Noteworthy...

US State Department's Africa Bureau receives less than rave reviews in a recent report from State's Office of the Inspector General


Today marks the 50th anniversary of the release of Miles Davis' Kind of Blue - the best selling jazz album of all time. Fred Kaplan examines the genius behind music (and see here for a great Legacy Recordings video tribute to the album - and Davis)


A recent International Crisis Group report briefing warns of increasing insecurity and political tension in Somalia's Puntland - a semi-autonomous region in north-eastern Somalia once touted as a success of the 'building blocks' approach to reestablishing national stability, and viewed as one of the most prosperous parts of the country


Is China revamping its climate change policy? The FT seems to think so...

Someone once told me






After somewhat of a cynical and discouraging week (I really do find the lack of a discernible US policy towards Africa most upsetting), I am determined to end on an uplifting note. Ever the optimist, I suppose! I happened to stumble upon the Someone Once Told Me project completely by chance, and find it to be most charming. Photographer Mario Cacciottolo has taken over 700+ photographs of people holding hand-made signs quoting something someone once told them. The image on the left is among my favorites.


What would your sign say? A parting thought for the weekend....

2009 Failed States Index (and a map!)

Foreign Policy has again joined forces with the Fund for Peace to compile the 2009 Failed States Index and a wonderful accompanying interactive map of state fragility.


The Index, which ranks 177 states in order from most to least risk of failure, is premised upon 12 social, political, economic and military indicators of state cohesion and performance, and an alleged 30,000 publicly available sources. The 12 indicators are: (1) demographic pressures; (2) refugees/IDPs; (3) group grievance; (4) human flight; (5) uneven development; (6) economic decline; (7) delegitimation of the state; (8) public services; (9) human rights; (10) security apparatus; (11) factionalized elites; (12) and external intervention. The data used are collected from May-December of the preceding year (in this case 2008). More information pertaining to the methodology employed may be found here.


According to the 2009 Index, the ten most fragile states are: (1) Somalia; (2) Zimbabwe; (3) Sudan; (4) Chad; (5) the Congo; (6) Iraq; (7) Afghanistan; (8) Central African Republic; (9) Guinea; (10) and Pakistan. This marks only slight shifts from 2008. No longer included in the top ten is Cote d'Ivoire, which has moved from #8 to #.. well, it appears to be absent from the 2009 ranking! Curious. Guinea, which in 2008 was #11 has now moved up to #9. Beyond this unfortunate bunch, other discernible jumps are those of Kenya (#26 to #14), Georgia (#57 to #33), Iran (#49 to #38), and China's appearance in the top sixty, at #57. Naturally, Norway, followed by Finland and Sweden remain the most stable.

Whither America's Africa policy? No, seriously. Where is it?

I really can do no better today than to direct you to Shashank's well thought out post in which he concludes:

After seven months, a presidential visit and now this major trip, it's still unclear what the Obama administration wants to do differently in Africa. The most important U.S. agency that works on Africa, USAID, still has no leader. Clinton's trip was full of the same hopeful but canned rhetoric about "good governance," "food security" and "helping Africans help themselves." Folks who care about Africa hardly expect the continent to be the Obama administration's No. 1 foreign policy priority. But they will be disappointed with this trip.

Not only is it disappointing, but it's actually quite laughable - and not in a joyous laughter sort of way. I really don't understand how anyone is meant to take US policy towards Africa (the presently non-existent policy, mind you) seriously when the country's own Secretary of State makes such ridiculous statements as her proposal for camcorders in the Congo, and her lending of support to Somalia's Sheik Sharif - evidently unaware of the consequences - among others. Her utterly distasteful outburst in the Congo doesn't do much to bolster her, or American, credibility either (surely there was a classier, more professional way of handling the matter, even if it upset you, Madame Secretary), and neither does her outlandish comparison of the 2000 Florida recount to Nigeria's rigged elections. I am terribly sorry to discover that she is still seemingly bitter over the matter, but drawing such faulty moral equivalences jeopardizes the advance of democracy in countries like Nigeria and others across Africa where corruption is rampant. To draw my own comparison, the ridiculousness implicit in such a statement is tantamount to that which would compare women's rights in, say, Sierra Leone - the worst place in Africa to be a woman according to the 2008 UN Human Development Report - to those in the United States. Think on that.


