantling of taxes on the import of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and machines. The farmers will be allowed to take all their profits out of the country and are under no obligation to sell their output on the domestic market. Oh dear.

[HT: The Meaningfulness of Little Things]

Lula in Beijing to "defend a new economic order"

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva arrived in Beijing today where it is expected that he and President Hu will strengthen bilateral relations between their two countries, promote oil contracts, strike deals on the sale of Embraer aircraft, and negotiate meat exports and biofuel for cars, among other top agenda items.

Already in March, China surpassed the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trade partner, and the trip seems to signal even further shifts in the global economic arena: namely, the U.S. out, China in. Or, perhaps more realistically - the U.S. down, but not (yet?) out; China up, and rising: 

"I think the trip that I am about to embark on... is one of the most important I am going on to defend a new economic order and a new commercial policy in the world," Lula told reporters before leaving Brazil.

Roberto Jaguaribe, a Brazilian foreign ministry official, said last week the trip represented a "reorganisation of the international scene" in which the top emerging economies were playing a bigger role in world affairs.

Among the more curious agenda items to be discussed between Lula and Hu is Lula's proposal that the countries conduct bilateral trade through each nation's currency, removing the U.S. dollar as an intermediary. Silva has been urging the end of the use of the American dollar in South American trade for some time now, suggesting such a move would reduce transaction costs for both exporters and importers, especially those operating on a smaller scale. Brazil and Argentina have agreed to trade with each other using their own currencies, and China and Argentina have likewise agreed to establish a 70 billion yuan ($10.24 billion) currency swap system that will enable trade between the two nations to be settled in Chinese currency. Might we be witnessing the gradual usurping of the U.S. dollar as the world's currency reserve by the Chinese yuan?

Such a reality may still be some way off, but the Chinese are slowly laying the ground for the yuan's ascendance, one bilateral negotiation at a time.

China continues to extend its reach into Latin America, world, etc.

Before the much hyped up and protested G20 summit, occurred a more low-key gathering held among members of the Inter-American Development Bank, which ended this Tuesday. To the surprise of no one, the Chinese, and especially Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of China's central bank, seemingly ran the show. How is this possible, you may ask? China became an official member of the Inter-American Development Bank in January 2009, and has been making its presence known ever since.

At this most recent IDB meeting, China agreed to a $10.24 billion currency swap with Argentina, a country whose bonds could be worth next to nothing by 2010. While China has done similar swaps with other countries, this is its first such deal with a Latin American state. So why now? And why with Argentina? 

Writing in FP Passport, Andrew Polk posits two reasons - the first, straightforward, the second "disturbing":

First, as Xinhua reports, the Argentines can essentially use the RMB as extra cash to pay for imports. But one might note that, since the Yuan is not a convertible currency, the money can only be used to purchase goods from -- you guessed it -- China, potentially giving a boost the Dragon's ailing export sector.

The other reason for the swap seems more strategic, especially in conjunction with other currency trades that China has very quietly signed with Malaysia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Belarus, and Indonesia over the past three months. As the Financial Times puts it: 

Economists...see Beijing's currency swap deals as pieces in a jigsaw designed to promote wider international use of the renminbi, starting with making it more acceptable for trade and aiming at establishing it as a reserve currency in Asia, something that would also enhance China's political clout."

To this Tom Pellman, writing in his brilliant blog Double Handshake: China and Latin America (which I highly recommend! Tom has some great insights into the growing Sino-Latin American relationship) adds:

Argentina’s central bank president, Martin Redrado, was quick to point out that the deal is a contingency plan; the country doesn’t need it at the moment. And, another asterisk behind the deal:

“The fact that China represents such a small share of Argentina’s total trade (less than 12 percent) suggests limited impact on FX, but is an important political gimmick at this time (convertibility will remain an issue),” RBS wrote in a research note issued on Tuesday.

Gimmick or no, Zhou proved that even in an international setting like the IDB summit, China will look for ways to extend its reach (and currency priorities).

I couldn't have said it better myself. 

An overstated withdrawal

The New York Times ran a story last week touting the steady decline of Chinese investment across the African continent:

As global commodity prices have plummeted and several of China's African partners have stumbled deeper into chaos, China has backed away from some of its riskiest and most aggressive plans, looking for the same guarantees that Western companies have long sought for their investments: economic and political stability.