While Secretary Clinton may be dancing away across the continent, the U.S. missed a prime opportunity to seriously engage with African leaders on matters of trade, foreign assistance, human rights - heck, even the objectives behind AFRICOM - and other matters of actual consequence to the continent. It's little wonder that African leaders are more seriously engaging with the Chinese as regards their countries' needs and policies. I probably would, too.

Why has China grown faster than India? And what (if anything) does this mean for Africa?

Chris Blattman and Bill Easterly address the issue. See here, here and here for a great discussion.


While I find myself nodding in agreement with much of what both experts have to say, I hesitate slightly when discussion turns to a near-comparison between growth in China and Africa. While neither scholar seems to be suggesting that China's path to growth can inform a similar phenomenon in Africa - or otherwise delving into very nuanced discussion of the similarities and differences between the process in both regions - I nevertheless feel inclined to caution against any such analogies. There are, of course, lessons which various African countries can learn from China - particularly as regards agricultural policies - but there are many constraints which hinder a direct, general analysis.


Martin Ravallion of the World Bank's Development Research Group has compiled a brilliant presentation highlighting precisely these constraints. Foremost among them:

  • Africa's higher levels of income inequality. At the time of China's economic reform, inequality was lower in China (a Gini index well under 30%) than found in all but a couple countries in sub-Saharan Africa today
  • The continent's high dependency rates
  • Africa's low population density, which impacts on matters such as technological innovation and the cost of supplying certain forms of basic infrastructure
  • Africa's weaker state institutions (Blattman's point about differing political climes, etc.)

Of course drawing any comparisons between China and Africa is also somewhat ridiculous, as we're dealing with one country and an entire continent. While this is quite an obvious point to make, you would be surprised at how many people conflate the two.


In short, there are many factors which preclude one from deducing too much about growth in Africa based on how it was played out in China. From my reading, both Easterly and Blattman appear on the brink of such an analysis, but quite wisely never take the plunge. It is precisely for this reason that theirs proves a truly worthwhile debate. Do read it.

Of rape, video cameras, and Clinton in the Congo. What did I miss?

I forthrightly admit that neither am I an expert in matters pertaining to the Congo, nor do I know much about preventing or otherwise dealing with cases of rape - in the Congo or elsewhere. Having said that, I'm quite certain that I'm not the only one absolutely baffled (floored is more like it, actually) by Hilary Clinton's announcement yesterday of a $17 million plan to combat the abysmal levels of sexual violence in the Congo, part of which entails "supplying rape victims with video cameras to document the violence." Really? Video cameras? To rape victims? Hmm.....


Texas in Africa and the ladies at Wronging Rights have virtually summed up my thoughts on the matter quite well, raising among other matters questions pertaining to who, exactly, will be receiving said camcorders; where the footage will be sent (do bear in mind that both the Congolese government and military hierarchy are quite generally unwilling to prosecute rape perpetrators); and indeed how the camcorders will be charged given that the country lacks a power grid on which to charge portable electronic devices (a most astute observation). Might I also add that it is most, most improbable that a rapist will cease his evil actions upon being confronted with a recording device. Again, while claiming absolutely no expertise on the matter, intuition leads me to believe that he might indeed become more violent in his actions.


Given all of these considerations and quandries, what on earth would lead someone to believe that video cameras are part and parcel of the solution to combatting rape in the Congo? Having brought my initial frustrations over the matter under control, I began to ponder the logic by which one could possibly arrive at such a conclusion. A cursory glance through my Google history is enough to frighten just about anyone, with phrases like "rape victim, video"; "rape, congo"; "rape, video, persecution" floating about - evidence of my feeble attempt at discovering existing cases (in the developing world) where video cameras effectively served as preventative measures or lead to the prosecution of the perpetrators; or otherwise research suggesting that the distribution of such devices may indeed be the way forward. Presumably Clinton's statement is premised on some research that someone must have conducted at some point in time, right?