Though I've touched on this issue before, it appears that it is one worth returning to. While the economic crisis has, indeed, adversely affected Chinese exports and subsequently many key African sectors, this does not spell doom for the continent anymore than it signals a mass withdrawal of Chinese investments, as the NYTimes appears to suggest.

The most recent issue of Africa-Asia Confidential does an especially brilliant job of driving this point home:

Anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms could be trying to shift unwanted goods to new markets in Africa. That might mean more choice and lower prices for African consumers. 'We don't see so many African traders coming in as before but demand for Chinese corporations is extraordinary. We see so many Chinese merchants and small companies sending people to Africa, many for the first time,' said Lily Tang, China Manager for Kenya Airways, which flies from Guangzhou to the continent.

Indeed, while some Chinese companies might be fleeing, the general trend is seemingly one of firm restructuring. China is continuing to invest in natural resource sectors across the continent, with projects picking up now that the weather is improving. Small-scale entrepreneurs are likewise continuing to pursue independent ventures in states across the region, peddling cheap goods in African markets. Though we may be witnessing a slowdown in such trends, it is hardly the end of 'China in Africa,' as such.

An additional point worth mentioning, one initially observed by Africa Works, is that the NYTimes story is based solely on the country of Guinea:

a country that has little going for it economically or socially. In more robust countries such as Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, Chinese investment is part of a mix of foreign capital. With growing cities, many African countries represent a rare opportunity to take advantage of new consumer demand.

It will, of course, be curious to observe how things unfold as the economic crisis progresses, but for the time being there really is no need for dramatic tales of complete Chinese withdrawal. Really.

[Photo credit: NYTimes]

Smart power in U.S-China (and Africa) relations

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has released a report entitled 'Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States,' which argues against zero-sum analyses of China's activities on the global stage (that is, perceiving China as either healthy competition or a strategic threat) and for increased U.S-China cooperation in the developing world. After taking stock of China and America's global soft power initiatives, the report concludes that:

The United States can do more to collaborate with China in the developing world, particularly in the areas of energy, health, agriculture, and peacekeeping. If such collaboration were to take place, the United States and China would find themselves working toward a greater global public good.

Perhaps of particular interest to readers of this blog will be the chapter on 'China's Soft Power in Africa,' written by Jennifer Cooke. Though much of Cooke's analysis has now been relegated to mere common knowledge (e.g. the Chinese are foremost interested in access to resources; much of China's loan money is given in the form of concessional loans; the Chinese government emphasizes the 'win-win' nature of Sino-African partnerships, etc.), she does an interesting job of comparing Chinese engagements in the continent with current U.S. engagements.

Of particular note is her observation that while U.S. soft-power programs in Africa have increased, the U.S. still exerts considerable hard power across the continent which, coupled with the stigma often borne by Western humanitarian assistance, often hinders the advancement of effective energy, health, agriculture and other development programs. For this reason (as well as several others which I won't go into - read the report!), Cooke concludes that there are areas in which the U.S. should emulate China's approach to Africa, and likewise sufficient common ground between the states so as to engender effective cooperation. Hers is an interesting and refreshing perspective few have yet been willing to offer. I'm not certain how likely such cooperation may be in the short-term, but it certainly is an objective to work towards going forward as it may, indeed, bring about the positive developments Africa needs. 

But enough of my rambling. Read the report and let me know what you think.

Turkey's African adventure

Back in the summer of 2008 I mused over Turkey's heightened interest in the African continent - Chinese style, if you will. It would appear that this interest has only bourgeoned in the face of the global economic crisis, with Africa quickly becoming somewhat of a playground for Turkish investors. From Global Post:

Historically, the Ottoman Empire had considerable relations with Africa — aided by the fact that African states such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Sudan were totally or partially subject to Ottoman rule. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, however, contact between Turkey and Africa all but broke off

Over the past decade and a half, Turkish policymakers have carefully shaped an African dimension to Turkey’s foreign policy that is increasingly involved in a dizzying range of sectors from trade to transport, health to humanitarian aid.

Turkey has made inroads into Africa’s transport sector with scheduled flights of flagship carrier Turkish Airlines to regional hubs of Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Lagos, Johannesburg and, most recently, Nairobi.

Ankara also plans to venture into Africa’s maritime sector, with investment in key facilities such as the Port of Mombasa.