Maybe I'm not a very diligent Googler (though this is highly doubtful; of the countless skills one acquires whilst writing a Master's dissertation and subsequently tackling a PhD, Googling ranks quite high among them), but the results of my several hours of searching are indeed just as laughable as the proposition in question. Among my findings/musings:

  • Video footage of rape acts has in some cases lead to the persecution and conviction of the perpetrators (see here, here, here and here, for instance), but in all such cases the acts were documented by either the perpetrators themselves or their cronies, or otherwise a passerby who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time - or indeed the right place at the right time, depending on your perspective. I wasn't able to find a single case in which a rape act was prevented or otherwise persecuted in which the victim was the one pressing the 'record' button. Perhaps Secretary Clinton has a CCTV-style system in mind, but then where would you install the cameras?
  • According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, a significant percentage of rapes in the Congo are committed by senior army officials, over whom the government and donors have little leverage. This ties into the earlier point regarding where footage would be sent and how it would be handled upon receipt. It moreover leads one to conclude that the focus should be on combatting the overall culture of corruption, rather than the supplying of video cameras. Alas.
  • Suggesting video cameras as a means by which rape victims can "document the violence" operates on the assumption that the victims will bring such videos forward as evidence (though we still haven't established to whom). The problem with this, though, is that rape victims in the Congo - and elsewhere in Africa - are often grossly stigmatized, and in some cases jailed. Given such a reality, documenting the act (especially by the victim) may prove quite counterproductive.
  • If the surrounding culture is one laden with corruption and embodying "entrenched notions of gender hierarchy and the sexual entitlement of men" (to quote Prof. Rachel Jewkes of the Medical Research Council speaking on South Africa's culture of sexual violence), video footage isn't going to assist victims in any significant way. Such measures will only be effective if the external environment is one in which such acts are outrightly condemned, of which the Congo isn't (yet) one.

I really could go on, but would nevertheless fail to understand how the camcorder proposition makes sense - or indeed discover any research suggesting its merits in the developing world. The effective use of camcorders for such means in the Western context is a moot point in my opinion, precisely because the surrounding culture is one in which acts of sexual violence are not only regarded with contempt, but are severely punished. While I'm sure Clinton's suggestion is well-intentioned and put forward with all the right motives, I cringe at such cases of "headless hearts" - arguably my favorite of Paul Collier's phrases - who fail to properly understand the realities of the countries they are somehow hoping to save. Inevitably, the law of unintended consequences always prevails. And while I certainly am no expert on the Congo, even I can make out the blatant flaws implicit in such a proposition. One would hope that the U.S. government could, too.


But then again, I'm no expert. Will someone please kindly inform me: what did I miss? ....


Update: For a different perspective on the issue of "Camcorders for the Congo," see Shshank Bengali's post. I'm not sure that it lends any credibility to the proposition, but it does well to suggest that this isn't the craziest U.S. initiative for Africa. I'm sure it ranks up there, though...

Noteworthy...

My goodness, where to begin? ....

Harvard (yes, that Harvard) is branching out beyond the world of academia to establish its own 'preppy' fashion line. I suppose it's quite safe to say that the university's economic woes must truly be taking a toll...


Adam Hothchild's "Rape of the Congo" from this edition of the NYRB. Quite apropos given Secretary Clinton's current visit there


Iran and China have just signed a $3 billion oil deal, wherein which China is to help develop Iran's refinery capacity in Abadan and the Gulf. Nearly one-fourth of Iran's petroleum exports already go to China


Buying mines in Africa and the question of China's soft power. Alternatively titled: Chinese adventures in the African resource market, as told by Sheishi (whoever she may be)


Slightly tardy (on my end), though nevertheless most worthwhile: via Aid Watch a review of Michaela Wrong's book, It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower

Feeling the African beat... in Beijing

Afrokoko Roots is a 15-piece international Afrobeat band, formed by Ghanian/Nigerian percussionist and vocalist Sunny Dada (what a great name!). The members of the band hail from Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, the USA, the Philippines and China, and together perform Afrobeat style music and reggae classics. The band is based out of Beijing (!) and is performing tomorrow - Wednesday, 12 August - at Yugong Yishan, should any of you find yourself in the area.



[HT: Danwei]

Over-exaggerated Asian scrambles and praise-worthy Angolan management on a Monday morning

Chatham House released a new report today which provides a comparative study of the impact of Asian oil companies on Nigeria and Angola - the two leading oil-producing companies in sub-Saharan Africa. While the report considers Indian, South Korean and Japanese national oil companies, the primary focus is on Chinese oil strategy. Specifically, the report considers why Chinese oil strategy has been - and remains - so successful; how it is that Angola emerged as the second largest supplier of oil to China in 2008; how Chinese companies negotiate deals; and how such deals benefit Angola and Nigeria, respectively.


Among the more interesting findings emanating from the report is that which suggests that Angola does not fit the stereotype of a weak African state being exploited by the resource-hungry Chinese. Indeed, the Angolan government has been quite successful in managing its relationships with China and its oil companies, as well as handling its own version of the oil-for infrastructure scheme. The case of Angola is contrasted with Nigeria, where the Obasanjo government largely failed to manage the scheme:

While Nigeria was playing politics with its Asian partners, Angola was driven by economic necessity to quickly access funds to finance its reconstruction [...]


[...] The scale of corruption, mismanagement and non-execution of projects in the Obasanjo years has sent shockwaves through Nigeria. [...] His intentions were good but officials failed to spell out the full implications of the scheme. And many used the scheme for private profit.

The report further suggests that Western fears about an Asian takeover in the Nigerian and Angolan oil sectors are highly exaggerated:

Except for Japan, [Asian oil companies] only acquired equity participation in both countries in the last five years. More important, the [western] oil majors remain the leading players in both countries. They dominate production and hold the majority of reserves.

While Western oil companies do, indeed, still own much of Africa's oil reserves, the Chinese scramble for African soil should not be downplayed. As the report itself notes, Angola is now the second largest supplier of oil to China, with Nigeria, the Congo, Kenya, and other oil-producing states not too far behind. In 2005, China imported nearly 701,000 bpd of oil from Africa - approximately 30% of its total oil imports. This figure has been rising in recent years, and is estimated to reach some 40-50% in the next decade.


The full report - Thirst for African Oil: National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola - may be found here.


On IR theory and the African challenge

Via Ryan C. Briggs I happened across a great site - Theory Talks - which serves as an interactive forum for discussion of debates in IR (international relations) with especial emphasis on the underlying theoretical issues. If you're like me, teasing out the appropriate theoretical framework for one's work is often the most challenging part of any research project, which is why I greatly appreciate what Theory Talks is trying to do. While the site certainly won't help to sort a framework for individual projects, it does present interesting perspectives and raise fascinating debates on issues surrounding the ever-evolving discipline that is IR.


Among the more curious "talks" I found (and there are quite a few!) is that by Kevin C. Dunn, visiting professor at Mbarara University in Uganda, who has written extensively on African politics with especial focus on the Congo. Dunn argues that images of countries (like the Congo, for instance) are often social constructions, which renders field work for the "white man" a very biased field, indeed:

The identity of the Congo, like other social identities, has been formed by being located within the narratives that we use to know, understand, and make sense of the social world. Narratives of national identities are formed by a gradual layering on and connecting of events and meanings, usually through three steps: the selection of events themselves, the linking of these events to each other in causal and associational ways (plotting), and interpreting what the events and plots signify. The example of the Congo is illuminating because it shows how these identity-constructing narratives are rarely the exclusive product of a state’s policy makers. External forces are constantly at play, seeking to select, plot and interpret the events and meanings by which identities are narrated.

The central thesis of Dunn's talk is that IR scholars are political actors as much as the phenomena they study. Being as such, it is inevitable that their research and findings are biased based on their constructed perceptions of their respective subject matters. Such bias, Dunn argues, is particularly pronounced in research focused on Africa, much of which is approached from a North American/Western European perspective where an idealized North American/Western European state is taken as the norm. Dunn's is an interesting discussion, and certainly one worth reading for any IR scholars with a focus on Africa.


For all African-centric theoretical debates see here.

In which my faith in the USPS is temporarily restored

I've been based in the US for the past few months and in a few short weeks will be returning to my beloved Oxford to continue with my PhD work. I'm thrilled to be heading back, though am ever so slightly intimidated by the amount of things I've managed to accumulate during my time here; things that I somehow need to transport back across the pond. Foremost among these are books.


It seems that everywhere I traveled over the past few months I stumbled upon wonderful used and collector bookshops: Raven Books in Cambridge, MA; the always-wonderful Strand in NYC; Bookman Bookwoman in Nashville; and of course my beloved Bookman's Alley in Evanston, where I passed many a day while an undergraduate at Northwestern. Not being one to resist the temptation of a good read, I've managed to acquire quite a large collection which must now find its way to England. The lingering question, is how?