Last month, Abdullah Gul visited Kenya and Tanzania — becoming the first Turkish president to pay an official visit to these sub-Saharan nations — to expand Turkey's relations with the two. During his trip Gul pointed out that all but two African countries had supported Turkey's candidacy in 2008 for a two-year, nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Hu, the Chinese Santa Claus

Today concludes Hu Jinato's 'magical mystery tour' across Africa ('magical' for all the 'gifts' Hu left behind; 'mystery' because, well, much of Chinese foreign policy remains precisely that). Despite the economic downturn and decreased demand for African resources, Hu did his best to persuade African leaders that China cares. 

In a speech in Tanzania, to which China has now promised substantial aid, Hu stated that: 

During times of adversity, it is all the more important for China and Africa to support each other, work in concert and tide over the difficulties together [...] As for problems that may arise from our cooperation, we want to properly resolve them through consultations with our African friends on an equal footing so as to maintain the larger interests of our friendly cooperation

How "friendly" this cooperation actually is for Africans, bypassing the political hacks sitting in Chinese-built mansions (a general overstatement, of course, but it does well to drive the point home), remains uncertain. With increasing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs moving into cities across the continent, Chinese companies driving out indigenous firms - in both the formal and informal economic sectors - and dubious labor conditions maintained in cases where Africans are hired, protests continue to mount. In a bow to this reality, Hu repeated support for Chinese companies to "to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local communities."

He said as much after the riots at Chambishi mine in Zambia, as well as on several other occasions. Only minor improvements in labor conditions and 'friendly cooperation' have been reported. Umpteenth time's a charm?

The beginning of the end of 'China in Africa'? Hardly.

I received an email from a friend yesterday directing me to this publication in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and enquiring as to whether the end of 'China in Africa' (the phenomenon, not the blog!) might be on the horizon. I've opted to respond publicly, as this is not the first time that the question has crossed my desk.

The short answer is: no. 

In the Jamestown piece, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills argue that the commodity price decline has adversely affected African export prices and growth, and subsequently African relations with China. They cite the withdrawal of Chinese entrepreneurs from Zambia and the Congo, and an overall Chinese strategic retreat from the continent, in turn suggesting that the market - and not grand strategy - is the main Chinese motivation in Africa. 

While this may be true to an extent, I fear that Herbst and Mills are overstating their claim. While some Chinese entrepreneurs have migrated out of Africa, Beijing continues to aggressively pursue its African relations, regarding the reality of a now waning West as the ideal opportunity to strengthen its influence across the continent. In the last month alone China has:

• Signed a $280 million deal with Mauritania to extend the port at Nouakchott 
• Agreed to build a hospital in Nairobi
• Offered $77 million to Uganda in a renewed bid to boost the East African country's development
• Installed government internet in Senegal
• Signed an aid and cooperation agreement to further ties with Rwanda
• Signed a 2.6 billion agreement to develop Liberia's iron ore mine, the biggest ever investment in the West African nation
• Signed another agreement (the Chinese do love their agreements!) with Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited to replace the nation's first communications satellite, which failed in orbit in November 2008
• Secured a $1 billion loan to Angola
• And built a national radio and television broadcast building in Congo

What's more, the floundering China-Congo deal Herbst and Mills cite is faltering not because of declining growth and commodity prices, as they suggest, but rather because western donors are threatening to renege on their promises of relief on the country's historic debt of $11bn if the Congo accepts Chinese financing on commercial terms. According to Barney Jopson in today's FT:

The focus of concern, according to western diplomats in Kinshasa, is that the deal would give the Chinese consortium unprecedented state financial guarantees, including some that earmark government revenues and make China a privileged creditor[...]

Trade between China and Africa is at an all time high. Hu Jintao is touring the continent this week, stressing the importance of Sino-African ties and shoring up African good sentiment. Deals continue to be signed. And this is meant to be the end? No, I'm afraid this is only the beginning.

More on Chocolate City (Africans in China, that is...)

Earlier this week I posted on Evan Osnos' New Yorker piece documenting the mushrooming African population in parts of China ("African" used loosely here, of course. A large percentage of the population informing Osnos' piece is actually Nigerian). Following suit, the most recent issue of the China Monitor, a publication of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, is dedicated to precisely this subject matter. How delightful when things work in tandem like so!