Just yesterday I stumbled across a service hosted by USPS - M bags - through which one can mail printed material overseas for a reduced rate. You're charged $35 for 11 lbs., and $3 for every additional pound. It's not the most amazing of bargains, but it is generally quite cheaper than what one would otherwise pay. Fabulous! It's so wonderful to discover that the postal service is kind to bibliophiles such as myself! Has anyone used this service and is it indeed recommended? Is anyone aware of other cost-efficient ways of transporting books overseas? Thoughts, comments, insights would be well appreciated!


Oh yes, and do have an enjoyable weekend!

Africa does not need more hot air

I must admit that I've been rather disappointed with the present US administration's policies towards Africa. To be perfectly frank, I was much happier with America's African policies under Bush (*gasp* yes, I said it), with few exceptions (AFRICOM, which I have spoken about in the past) is indubitably one of them. What Bush tried to do - and was moderately successful in achieving - was positively engaging with the continent: increasing development assistance where needed, introducing programs to reduce the burden of AIDS and malaria, AGOA, working to secure a peace deal between north and south Sudan in 2005, etc. His policies weren't perfect - many were seriously flawed - but there appeared to be a genuine sense of engagement and interest. Whether that was driven by humanitarian goodwill or geopolitical interests I will leave for you to decide; the point is that the US appeared to be active in creating opportunity for Africans. In short, they not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.


Not only does the Obama administration appear disinterested, but it is seemingly failing to capitalize on opportunities where they exist. I bring this up because Hilary Clinton is presently in Africa. Like many others, I am following the news hoping to discover something - anything - of substance (indeed, something to blog about!), but am seemingly failing in this endeavor (if someone has managed to stumble upon anything worthwhile pertaining to Clinton's time in Africa, do please send it my way). Her rhetoric - much like President Obama's in Ghana earlier this year - is filled with the same empty jargon uttered by Western politicians of yore. Yes, Kenya needs to reform; and yes, we all know that the continent has "enormous potential for progress;" and we all understand the importance of stability in Somalia. Blah, blah, blah. By the by, overemphasizing agricultural policy to the neglect of manufacturing and entrepreneurship does little to foster sustainable development across the continent. And publicly making promises to Somalia's Sheik Sharif is tantamount to wishing death upon his administration. While I do understand that the trip was all quite last minute, there are some things on which a Secretary of State must absolutely be briefed.


While I do further realize that Africa isn't much of a priority for the US government at present (a grave flaw, indeed, given especially China's growing influence across the continent!) and is constrained by the financial crisis and domestic politics, there are things the administration can do besides simply blowing about hot air: increasing diplomacy with leading economies, improving foreign assistance and trade, and being actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, are foremost among them. Indeed, if the United States seeks genuine relations with African nations, it is in the interest of both parties to move beyond the one-dimensional quality that characterizes them today. One of my favorite bloggers, Texas in Africa, has an absolutely brilliant open letter to Secretary Clinton posted today in which she stresses precisely this point, and goes even further to suggest how the US might actively work to aid the continent. The post is focused primarily on the Congo, but several of the points are indeed quite applicable elsewhere around the continent. Its message even more so.


Where do I sign?


[image: the NYTimes]

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa maybe really isn't

Well, add Algeria to the list (the ever-growing list of countries where anti-Chinese sentiment is high: Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya....). Reports from Afrik.com suggest growing xenophobia against Chinese is now escalating in Algeria, where job seekers are blaming the country's growing unemployment rate on the increased number of emigrants living in the country and working for meager pay:

On Tuesday, a fight broke out between Algerians and Chinese, after a disagreement between an Algerian shopkeeper and a Chinese migrant worker in Algeria’s Bab Ezzouar district. According to reports, ten Chinese migrants were injured and two Chinese shops looted in the fight.

In July, an al-Qaeda-linked group threatened to target Chinese workers in north Africa, following June 26 Mass factory brawl between Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs in southern China, where hundreds were killed. In response to the report, the Chinese embassy in Algiers urged all 50,000 Chinese who live and work in Algeria to be more aware of safety precautions.

Unfortunately such outbursts are popping up all over the place. In Zambia, the 2006 presidential election effectively turned on the Chinese presence, with opposition candidate Michael Sata vowing to expel all Chinese workers if elected. While he ended up losing the presidential seat, he did win in Lusaka and the Copperbelt - the two regions where the Chinese presence is most pronounced. Similar (albeit not political) dissatisfaction erupted in Lesotho last year, when rioters began attacking Chinese businesses; in Namibia this year with increased worker casualties; in Kenya, as the unemployment rate soars... And the beat goes on.

I'm inclined to suggest that such outbursts are not anti-Chinese outbursts per se, but rather symptoms of a much greater problem. With increased poverty, unemployment, a general lack of functioning institutions, it should come as little surprise that Africans are angry with those who appear to be exacerbating these pre-existing realities. There are, of course, serious concerns surrounding Chinese hiring practices for which the Chinese alone are responsible; at the same time, it seems that the burden of rising unemployment rests as much with African governments as it does with Chinese workers. Many governments have yet to implement policies regulating Chinese (or foreign more generally) entrepreneurship, or ones which might genuinely stimulate domestic economic activity. The underlying problem of all this xenophobia may indeed not be the Chinese themselves, but rather poor institutional environments with little opportunity for economic mobility and governments which are seemingly doing little about it. Indeed, it seems that there is more than just one issue at play here.

Noteworthy...

I had it in my mind to write something substantial here today, as there is indeed very much to talk about. Unfortunately I'm a bit under the weather and fear that any attempts at coherent argument or analysis will fall flat - and fast! Ergo, today's noteworthy reads...


Fred Kaplan asks: What's Bill Clinton doing in Pyongyang?


Perhaps the answer has something (or everything) to do with news that Burma is secretly building nukes


A great project in northern Uganda - Women's Income Generating Support - headed by Chris Blattman and Jeannie Annan provides women with grants and business training


Might China agree to an oil embargo on Iran?


What to do about climate change induced migration in Ghana (and arguably elsewhere)

On the militarization of foreign assistance, and why it should remain the road less traveled

Further to last week's post on American military bases in Africa, Foreign Policy's William Moseley argues for a halt to the militarization of humanitarian aid across Africa. While Moseley is focused primarily on Mali, where he has been engaged in development work for some 20+ odd years, his line of reasoning may well be applied elsewhere in the continent:

In the West African country of Mali [...] there has been low-grade al Qaeda activity occurring in the northern frontier over the past few years. The marginal desert region between Mali and its neighbors is appealing real estate for would-be terrorists because it is difficult to control and monitor. It provides space for camps and opportunities for terrorist cells to tax cross-border trade and occasionally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. The U.S. government provides assistance to Mali's military to manage and contain the few, mostly foreign, al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country.

But now the U.S. military is getting involved in development work across Mali and in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa -- as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan -- despite the de minimis al Qaeda threat. Now, military personnel repair schools, wells, health centers, roads, and bridges. Army doctors provide basic treatment and vaccinations. In fiscal year 2008, the Defense Department gave the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Mali $9.5 million to run a counterterrorism program, with close coordination between the two. The program provides curriculum advice to Koranic schools and job training for young men (who are seen as highly susceptible to Islamist rhetoric). USAID has also built 14 community radio stations that broadcast programming on peace and tolerance.

But this reframing of aid to Mali within the fight against terrorism could prove counterproductive. The Pentagon has taken its conceptualization of the fight against al Qaeda in war zones and applied it broadly in a peaceful country. In the past, U.S. involvement in West African countries like Mali has focused intently on humanitarian assistance, not a geopolitical agenda.

Indeed, once you increase military involvement in development work to such an extent, such work comes to be viewed by locals as part of a broader military campaign. And while this is quite justified in conflict situations - as are Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance - it may indeed prove counterproductive in an altogether peaceful country, like Mali. While I have absolutely no problem with the U.S. military - or any other foreign military, for that matter - assisting the Malian army in managing the terrorist threat (even running a counterterrorism program if it feels so inclined and such a program is deemed to be of value), I do agree that military involvement in aspects of humanitarian aid in which other agencies are already active, and in many cases better suited, may elevate tensions rather than effectively assisting communities in their needs. This is not to suggest that all military-operated foreign assistance programs be dismantled, but rather that other existing alternatives exhausted before such a path is pursued. And with so many other alternatives, such a path should very rarely be embarked upon.

Decoupling? No, a new coupling

Over the weekend The NYTimes had a rather cliched though nevertheless worthwhile article on declining foreign investments in Africa. This, as a consequence of the global financial crisis:

When the credit crisis erupted in September, many experts thought that Africa would be spared the financial turmoil of the American and European financial systems, because African banks had almost none of their assets tied up in the global subprime market.

But it has recently become clear that Africa is being hit hard. The World Bank estimates that its economies will grow an average of 3 percent this year, compared with an annual average of 6 percent from 2004 to 2008.

“The crisis could not have come at a worse time,” said Jose Gijon, chief Africa economist at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris. “Before the meltdown, many African countries had made significant progress in attracting foreign investment and private capital, and this could derail those efforts.”

But one must not forget about the Chinese, who show no intention of curtailing their African investments. Quite the contrary, really:

China which has become a major investor and trading partner for Africa, continues to invest. The China-Africa Development Fund, which has invested nearly $400 million in projects in Africa, said it planned to raise an additional $2 billion by November. African groups are also continuing to pump money into projects ranging from telecommunications to new oil fields.

Indeed, many in Africa believe that it is China - and China alone - that will spur and sustain the continent's growth. In the words of Martyn Davies, the relationship between China and the African continent is not decoupling - as is the case now between many emerging economies and America, for instance - but rather a "New Coupling." Africa is still open for business, and the Chinese are the continent's main customers.

Literary must-not-reads

Who would have thought: a 'what not to read' booklist (quite short, mind you; and I'm not sure I entirely agree with the selections, but there it is, nevertheless)! Via The Second Pass readers are warned of the 'must-read' classics they really ought not to read. Sadly it's quite late for me, as I have endured the alleged boredom of at least half of these literary works, but perhaps you still have the chance to save yourself. And if you desire some suggested readings, do check out The Second Pass' shelf. What a delightfully curious little book blog !....


Happy weekend, everyone; and happy reading, too!

Uncle Sam's African footprint

This week's issue of The New Statesman has a curious map tracking America's 'military footprint' around the world (i.e. the global distribution of American military bases):


From the map it is quite clear that the majority of U.S. bases are found in parts of Europe and the Middle East. In Africa, bases are located in Algeria, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. Many of these countries were considered for the home of AFRICOM, the US-Africa military command established under Bush (Esquire, of all places, had a great piece on the Africa Command programme back in 2007. Certainly worth a read!)


Many African states have been - and remain - quite vocal over their displeasure with the presence of such bases, maintaining that they constitute a direct violation of their sovereignty. Equally so, other states appear quite enthused to garner the assistance of the United States military in dealing with various regional issues. While I do certainly have my opinions on the matter, none are yet fixed in stone. What are your thoughts on U.S. military presence in Africa?

Chinese agricultural techniques and African development: a hope for better things to come

China has been having a bit of a rough go here on China in Africa this week. First it's found to be de-industrializing other developing nations, then peddling fake drugs in Africa, its media outlets producing questionable maps, and today victimizing African labourers. Not at all a very rosy picture! There is good news, however: a report commissioned by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and prepared by my colleagues at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, finds that the very technologies employed in China's agricultural boom might be appropriate - and indeed highly beneficial - in the African context.


The report - "The Relevance of Chinese Agricultural Technologies for African Smallholder Farmers: Agricultural Technology Research in China" - finds that of particular benefit are water-saving technologies and soil-related techniques such as tilage and planting methods. Evidently, small-scale African farmers face similar challenges as do their Chinese counterparts, and there is much in the way of technology and knowledge exchange that might benefit the former. According to the report, Chinese experts are especially focused on seed and rice technologies, particularly in Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rapid advances in seed technology and new plant varieties have been a major factor in China's crop production increases, and it is believed that similar advancements may facilitate an agricultural boom across Africa.


In Mozambique, a 52 hectare agricultural demonstration centre is planned west of Maputo, at Boane. According to the report, crops will be planted this year to test whether the Mozambican climate is suited for various varieties of seeds, including maize, rice, vegetables and fruit. In Kampala, Uganda, Chinese contractors are building an aquaculture demonstration centre. The centre is envisaged to generate knowledge for fish farmers, fishers and researchers in the country.


The agricultural sector employs approximately 65% of Africa's population, and is the largest private sector on the continent. Poor agricultural planning, weak land tenure policies, and a low capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and markets have, however, generally hindered the sector from becoming a productive, profitable business. While the Chinese are incapable of ameliorating all these troubles, they may do well to provide the relevant technologies to farmers and place Africa's agricultural sector back on track to success. Fingers crossed.